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This report is the product of a six-month study 
initiated by Oxfam, and supported by the 
Department for International Development (DFID). 
The aim of the study was to explore the potential 
for frames theory to be used as a practical tool 
to re-engage the UK public in global poverty 
– an objective not pursued in concert by the 
development sector since Make Poverty History  
in 2005. 
In exploring the uses of frames theory, we have 
built on work by Tom Crompton at WWF-UK, who 
began the task of linking values to frames and 
thereby suggesting new ways forward for engaging 
the public in environmental issues and actions. 
An important finding from his Common Cause 
paper is that there is a common set of values that 
can motivate people to tackle a range of ‘bigger 
than self’ problems, including the environment 
and global poverty. The implication is that large 
coalitions can – and must – be built across third-
sector organisations to bring about a values 
change in society. This report responds to that call.
Background
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Methodology
The report is based on mixed methods: 
mainly secondary research (ie a literature 
review) with some important deliberative 
elements brought in. Early in the study 
we convened a group of senior NGO staff 
to talk about the common practices and 
working assumptions in the development 
sector. This staged conversation became  
a key input into our research method.  
It was observed by Joe Brewer, a cognitive 
policy expert, who identified some of the 
frames present in the conversation. This 
has provided the kernel of our analysis  
of current, and possible future, frames  
for the sector. 
This study is envisaged as the first stage 
in a much longer, and more collaborative, 
programme of work. We would like to see 
further debate and deliberation around 
the frames we have begun to identify, 
followed by research to validate and refine 
these frames. There should also be further 
opportunities for the sector to develop 
frames-based approaches to public 
engagement, in close co-operation  
with one another.
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The basic argument of this paper is that there is a problem in terms of the UK 
public’s levels of engagement with global poverty. Simply put, people in the 
UK understand and relate to global poverty no differently now than they did in 
the 1980s. This is the case despite massive campaigns such as the Jubilee 
2000 debt initiative and Make Poverty History; the widespread adoption and 
mainstreaming of digital communication techniques and social networks; 
steady growth in NGO fundraising revenues; the entire Millennium Development 
Goal story; and the establishment of a Westminster consensus on core 
elements of development policy. 
By many measures we have made amazing strides forward in recent years, 
but the public have largely been left behind. The result is that we operate 
within social and, by extension, political conditions that are precarious in the 
immediate term and incommensurate to the challenges of poverty and climate 
change in the medium and long term.
This study looks at what can be learned from values (the guiding principles 
that individuals use to judge situations and determine their courses of action) 
and frames (the chunks of factual and procedural knowledge in the mind with 
which we understand situations, ideas and discourses in everyday life). Values 
and frames offer ways to look at the problem of public engagement with global 
poverty and to identify possible solutions.
If we apply values and frames theory to the question of how to re-engage 
the public, we come up with some compelling insights into the impact of 
our existing practices and some striking solutions to the problems that these 
reveal. They may not be perfect solutions, and they bring with them significant 
challenges. But we believe they offer something valuable and timely: a fresh 
perspective. The persistent problem of public engagement suggests it is time 
for the development sector to transform its practices radically. Values and 
frames offer pathways to potential solutions that should be debated across the 
sector, and now.
Executive Summary
The problem 
• Public engagement matters because the 
UK public has a vital role to play in tackling 
global poverty. This role can be described 
as having three dimensions. First, the 
public provides a licence for NGOs and 
government to take immediate action 
on global poverty (in supporting public 
spending on development aid, for example). 
Second, individuals make a positive 
difference through the actions they take in 
their daily lives (eg giving money, buying 
ethical or fairtrade products, volunteering 
and lobbying). Third, public support opens 
up a space for debate in society, which in 
turn gives government the opportunity to 
make the systemic changes required to 
tackle the causes of global poverty.
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• The UK public is stuck in terms of how  
it engages with global poverty. Since 1997 
around 25% of the UK public have reported 
being ‘very concerned’ about global 
poverty. In 2005, as Make Poverty History 
built up, these levels reached 32%. But 
they have fallen ever since, and are now 
back at 24%. Meanwhile the segmentation 
model used by the Department for 
International Development (DFID) suggests 
that the proportion of the most engaged 
segment of the public has shrunk by a  
third since April 2008. It now stands at  
only 14%.
• The quality of public engagement 
is also low: “the public as a whole 
remain uninterested and ill-informed”. 
Even engaged people can’t sustain a 
conversation about debt, trade or aid  
for long. 
• The causes of poverty are seen as 
internal to poor countries: famine, war, 
natural disasters, bad governance, over-
population and so on. The dominant 
paradigm has been labelled the Live Aid 
Legacy, characterised by the relationship 
of ‘Powerful Giver’ and ‘Grateful Receiver’. 
Public perceptions have been stuck in this 
frame for 25 years. As one respondent said 
in recent research: “What’s happened since 
Live Aid? I was at school then. Now I’m 36 
and nothing has really changed.”
• The practices of the development sector 
are strongly implicated in the state of 
public engagement. Data on voluntary 
income suggest that increasing incomes 
have been gained by changing the nature 
of engagement: by turning members 
into supporters, and setting them at 
arm’s length. In the social movement 
literature, today’s NGOs are described 
as ‘protest businesses’, and their model 
of public engagement is called ‘cheap 
participation’ (characterised by low barriers 
to entry, engagement and exit – all of 
which generate high churn). The sector’s 
engagement models have achieved big 
numbers and ever-increasing incomes,  
but with what impact on the quality of 
public engagement?
• Make Poverty History exemplifies 
these themes. On the one hand, it was a 
spectacular success: a mass mobilisation 
with near universal awareness. On the 
other hand, it changed nothing for the UK 
public. The transformative potential offered 
by the rallying cry of ‘justice not charity’ 
went unheard, in part because it was 
unfamiliar and hard to comprehend, and 
also because it was drowned out by the 
noise of celebrities, white wristbands and 
pop concerts. 
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• Our reading of the Make Poverty History 
campaign suggests that the prevailing 
‘transaction frame’ (in which support for 
tackling poverty is understood simply as 
making donations to charities) proved 
too strong. Meanwhile all the things that 
made the campaign ‘mass’ reinforced 
the consumerist values that make the 
transaction frame so dominant. In the end, 
Live8 reminded everyone of 1985; in the 
public mind, Make Poverty History became 
the slogan for Live8, and the Live Aid 
Legacy was (inadvertently) reinforced.
• The Make Poverty History case study 
demonstrates that frames and values can 
be powerful theoretical lenses through 
which to see problems. The rest of this 
paper explores these theories further. It  
also investigates where some of the 
solutions might lie, if a values and frames 
approach is adopted.
Towards solutions
• Values are powerful guiding principles that 
are foundational to humans’ motivational 
systems. Empirical research shows that 
they correlate strongly with patterns of 
behaviour. People who have stronger 
‘self-transcendent’ values tend to engage 
in more pro-social behaviours, and sustain 
that engagement over time. This suggests 
that if the development sector wants to 
widen or extend public engagement, we 
should appeal primarily or even exclusively 
to people’s self-transcendent motivations. 
If we appeal to their self-interest, they will 
only become more self-interested, and less 
likely to support pro-social campaigns in 
the longer term.
• A large body of cross-cultural research 
indicates that there are relatively few human 
values, and that these can be clustered 
into ten types. They are all inter-related, 
such that changes in one affect others. 
Values types can be plotted in a circle of 
compatible and conflicting values known 
as a circumplex. If you reinforce values 
on one side of this circumplex, you will 
suppress values on the other side. The 
values the NGO sector is interested in when 
it campaigns on ‘bigger than self’ problems 
(such as global poverty and environment 
issues) are primarily of the type called 
Universalism. This includes the values of 
Equality and Social Justice, as well as 
Unity with Nature. The antagonistic values 
to these on the circumplex are known 
collectively as the Power and Achievement 
values, including Wealth and Status. 
• Frames offer one way of activating 
positive values. They have a rich academic 
heritage, having first come to prominence in 
the mid-1970s. Put simply, we understand 
things, mostly subconsciously, using 
frames. In language, for example, our 
‘frame’ for a word is not just its dictionary 
meaning but also all the other things we 
know, feel or have experienced in relation 
to it. When we hear a particular word 
or encounter a specific situation, the 
dictionary meaning and all those other bits 
of knowledge and experience are activated 
in our brains. This is the ‘frame’ for a word 
or scene – and hence it is thought that 
frames can activate values. 
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• Since 2000, frames have begun to be 
used as practical tools, particularly by 
cognitive linguists such as George Lakoff. 
Lakoff’s work on ‘cognitive policy’ in the 
US has applied frames theory to political 
problems. He split out the frames concept 
into ‘deep frames’ and ‘surface frames’, 
the distinction being that deep frames 
essentially represent whole worldviews. 
Deep frames connect to values systems 
and hence are more foundational and 
abstract than surface frames. Surface 
frames are closer to the ‘simple’ meanings 
of words – not just the dictionary definition, 
but the whole ‘chunk’ of related knowledge. 
This theory can teach us much about which 
frames we should use in our messages, 
but it can also help us to identify the deep 
frames around which we can organise our 
strategies and practices. 
• The literature on cognitive frames does 
not directly connect with the concerns 
of campaigners on global poverty. The 
evidence base for how frames work is weak 
when compared to the weight of empirical 
data that lies behind values theory. There is 
still much to be done to develop the main 
measurement methodology (discourse 
analysis) into a campaign evaluation tool. 
Because of these limitations we employed 
an exploratory methodology in this study. 
We held a ‘staged conversation’ with 
senior development NGO campaigns staff, 
and had it observed by a cognitive frames 
analyst from the US. Working together, we 
have identified some positive and negative 
deep frames which seem to be at work 
in the practices and discourses of UK 
development NGOs.
• The negative deep frames we identified 
include the ‘rational actor’ frame, the ‘elite 
governance’ frame and the ‘moral order’ 
frame. These frames are defined in the 
paper below, but it is worth summarising 
one of them as an example. The ‘moral 
order’ frame holds that nature is moral 
and that natural hierarchies of power are, 
by extension, also moral. Power then 
becomes bound up with a very particular 
conception of morality: man above nature, 
Christians above non-Christians, whites 
above non-whites. Such a frame underpins 
notions of mission, and what it is to be a 
charity. By making inferences based on 
deep frames like the ‘moral order’ frame, 
we can suggest that alternative positive 
frames could include the ‘embodied mind’ 
frame, the ‘participatory democracy’ frame, 
and an emerging frame that relates to ‘non-
hierarchical networks’. 
• Working from positive deep frames, we 
inferred some surface frames that could 
activate those deep frames in the context 
of global poverty. Applying frames theory, 
it is striking that some of the words that 
should be avoided are right at the heart 
of how the development sector describes 
itself – words such as ‘development’, ‘aid’ 
and ‘charity’. To take just the first of these, 
‘development’ is a problem because it 
activates the ‘moral order’ deep frame 
in which ‘undeveloped’ nations are like 
backward children who can only grow up 
(develop) by following the lessons given by 
‘adult’ nations higher up the moral order. A 
variety of different frames for development 
are proposed in academic literature, 
including most famously ‘development 
as freedom’ (Amartya Sen) and AK Giri’s 
challenging thesis of ‘development as 
responsibility’. A frames approach has the 
potential to transform everything about 
an organisation and its practices. Getting 
the surface framing right is part of this 
transformational change process.
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Implications
• The implications that we have drawn 
from our work so far will need to be refined 
and tested through further research. We 
should not assume that they will lead 
us to uncontested solutions; there are 
likely to be both theoretical and practical 
problems in adhering strictly to the values 
and frames prescriptions identified here. 
The development sector will need to come 
together if we are to find a way to break the 
current lock-in of public engagement. 
• Rebalancing the dominant values in 
society is a potentially formidable task. It 
is likely to require more than the will of a 
single NGO or even the entire development 
sector. But it is not an insurmountable 
challenge. We are not proposing the 
creation and introduction of an entirely new 
set of values. Instead frames and values 
theory suggests that transformational 
change can be achieved simply by 
reinforcing the positive values which people 
already hold: by changing the level of 
importance accorded to particular values 
relative to others.
• Some of those who are resistant to the 
proposed programme of change may 
object to these ideas on the grounds of 
mind manipulation. We should counter 
any such charges upfront, by stating that 
there is no such thing as values-neutral 
communications, campaigns or policy. 
Every message and activity activates and 
strengthens values. Those values and 
frames that are dominant in society are so, 
in some considerable part, because of the 
activation and strengthening undertaken 
by other actors, most obviously companies 
and marketers. The evidence strongly 
suggests that if the self-enhancing values 
of achievement, power and hedonism are 
activated and strengthened – as they are 
by consumer marketing – then the positive 
vales of universalism and benevolence 
are actively suppressed. In other words, 
the social and political scales are tipped 
significantly against the emergence of the 
systemic changes NGOs are interested in. 
Meanwhile, the deep frames we discuss 
are already out there in society, and at work 
in how we think. We are not advocating the 
forcible replacement of frames, but instead 
drawing attention to the frames which are 
dominant in our culture, and showing how 
we, as practitioners, have choices about 
the frames we activate through our words 
and deeds.
• Most importantly, this paper does not 
provide answers. It is in keeping with the 
frames we advocate that no organisation 
or group of organisations should set 
themselves up as the authority on which 
frames others should use. It is for the 
sector to find ways to negotiate the 
tensions we identify. Ultimately, we see 
change as a process of reflective practice, 
pursued through deliberation and debate. 
The public themselves should also be 
involved in the collective task of finding new 
frames for development. 
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• The implications outlined in this report 
should serve as a starting point for the 
debate. They include the following:
 We need to shift the balance of 
NGO public engagement activities 
away from ‘transactions’ and towards 
‘transformations’. This means placing less 
emphasis on ‘£5 buys...’ appeals and 
simple campaigning actions, and more 
emphasis on providing supporters with 
opportunities to engage increasingly deeply 
over time through a ‘supporter journey’. 
 In online campaigns and communications, 
similar principles apply. It is important to 
move to models where clictivism is a small 
and complementary tactic that supports  
in-depth engagement, and not the 
dominant model it is at the moment. 
In order to engage people with the 
complexities of global poverty, developing 
opportunities for more meaningful action 
over the longer term should be the focus.
 Models of communication should be 
based on genuine dialogue. There need 
to be opportunities for supporters and 
practitioners to deliberate together.
 There should be serious reflection 
about whether, when and how we use 
forms of words that have come to define 
and sometimes undermine the public 
perception of NGOs and their work – words 
such as ‘aid’, ‘charity’ and ‘development’. 
 Celebrities should be used with extreme 
care in campaigns, given the strong links 
between celebrity culture, consumer culture 
and the values of self-interest.
 Charity shops should also try to distance 
themselves from consumer culture. They 
should return to their roots by presenting 
themselves as places for giving more 
than buying, and emphasising their role in 
closing up loops of consumption. 
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 If, for short-term reasons, NGOs 
choose to trade on more self-interested 
motivations, for instance to earn revenue 
or engage new supporters, then they 
must do so. But all the time they should 
be mindful of the collateral damage these 
tactics will cause to the supporter base 
in the longer term. Such tactics should 
only be employed as part of a considered, 
longer-term strategy for building public 
engagement with development –  
a strategy founded on positive values.
 This agenda should also be pursued with 
others beyond the development sector – 
ideally including the Government, whose 
practices and policies are instrumental 
in determining the dominant values and 
frames in society. There is an opportunity 
in particular for DFID to play a key 
convening role that enables otherwise 
financially competitive NGOs to debate 
and plan together using values and frames 
perspectives. Tom Crompton’s Common 
Cause paper, and working group, has 
already set in motion a process for wider 
debate across the third sector that DFID 
could respond to. 
This paper is intended to spark and 
invigorate that debate. It provides a 
potential focal point around which to 
begin building informal networks and ‘safe 
spaces for dialogue’. It also highlights the 
grave consequences if we do not act. 
Recent qualitative research conducted for 
the Independent Broadcasting Trust (IBT) 
has found that young people aged 14 to 
20 are “relatively informed but broadly 
disengaged” on issues of global poverty, 
and have inherited a sense of ‘development 
fatigue’ from the media and their parents. 
We believe there is an urgent need for 
action if we are to break the cycle of 
disengagement that is already showing 
signs of engulfing the next generation.
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Full Commentary
1.The state of 
public engagement 
in global poverty
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This section...
• Presents an overview of the evidence 
on public perceptions of global poverty. 
Levels of public engagement are static 
or falling, and the public remains stuck 
in a negative frame for poverty that 
dates back 25 years to Live Aid.
• Contrasts the data on public 
engagement with those on public 
donations to development NGOs, which 
have been steadily increasing across the 
same period. The disjuncture between 
the two sets of data sparks some 
serious questions about how long the 
prevailing business model  
for development NGOs can continue,  
and what the implications are for the  
quality of public engagement.
• Illustrates these tensions in a short 
account of Make Poverty History, 
which sets the findings from the Public 
Perceptions of Poverty research  
alongside other existing analyses of  
Make Poverty History. 
• Finds that values and frames provide 
useful lenses through which to view  
the successes, shortcomings and long-
term impact of the Make Poverty  
History campaign.
Public engagement matters for international 
development. Several arguments can be 
made to support the case that the UK 
public can make an instrumental difference 
in how and when people in poor countries 
move out of poverty.
 The first and most longstanding 
argument is that the public provides the 
UK government with a mandate for public 
spending on overseas development aid 
(see eg McDonnell 2006). This argument 
has particular resonance during the current 
debate about whether the government 
can afford to ringfence the 0.7% of 
Gross National Income (GNI) committed 
to development aid spending, against a 
background of deep public sector cuts. 
At time of writing this debate seems 
critical, and finely balanced. According 
to the Institute of Development Studies’ 
new public opinion tracker only 33% of 
the public supported the ringfencing of 
development aid spending in August  
2010, while 57% opposed it (Henson & 
Lindstrom 2010).
 Second, the UK public can have an 
impact on international development 
directly through their actions. Donating to 
development NGOs is the most obvious 
means of intervening, but other forms of 
giving are also significant. Oxfam talks 
about public giving in terms of money, but 
also in terms of time, voice and product 
(Oxfam 2008). In the last category are 
included not only gifts of ‘product’ – ie 
giving unwanted items to charity shops – 
but also the purchase of ethical products, 
most notably fairtrade.
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 Third, there is an impact associated  
with the public’s actions and conversations 
in the public sphere (including those in  
the media, responding to public concerns). 
These interventions open up space for  
the kind of political, socio-economic 
and pro-environmental change that is 
necessary to tackle global poverty. The 
public’s role here is more than pressuring 
the government to accede to campaigning 
demands; it is about opening up the 
political and wider societal space to the 
possibility of deeper change. It is only with 
deeper change that we can build new 
institutions and societal norms, which 
in turn will enable different models of 
development, and more effective results.
The whole spectrum of public engagement 
in global poverty matters. Aid alone cannot 
bring global poverty to an end. Securing 
0.7% of GNI for aid spending is one 
objective, but we would contend that the 
other ends to which public engagement  
is the means are at least as important.
1.1 The evidence on public perceptions
Even a quick look at the data on public 
perceptions of global poverty tells us there 
is a problem. This is evident from the  
most reliable single source of such data, 
the Public Attitudes Towards Development 
surveys conducted by the Department  
for International Development (DFID).  
This series of annual studies has asked  
a more or less consistent set of questions 
that goes back to 1999, providing the  
only longitudinal set of data on UK  
public attitudes to global poverty that is 
publicly available. 
Public Perceptions of Poverty research
DFID’s data is supplemented by ad 
hoc surveys and qualitative studies 
commissioned both by government and the 
third sector. One of these supplementary 
sources is the Public Perceptions of 
Poverty (PPP) research programme, 
which tracked public attitudes to global 
poverty between 2004 and 2007. The 
PPP programme involved six waves of 
quantitative research and four waves of 
qualitative interviews. It was funded by 
DFID, and managed by Andrew Darnton  
for Comic Relief.
The research evidence on public 
engagement with global poverty has  
been reviewed by Andrew Darnton for  
DFID on three occasions since 2004.  
The most recent review was at the end  
of 2009, soon after the publication of  
two significant documents from
Parliament and Government respectively. 
One of these was Aid Under Pressure, 
the product of an enquiry by the House 
of Commons International Development 
Committee (IDC). Some of its 
recommendations concerned how  
to re-engage the public, and how 
to measure their support. The other 
publication was an external review of  
the first ten years of DFID’s ‘Building 
Support for Development’ strategy. 
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Time for a step change
Andrew Darnton’s Rapid Review of late 
2009 argued that it was time for DFID to 
make a step change in its approach, to 
prioritise public engagement over public 
support for development aid, and to 
aim for no less than a “deep-cut values 
shift in society” (Darnton 2009:32). The 
current study on finding new frames for 
development picks up where the Rapid 
Review left off.
We should start by recapping the current 
state of public engagement with global 
poverty. The Rapid Review’s headline 
assessment was that: “In terms of 
engagement with global poverty, the public 
is on a downward trajectory” (ibid:3). No 
new evidence to contradict this finding has 
since come to light, and the latest wave of 
DFID’s Public Attitudes Survey (February 
2010) confirms a picture of steadily ebbing 
public support (TNS 2010). The trend of 
stagnation or gradual decline in levels of 
public engagement can be observed in a 
number of dimensions, as outlined below.
Low levels of concern
The ‘concern’ question has been asked 
using exactly the same wording since the 
start of the PPP project in 2004, and is 
taken as the headline measure of public 
engagement. Specifically, that headline 
measure has been set in relation to the 
proportion of the public who answer that 
they are ‘very concerned’ in response to 
the question ‘how concerned would you 
say you are about levels of poverty in  
poor countries?’. 
Over the past ten years, levels of the 
‘very concerned’ among the public have 
fluctuated, but the long-term average is 
around 25% (see eg Darnton 2007).  
There have been higher peaks, however,  
in response to communications activity  
and anti-poverty campaigns  
(see Figure 1 on p15). 
The Make Poverty History effect
Looking at the data going back to the first 
DFID Public Attitudes survey in 1999, for 
example, a ‘Make Poverty History effect’  
is apparent. Levels of those ‘very 
concerned’ peaked at 32% in the run-up 
to the G8 meeting at Gleneagles, in April 
2005. After that point Make Poverty History 
activity slowed, and levels of engagement 
dropped off. 
Writing about the six waves of PPP data 
from December 2004 to April 2007, 
Darnton concluded that “levels of public 
concern about global poverty appear to be 
static or actually falling” (ibid). With three 
years more having elapsed, this trend 
has only become clearer. The September 
2009 figure of 21% ‘very concerned’ 
respondents was the lowest level  
recorded since 2003. 
The latest DFID data, from February 2010 
(TNS 2010), show a slight improvement 
at 24%. But the trend since 2005 is still 
downward. This is what might be expected, 
with little new effort or strategy towards  
re-engaging the public having been 
adopted since Make Poverty History. 
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Figure 1 above shows all the available 
data on levels of those who are ‘very 
concerned’. The data are divided into two 
series, partly to show the point at which the 
question wording was changed from asking 
about ‘poverty in developing countries’ to 
asking about ‘poor countries’, and partly  
to show the Make Poverty History effect 
most clearly.
Q: ‘How concerned would you say you are 
about levels of poverty in poor countries?’
Sources: ONS 1999-2004; PPP 2007a; 
MORI 2008; COI 2009; TNS 2009a; TNS 
2009b; TNS 2010
The ‘concern’ question has been criticised 
by observers such as the House of 
Commons International Development 
Committee (HoC IDC 2009), on the 
grounds that it offers a poor measure 
of support for development aid. This is 
certainly a fair criticism, as the question 
is a better measure of engagement with 
poverty in the round than of support for 
development aid. 
As Dr David Hudson suggested when 
giving evidence to the IDC, different 
questions are needed to measure support 
for aid spending, and ideally questions 
that compare relative spending priorities. 
DFID has responded to that observation 
by including new questions of this kind 
in its annual tracker. Again the findings 
are not good, from the perspective of 
public support. Asked to rank six areas of 
government spending in terms of priority 
in 2010, respondents put ‘support to poor 
countries’ at the bottom of the list. It was 
ranked in first, second or third position by 
only 22% of respondents, compared to 
31% in September 2009 (TNS 2010).
Given that the concern question is read 
as a measure of all-round engagement, 
it can also be argued to be the best 
quantitative measure of the level of salience 
of global poverty. Qualitative evidence is 
unambiguous here, showing global poverty 
to be a low-salience issue for the UK 
public. As the final wave of PPP qualitative 
research concluded: “poverty is not an 
issue for most people” (PPP 2007b).
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Figure 1: Levels of ‘very concerned’  
reported by the UK public (%), 1999-2010
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The engaged core
However, ‘most people’ is not all people. 
It has been held as a truth by some of 
DFID’s longest-serving staff (and ex-staff) 
that there is a core of around a quarter of 
the public who are committed to the anti-
poverty agenda (Frances Burns, personal 
communication, c. 2002). As mentioned 
above, this pattern is borne out across  
the ten-year data series on levels of the 
‘very concerned’. 
When Make Poverty History and the 
events of 2005 raised levels of the ‘very 
concerned’ to 32% this was regarded 
by the researchers as a breakthrough. 
However, as discussed, levels of ‘very 
concerned’ have slipped since then,  
and there is a sense that they are  
currently slipping further. 
A newer, and more three-dimensional, 
indicator of all-round engagement is 
provided by DFID’s Citizen Segmentation 
model, launched in 2008. This divides  
the public into six segments based on  
29 survey items, which tap attitudes  
and beliefs relating to global poverty  
(MORI 2008). 
Figure 2: Profile of the segments in the DFID Citizen 
Segmentation model, 2008-10 (TNS 2010)
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Active Enthusiasts fall,  
Disapproving Rejectors rise
When the model was generated in 2008, 
the most engaged segment – Active 
Enthusiasts – made up 21% of the UK 
public. This group roughly corresponds 
to the ‘very concerned’, although other 
segments also report above-average levels 
of ‘very concerned’ people. As with levels 
of the ‘very concerned’, it is notable that 
the proportion of Active Enthusiasts is not 
static; the distribution between segments  
in the model constantly shifts. 
For the purposes of this quick summary  
of public perceptions, it is sufficient to note 
that since April 2008 the trend has been 
for a decline in the proportion of Active 
Enthusiasts. Their numbers have fallen  
by a third, from 21% to 14% of the public. 
Across the same period the bottom two 
segments, the aptly named Insular Sceptics 
and the vocal-minority Disapproving 
Rejectors, have grown from roughly a 
quarter (27%) to a third (33%) of the public.
A sense of powerlessness
‘Agency’ is also regarded as a key 
dimension of public engagement. In this 
context we can define it as a person’s belief 
that they are able to undertake an action 
to tackle poverty, and that that action will 
have the desired effect. The PPP research 
tracked levels of agency across the Make 
Poverty History campaign, using the 
statement ‘There is nothing I can personally 
do to tackle poverty in poor countries’. 
Across the PPP surveys, levels of 
disagreement with this (negative) statement 
fell. While 40% of respondents agreed 
but 44% disagreed in Wave 1, by Wave 
6 45% agreed and only 40% disagreed 
(PPP 2007a). Since the end of PPP, the 
DFID trackers showed that levels at first 
swung back, such that slightly more people 
disagreed than agreed with the statement. 
Since then they have remained static. 
In the February 2010 wave, 36% agreed 
but 44% disagreed (TNS 2010). Across the 
period from 2004, agency has fluctuated 
somewhat but remains relatively static. 
The public are roughly evenly split between 
those who say they can and can’t take 
action to tackle poverty.
A lack of understanding
The Rapid Review concluded that, looking 
across the available evidence, “the public 
as a whole remains uninterested in and 
ill-informed about global poverty” (Darnton 
2009:10). Knowledge of global poverty 
can be assessed across a number of 
dimensions, and some of the more 
common of these are highlighted below. 
We have not included awareness of key 
organisations and initiatives, partly because 
it could be deemed unreasonable to expect 
the public to know about (for example) 
the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) when no information or education 
campaigns have been undertaken in the 
UK on this subject. For the record, in the 
Eurobarometer 2007 survey 14% of the 
UK public said they were aware of the 
MDGs, including 4% who said they knew 
something about them (see Darnton 2007).
“the public as a whole 
remains uninterested in 
and ill-informed about 
global poverty”
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Low levels of public understanding are 
apparent in relation to debt, trade, and aid 
— the three pillars of international action to 
tackle global poverty that underpinned the 
Make Poverty History campaign. 
In the dark over debt
The PPP qualitative research found 
only a minority of more engaged people 
spontaneously thinking of debt as a cause 
of global poverty (PPP 2007b). These more 
engaged respondents found debt easy 
to discuss at the top level, but difficult to 
explain in terms of how it actually worked. 
There was widespread uncertainty 
among respondents about whether the 
UK government had written off the debts 
of developing countries or not. This 
uncertainty has also been reported in more 
recent research (eg Creative 2008). 
Four missing facts on trade
In 2004 Christian Aid undertook a research 
study in preparation for a campaign on 
trade justice (TRBI 2004, in Darnton 2007). 
This study found that the public knew 
almost nothing about systems of global 
trade. One typical respondent is quoted 
saying: “I didn’t know international trade 
rules were a factor in poverty in the  
Third World.” 
The researchers concluded that there were 
four missing facts that the majority of the 
public would need to understand if they 
were to be able to sustain a discussion 
around trade justice. These four missing 
facts included simple but substantive 
points such as ‘there are trade rules and 
regulations put in place by rich countries’. 
The missing facts were carried forward  
into the PPP research. In the final qualitative 
wave in 2007 it was found that, for the 
majority of more engaged respondents,  
the four missing facts were “still missing” 
(PPP 2007b). The report concluded 
that among the general public “There is 
no greater understanding of trade than 
before”. The same pattern of ignorance is 
apparent in more recent qualitative research 
(eg Creative 2008). 
Fairtrade: well known but  
poorly understood
On the surface the concept of fairtrade has 
been a huge success with the public. In the 
last wave of PPP research awareness of 
fairtrade was described as “near universal”, 
93% of respondents having heard of it  
(PPP 2007a). In the most recent wave of 
tracking data for the Fairtrade Foundation, 
74% of respondents recognised the 
Fairtrade Mark: an all-time high level of 
awareness (TNS/Kantar 2010).  
But qualitative evidence suggests that the 
public’s understanding of the mechanics 
and issues behind fairtrade is scarcely 
better than their understanding of trade 
justice. Asked to explain her motives 
for buying fairtrade, one woman in a 
research study for the Fairtrade Foundation 
(Research Works 2005 in Darnton 2007) 
memorably commented: “You’re doing 
something for somebody somewhere  
aren’t you?”
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It is appropriate at this point to raise a 
caveat. How reasonable is it for the general 
public to know about complex issues 
relating to international development? Such 
a question has a bearing on whether 25% 
is a reasonable aspiration for the proportion 
of engaged members of the public. 
In the context of fairtrade the fact that 
nearly all the UK public are aware of the 
concept, and that they should thus be 
able to infer that there is such a thing as 
unfair trade, may be deemed sufficient. In 
other contexts, however, low knowledge 
is more likely to be a barrier to change. 
Not knowing there is a G8 closes off that 
focus for political action, and not knowing 
there are Millennium Development Goals 
prevents the public from holding politicians 
to account on their commitments (see eg 
Darnton 2009).
A mile wide and an inch deep
Public support for development aid has 
been famously described by Ian Smillie 
as “a mile wide and an inch deep” (Smillie 
1996). Across different donor countries 
(and by a variety of different measures) 
support for aid is traditionally thought to 
be strong and stable, running at around 
70% (see eg Hudson and van Heerde 
2010). But the ‘inch deep’ dimension of 
public awareness is captured in qualitative 
research; it transpires that the only form  
of aid that most of the public are aware of 
is humanitarian aid provided in response  
to disasters. 
In research for DFID on aid effectiveness, 
Creative Research found that the public’s 
default definition of aid was “donations 
to charities in response to disasters” 
(Creative 2006, in Darnton 2007). This 
echoes work by Ida McDonnell at the 
OECD Development Awareness Centre. 
McDonell found that, across donor nations, 
the prevailing understanding of aid was 
as “short term charity for humanitarian 
relief” (McDonnell et al 2003, in ibid). So 
wedded are people to the idea that all aid is 
provided by charities, that the only role they 
can imagine for the government in relation 
to aid is to encourage the public to give 
more money to those charities (Creative 
2006, in ibid). 
Given this lack of understanding of 
development aid, it is small wonder that 
few of the public know about DFID and 
what it does. In the February 2009 Public 
Attitudes survey 40% of the public reported 
having heard of DFID, including 22% who 
claimed to know something about it (TNS 
2010). These levels have been static since 
2007. In the 2010 Survey the question 
was rephrased to ask about knowledge of 
‘UKAid from DFID’, and a similar result of 
41% awareness was achieved (ibid). 
An alternative measure was provided in a 
2007 evidence review for DFID (Darnton 
2007), based on data from a 2007 mini-
wave of tracking by TNS. This review 
showed that only 20% of the 21% of 
respondents who reported awareness 
of DFID also knew that DFID supported 
development projects overseas. From this it 
could be said that only approximately 4% of 
the public understood what DFID does. 
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Corrosive views on corruption
There is a fourth concept alongside debt, 
trade and aid that should be accounted 
for when assessing public perceptions 
of measures to tackle global poverty: 
corruption. While the PPP qualitative 
research consistently found that even the 
more engaged respondents were unable 
to sustain a conversation about trade (and 
somewhat less so debt and aid), corruption 
was found to be “the only issue which 
people will happily talk about in relation 
to global poverty” (PPP 2005, in Darnton 
2007). This trait persists in subsequent 
studies. Work carried out by Creative 
for DFID in 2008 found that “Everyone 
perceives that money is siphoned off by 
corrupt leaderships / further down the line 
or diverted to buying arms” (Creative 2008). 
In a recent study for Save the Children on 
its child survival initiative, the first ‘barrier’ 
reported by respondents to donating to 
the campaign was “money not getting 
through to the end cause” (Mango 2009). 
Quantitative data back this finding up, and 
even suggest that corruption is becoming 
more salient among the UK public. For 
instance, 57% of respondents to the most 
recent wave of DFID surveying (February 
2010) agreed with the statement ‘the 
corruption in poor country governments 
makes it pointless donating’. This figure 
rose by 13 percentage points in less than 
18 months – from 44% in September 2008 
(TNS 2010). 
It was wisely observed in the PPP research 
that people often feel uncomfortable 
talking about global poverty and their role 
in it. It may be that some anticipate being 
asked a question at any moment about 
whether they would be prepared to make 
a donation, or take action in some other 
way. The researchers commented that “the 
public is looking for an excuse to disengage 
from stories about poverty” (PPP 2007), 
and added that corruption often provides 
that excuse. 
Corruption and charitable giving
Among more engaged segments of the 
public, people are more likely to go on 
giving despite the widespread perception 
of corruption. Only 12% of those in the 
top segment of DFID’s segmentation 
model – the Active Enthusiasts – agree with 
the statement about corruption making 
donating pointless (TNS 2010). Yet it is 
remarkable in the survey data that those 
in the most engaged subgroups report 
a stronger-than-average belief that aid is 
being wasted due to corruption (see eg 
Darnton 2007). 
57% of respondents 
to the most recent 
wave of DFID surveying 
(February 2010) agreed 
with the statement  
‘the corruption in  
poor country 
governments makes  
it pointless donating’.
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A similar pattern is apparent in the 
most recent wave of DFID surveying. 
When people were asked to identify 
spontaneously the causes of poverty in 
poor countries, the most popular answer  
by far was ‘corrupt leaders/governments’. 
This was mentioned by 56% of 
respondents, compared to only 23% citing 
lack of education (TNS 2010). As with the 
question on corruption and donating, the 
levels of agreement are notably up in the 
recent wave – up four points on September 
2009. Above all, the traditional variation  
by segments is still apparent: 64% of  
Active Enthusiasts cite corruption as the 
top cause of poverty, a proportion that 
is eight percentage points above the 
population average.
Given the high salience of corruption, 
and the tendency of the public to seize 
on it as an excuse to disengage from 
poverty, PPP researchers warned that 
tackling the issue of corruption directly 
through public communications could be 
counterproductive (PPP 2007). It should 
be mentioned that a number of other 
commentators, including the House of 
Commons IDC, have taken the opposite 
view: “DFID needs to address this issue 
head on if it is to succeed in allaying 
taxpayers’ concerns” (HoC IDC 2009). 
This is clearly an area where more 
discussion is needed – and one that we 
return to in the context of frames in Section 
4 below. It is sufficient to note here that 
how we handle sensitive issues is key to 
how the public thinks about them.
Considering the causes of poverty
Exploring public perceptions of the causes 
of poverty is another area that is central 
to gauging levels of public understanding. 
Findings also provide insights into the 
underlying motivations of different groups, 
and possible strategies to re-engage 
them. It has been mentioned above that 
corruption is now the most spontaneously 
reported cause of poverty. This is in 
keeping with the longer-term data, which 
indicate that most people think the causes 
of poverty are internal to poor countries. 
These findings can be traced back to 
the Viewing the World study for DFID in 
1999. This found that the general public 
understood the developing world to mean 
Africa (DFID 2000, in Darnton 2007). The 
respondents then associated Africa with 
poverty, famine and drought. Only ‘activist’ 
respondents who were supporters of NGOs 
put forward a different view (incorporating 
debt or trade). 
In work around the same time, Greg Philo 
of the Glasgow Media Group reported 
that the public saw African countries’ 
problems as “self-generated”, including 
war and poor governance (Philo 2002, in 
ibid). These findings were echoed in the 
qualitative research on PPP, which found 
that the causes of poverty were seen 
either as “natural” or “man-made”, but that 
either way, they were deemed “internal” 
to poor countries (PPP 2005, in ibid). 
One respondent in that wave of the PPP 
research was typical in calling Africa  
a “bottomless pit”.
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Live Aid’s long shadow
These kinds of views are exemplified in the 
influential study The Live Aid Legacy (VSO 
2002). When respondents were asked to 
make spontaneous associations with the 
‘developing world’ or ‘third world’, 80% 
of their answers related to war, famine, 
debt, starving people, natural disasters, 
poverty and corruption. Through holding 
these views that attribute poverty to internal 
causes, the majority of people are excluded 
from active engagement with global 
poverty. We could say that they effectively 
exclude themselves. 
The resulting paradigm for relations 
between the UK public and those in the 
developing world is encapsulated in the 
concept of the ‘Live Aid legacy’, which 
casts the UK public in the role of “powerful 
giver”, and the African public as “grateful 
receiver”. This dynamic still prevails. The 
latest research study in the Reflecting the 
Real World series co-ordinated by IBT 
explicitly states that the Live Aid Legacy 
is still in effect. One respondent in that 
study described the developing world as 
“malnutrition and pot-bellied young children 
desperate for help with flies on their faces” 
(TW Research 2009).
In reading this body of research, one gets 
the overwhelming sense that nothing has 
changed in ten years. Three recent studies 
show that Live Aid continues to cast a 
long shadow. The PPP research found that 
Live8 in 2005 served only to reinforce the 
dominant paradigm set up in 1985. Thus in 
qualitative research undertaken for DFID in 
2006 (Creative 2006, in Darnton 2007) one 
respondent commented:
“this Africa thing seems to be exactly  
the same now as it was when I was ten 
years old”.
In 2008 the same researchers undertook 
further qualitative work, supporting the 
development of DFID’s segmentation 
model. Their research revealed feelings  
of hopelessness among respondents when 
discussing global poverty. They reported  
“a universal feeling that efforts have long 
been made to combat poverty in places  
like Africa and yet little has changed” 
(Creative 2008). 
Finally, campaign development research 
for Save the Children in September 2009 
found the same public reactions (Mango 
2009). Indeed it could almost be the same 
respondent as in the 2006 study:
“What’s happened since Live Aid? I was at 
school then. Now I’m 36 and nothing has 
really changed.”
At face value we could say that the UK 
public is stuck in its perceptions of Africa. 
But we could also argue that people are 
stuck in the frame they have been given 
for tackling poverty by Live Aid, creating a 
one-dimensional picture of Africa that has 
endured for 25 years. 
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A future of development fatigue?
To end this section looking forward instead 
of looking back, it is worth noting that  
the sense of being stuck is not just 
apparent among those who lived through 
Live Aid. It is also there among the younger 
generation, brought up on Live8. Recent 
qualitative research conducted for IBT 
with young people aged 14 to 20 has 
found that this new cohort are “relatively 
informed but broadly disengaged” on 
issues of global poverty (TW Research 
2010:10). We read that “Young audiences 
have inherited a sense of fatigue about 
the developing world... Perceptions of the 
static nature of development don’t help.” 
This latest research suggests that public 
disengagement from global poverty is  
not just a historic trend but one that will 
stretch out into the future, unless the 
dominant ‘static’ model of development 
can be overturned.
1.2 The evidence on public donations
The section above has reviewed the 
evidence on public engagement in terms 
of attitudes to global poverty, and we now 
move on to consider some of the actions 
that relate to those perceptions.
Dynamic income growth
Turning to the data on public donations 
to international development NGOs in the 
UK, we could not find a starker contrast 
to the survey data on levels of the ‘very 
concerned’ public [see Figure 3]. Donations 
have shot up since 1995, and particularly 
markedly since 2003. There has been a 
steady upward trend since 1979. The data 
here are based on the voluntary income of 
international aid and development NGOs 
featuring in the Charities Aid Foundation’s 
top 200 (and latterly top 500) annual 
NGO listings, from 1979 to 2006. The 
data record all voluntary income. While 
comprising more sources of revenue than 
just public donations, this can be taken as 
a close proxy for public donations.
 
Public disengagement  
from global poverty is  
not just a historic trend  
but one that will stretch  
out into the future, unless 
the dominant ‘static’  
model of development  
can be overturned.
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Looking at these data on voluntary income 
might lead us to ask: where has the 
problem gone? For many practitioners  
in the development sector, especially  
those starting from a fundraising 
perspective, the idea that there is an 
immediate cause for concern may only 
surface after a little reflection. 
If we set these data against those in the 
previous section, however, we are likely 
to be prompted to ask some serious 
questions about such a stark contrast. Why 
is concern static or falling, when voluntary 
income is rising sharply? Is this growth 
in donations sustainable? If the pool of 
engaged supporters is getting no larger, 
where will future growth come from? How 
stable is the support of those people who 
are only weakly engaged? And what will 
happen if economic conditions remain 
unfavourable? There is a possibility that 
these two charts paint a picture of a very 
mature market, one in which many of the 
‘customers’ have little idea of the product 
they are ‘purchasing’.
From boom to bust?
There are more recent data to draw upon 
than those from the CAF series. They 
include findings that pick up the impact of 
the global economic downturn in late 2008. 
These suggest that the long-term rise in 
revenue may be going into reverse. 
The Charity Commission has been 
undertaking surveys since September 2008 
to monitor the impact of the downturn 
on registered charities. Its most recent 
findings, reported under the title Decision 
Making in Hard Times (February 2010), 
were that 29% of 1,008 charities had 
experienced a drop in fundraising revenue 
over the previous six months (Charity 
Commission 2010). 
Figure 3: Voluntary income of IAD charities, (£millions, adjusted for inflation) 1979-2006 
(CAF data, analysis by Jeff Mouhot at the University of Birmingham  
for the ‘NGOs in Britain’ project - www.ngo.bham.ac.uk )
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A similar snapshot emerges from DFID’s 
Public Attitudes survey, which in February 
2010 asked respondents whether they 
had made a donation to charity in the 
previous six months (TNS 2010). 64% of 
respondents said they had – 8% fewer than 
in September 2009. Only 15% said they 
had given to ‘a charity that provides aid  
for people in poor countries’, compared  
to the previous figure of 20%. 
The changing face of participation
How did the NGO sector achieve the 
soaring revenues mapped out in the CAF 
data? These sharp quantitative increases 
may be concealing a qualitative problem: 
there is more engagement going on, but it 
is of a qualitatively different kind. This is the 
thesis set out by Matthew Hilton and his 
colleagues in the history department  
at Birmingham University, who assembled 
the CAF data (as part of a project in the 
history of NGOs in Britain, 1945-1997 
- see Hilton et al 2010). Writing about 
the changing nature of civic participation 
in Britain, the authors are keen to point 
out that the idea of a collapse in public 
voluntarism is a misreading. 
Although it is true that far fewer people 
go to church or attend weekly meetings 
of local groups than was the case in the 
1950s and 60s, that does not mean they 
are not participating in civil society (as the 
CAF data above dramatically demonstrate). 
Speaking of the research evidence on 
the continually changing nature of public 
engagement, Hilton writes: “Attention has 
been drawn to how face-to-face member 
participation in voluntary associations  
has increasingly been displaced by  
a more distant, 'cheque-book'  
relationship between NGOs and their 
supporters” (ibid:4).
In this model a social movement gains 
big numbers of supporters by changing 
the relationship with them to one that is 
more at arm’s length. This change in the 
nature of voluntary sector organisations has 
been written about since the mid-1980s, 
when the phrase ‘cheque-book member’ 
was coined by Hayes (1986 – in Jordan 
and Maloney 1997). It is a phrase that 
sums up the transformation from group 
member to supporter – someone whose 
main relationship with the social movement 
group is a transactional one. This is the 
principal means by which Matthew Hilton 
explains the inexorable increases in revenue 
on the CAF chart. 
What the chart does not reveal, however,  
is the degree of churn among the 
supporters who provide the revenue. 
Recruitment and retention costs have 
become key issues for modern NGOs 
because the cheque-book member as 
consumer can shop around, and frequently 
does. Data from the Public Fundraising 
Regulatory Association (PRFA) the 
organisation that oversees all face-to-face 
fundraising activity show that attrition rates 
for doorstep-recruited donors are as high 
as 31% only five months after recruitment. 
The attrition rate for on-street recruitment  
is 53% in the first year (PFRA 2010). 
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It is a minor cause for celebration for 
the regulator in a recession that these 
attrition rates are not higher. Seen from 
the recruited individuals’ perspective, 
however, the rates raise doubts about 
levels of engagement with the charities 
in question. Fundraisers know that high 
levels of churn are an inherent danger in the 
current business model, hence their efforts 
to minimise attrition through Customer 
Relationship Management. The PFRA says 
that the organisations that are surviving the 
recession are those making improvements 
in “donor care and stewardship”. 
Developing effective customer-journey 
models is essential to deepening public 
engagement and building retention.
The high cost of churn
Churn is a classic attribute of what 
Jordan and Maloney labelled as a ‘protest 
business’, a term coined to capture 
the new relationship between social 
movements and their cheque-book 
members (Jordan and Maloney 1997).  
They also used the term ‘revolving door 
model’ (borrowed from Cohen 1995) to 
describe the intensive recruitment practices 
of NGO groups-turned-businesses. 
This is because the fundraisers of these 
organisations have to work hard constantly 
to attract new recruits in order to replace 
those who drop out. 
Jordan and Maloney based their 
analysis on close study of a number of 
environmental NGOs that took off in the UK 
in the 1970s, including Friends of the Earth 
and Greenpeace. But their definition of a 
‘protest business’ could easily be applied 
to NGOs in other sectors, and up to the 
present day [see Figure 4].
(i)  Supporters, rather than members,  
are important as a source of income.
(ii) Policy is made centrally, and  
supporters can influence policy  
primarily by their potential for exit.
(iii) Political action is normally by the 
professional staff rather than the  
individual supporter or member.
(iv) Supporters are unknown to each  
other and do not interact.
(v) Groups actively shape perceptions of 
problems by providing supporters with 
partial information.
(vi) Supporters are interested in narrow 
issue areas. Particularity rather than 
ideological breadth is the agency  
of recruitment.
Figure 4: The characteristics of protest businesses (Jordan and Maloney 1997)
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Cheap participation
As summed up in the six-part definition 
above, the relationship between interest 
group and supporter (notably no longer 
called a ‘member’) is one characterised by 
the authors as ‘cheap participation’. This 
kind of participation is ‘cheap’ because 
the barriers to entry (ie initial joining costs) 
are kept low, yet supporters can make a 
political statement about their personal 
preferences by being a supporter – without 
having to commit significant money or time 
resources to the ongoing relationship. From 
an economist’s point of view, this is cheap 
participation in that the transaction costs 
of the relationship are low; unfortunately so 
are the barriers to leaving the relationship 
(hence the churn), and in the meantime the 
engagement with the group and its issues 
is shallow.
Making the relationship with the supporter 
as easy as possible is key to keeping 
the transaction costs low, and hence 
to the overall success of the business 
model. Jordan and Maloney highlight the 
mechanism of the direct debit as a key 
element of making participation cheap: it 
removes the need for an annual decision 
to continue membership and renders the 
membership less visible to the supporter. 
Thinking back to the CAF revenue chart, it 
would be interesting to plot the relationship 
between the take-off in development NGO 
revenue and the take-up in direct debit 
giving. Anecdotally, Oxfam fundraisers have 
commented that the introduction of a ‘£2 a 
month’ giving plan in the mid-1990s played 
a significant role in driving the revenue 
increases experienced at that time. 
The rise of direct mail
Direct debit is one contributory factor 
mentioned by Jordan and Maloney as 
they describe the adoption of commercial 
marketing practices by interest groups. 
Another is direct mail methods, credited 
with facilitating a shift in focus that 
transforms organisations first into ‘mail 
order groups’ and then into ‘protest 
businesses’. While the authors were writing 
13 years ago, the use of mail order to 
recruit and relate to supporters has clearly 
been pivotal in putting the supporter at 
arm’s length, enabling NGOs to change 
their business model to one focused on 
recruitment and retention. 
Coming up to the present day, the use of 
digital marketing methods arouses similarly 
strong views. Jordan and Maloney’s 
book is blissfully unaware of the coming 
internet; Pippa Norris, writing five years 
later, celebrates the internet as heralding 
“the reinvention of political activism” (Norris 
2002:222). Norris identifies “multiple 
alternative avenues for political expression”, 
including information, communication and 
mobilisation activities. She is alert to the 
transformative potential of the internet for 
civil society groups and their supporters, 
partly because it is a non-hierarchical 
‘network of networks’. 
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Activism or clicktivism?
Ultimately, however, the magnificence of 
this technology comes down to how it is 
employed. Some observers would suggest 
that it is currently being used to extend 
and speed up the protest business model 
rather than overturn it. The use of email 
as a tool for recruitment, fundraising and 
campaigning has been criticised in many 
quarters. A recent blog on the Guardian 
website described online campaigning  
as ‘clicktivism’ and suggested that  
“…clicktivism is to activism as McDonalds 
is to a slow-cooked meal. It may look like 
food, but the life-giving nutrients are long 
gone.” (White 2010). The consumerist 
metaphor is well chosen for today’s protest 
businesses, with their cheap (and un-
nourishing) model of participation.
Most recently Malcolm Gladwell (of 
Tipping Point fame) has entered this 
debate with a piece in the New Yorker 
entitled ‘Small change: why the revolution 
will not be tweeted’ (Gladwell 2010). His 
main point is about the appropriate use 
of digital technology in campaigning, 
based on the kinds of social networks 
the technology best supports. Online 
networks are characterised by weak 
ties (remote relationships, but lots of 
them). ‘High-risk activism’, on the other 
hand – the kind of activism that drove 
the civil rights movement in the US – 
requires relationships based on strong ties 
(involving close friends, such as the people 
you grew up or went to school with). 
Gladwell’s inference is that online activism 
will only enable incremental change: 
transformational change involves high-risk 
activism that challenges prevailing power 
structures in the real world. 
Practitioners of online campaigning know 
this (although the ‘online evangelists’ 
Gladwell rebuts don’t always say it). 
In a blog responding to Micah White’s 
‘clicktivist’ critique, a US online organiser 
makes a distinction between good and bad 
online activism: “Good online organising 
offers a powerful and fundamentally 
democratic tool for achieving that vision 
[of a more humane, sustainable and 
peaceful world]” (Brandzel 2010). Brandzel 
gives many examples of effective online 
organising, but it is notable that they all 
have in common a move from initial online 
engagement to subsequent offline actions. 
The most compelling example that 
Brandzel cites involves the celebrated 
US online organiser, MoveOn.org, which 
has set up hundreds of local leadership 
councils in communities across the 
United States. These leadership councils 
recruit volunteers, draft community plans 
and organise neighbourhood events. As 
Brandzel observes: “Most would never 
have gotten involved if the first step had 
been more intimidating than an online 
signature” (ibid). 
The potential for the internet to capture the 
previously unengaged is clear, but what is 
key to the success of online approaches is 
their capacity to convert online users into 
offline activists. The very name MoveOn 
implies a supporter journey, and it can be 
inferred that bad online organising is that 
which fails to take the public anywhere. 
What is key to the success 
of online approaches is their 
capacity to convert online 
users into offline activists.
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Tugging at the heartstrings
The current reality of NGOs as big 
businesses, with business models built 
around aggressive revenue targets, 
is reflected both in the content of 
communications and in the techniques 
used. Research conducted by the 
sector has shown that the most effective 
messages for securing donations are 
those that pluck at the public’s heartstrings 
(see eg Mango 2008). More precisely, 
work commissioned by Comic Relief 
on The Psychology of Giving found that 
giving money involves both the heart and 
the head, with the initial trigger usually 
an emotional appeal (Leapfrog 2004). 
Communications that reveal the shocking 
truth of suffering among poor people, and 
then cause us to consider the good fortune 
of our own position, are seen as the most 
effective in triggering giving. 
Meanwhile, the short films broadcast 
on Red Nose Day have become more 
emotionally hard-hitting over the years. 
The relationship between the content of 
the BBC telethon and public donations is 
closely monitored, and it is reported that 
the biggest ‘spikes’ in donations are in 
response to the short films that trigger the 
strongest emotional responses. 
A Comic Relief press release reports that 
on the night of Sport Relief 2010, the 
biggest number of calls to give money 
occurred at 9.26pm. This was just after 
an appeal film that featured Chris Moyles 
watching a child die of malaria in a hospital 
in Uganda (Sport Relief 2010). The film 
supplied little context because its primary 
focus was on the child dying, and then on 
the stricken Moyles giving the freephone 
number [the clip is currently available to 
view on YouTube]. 
As well as the content of appeal films 
having become more direct, it is said that 
the films have got shorter in proportion 
to the rest of the broadcast. This has left 
more time for comics, celebrities and the 
celebrating of public participation and funds 
raised. But having intensified its emotional 
appeal so much over the years, where  
can the Red Nose Day TV appeal format  
go next in pursuit of revenue growth year 
on year? 
Consortia versus competition
Similar questions are being asked in the 
development sector as a whole. As part 
of its work on the impact of the downturn, 
the Charity Commission has been holding 
regional focus groups with NGOs from a 
mixture of sectors in order to understand 
what charities can do to survive the 
recession (Charity Commission 2009). 
The Commission has aired a number of 
suggestions designed to help charities 
work smarter, including forming consortia 
to bid for public sector funding and working 
jointly with other organisations pursuing 
similar agendas. 
Unfortunately the response from charities 
on the latter point was not in the direction 
the Commission wanted. Instead of 
increased collaboration, the charities felt 
they had “no choice but to compete with 
one another” (ibid:4). For many charities the 
instinctive response to the downturn seems 
to have been to develop sharper business 
practices, taking them away from their 
founding mission as interest groups. 
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It could be argued that NGOs have just 
been responding to wider market trends in 
recent years, characterised by deregulation 
and privatisation. The sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman has described these trends as the 
rise of ‘liquid modernity’ (in e.g. Baillie Smith 
2008), meaning that institutional purposes 
become fluid and distinctly blurred. This 
process can be seen in development NGOs 
as they build stronger partnerships with 
governments and corporations, in order to 
tackle poverty in the global South. 
Blurring the boundaries
The kind of liquidity highlighted by Bauman 
can also be seen in the rise of consultants 
working in the development sector and 
the way they operate. Consultants often 
work both for NGOs and for their corporate 
and government partners, blurring the fine 
lines between organisations and further 
embedding the sector in consumer-based 
models. Given far-reaching changes such 
as this in development practices, one can 
argue that it is time for NGOs to refresh the 
frame of themselves as charities that still 
dominates how the public sees them.
The issue of how development practices 
in the South have evolved is raised later 
in this report (see Section 2.4 on values). 
But here it is sufficient to underline that 
the trend towards protest businesses 
identified by Jordan and Maloney seems 
to be continuing unabated. NGOs are 
fervently “chasing the same chequebooks” 
(1997:152) to feed revenue growth, often 
at the expense of deeper engagement with 
the public.
1.3 The case of Make Poverty History 
The case of Make Poverty History (MPH) 
offers us the chance to see the themes 
introduced in the sections above in action. 
We have already seen how in early 2005 an 
‘MPH effect’ was apparent, with levels of 
the ‘very concerned’ reaching a long-term 
high. In terms of active engagement, MPH 
offered a new portfolio of ways in which 
people could get involved in tackling global 
poverty. From a strategic perspective, it 
can also be seen as a concerted attempt 
to break the Live Aid Legacy and the 
transactional model of campaigning. 
Organisationally MPH was a very different 
entity from the NGOs that became its 
members – whether or not those NGOs 
could fairly be described as ‘protest 
businesses’. The campaign was serious 
about its coalition structure – there was 
not even a core directorate or single 
spokesperson. This structure immediately 
made MPH non-competitive, and the 
shift away from the transactional model of 
campaigning was made even clearer in the 
uniting of the coalition behind the rallying 
cry of ‘justice not charity’. 
In putting its call for political and economic 
action at the centre of the campaign, and 
in pursuing mass mobilisation through a 
coalition structure, MPH can be seen as 
“the direct successor” to the Jubilee 2000 
debt campaign (Sireau 2009). It also built 
on the platform provided by the Trade 
Justice Movement.
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‘Justice not charity’
MPH can be read as a deliberate attempt 
at reframing the problem of global poverty, 
the potential solutions, and the public’s 
role. Its emphasis on ‘justice not charity’ is 
consistent with some of the positive frames 
for development that we go on to identify 
below. Frames analysis is particularly useful 
for understanding the MPH movement, 
with its combination of actions and 
communications, its open structure and  
yet its need for a single centre. 
It is notable that the most complete analysis 
of MPH completed to date – a book by 
Nick Sireau that came out of the year he 
spent shadowing the MPH Co-ordination 
Team during his PhD – undertakes a 
frames analysis of the campaign (Sireau 
2009). As it happens, Sireau’s is a slightly 
different branch of theory from the cognitive 
frames that we adopt in this report. He 
looked at ‘collective action frames’ as 
defined by academics working on social 
movements and public participation. He 
identified the overarching structure of MPH 
as ‘the economic injustice master frame’ 
– consistent with the explicit ‘justice not 
charity’ call to action.
Mobilising the masses
As well as trying to engage a mass public 
in new ways, thereby reframing global 
poverty and the possible solutions, MPH’s 
strategy aimed to mobilise people as never 
before. The idea was to show a mobilised 
mass public to the UK government as a 
means to galvanise political change at 
the G8 Summit. Thus large numbers of 
supporters needed to engage in visible 
actions: marching in the Edinburgh rally 
at the start of the summit; handing in their 
white bands to fill large perspex letters that 
could be marshalled on the hillside opposite 
Gleneagles (and later transported to 
Parliament Square); bombarding politicians 
with text messages, emails and postcards 
calling for particular policies to be delivered. 
The political impact of these actions has 
been fiercely debated. The value of the 
final G8 communiqué divided NGOs in 
the coalition and is still contested – see 
eg Sireau 2009. As a mass mobilisation, 
however, MPH was a phenomenal success. 
Just in terms of its structure MPH was the 
biggest coalition in campaigning history: 
540 member organisations were involved at 
its peak. It could also be judged the biggest 
mass mobilisation: 225,000 people took 
part in the Edinburgh rally (ibid) and in July 
2005 87% of the UK public had heard of 
MPH (see eg Darnton 2007). 15% of the 
UK public reported having undertaken at 
least one action for MPH (ibid).
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Despite the success of MPH in engaging 
the mass public, that public barely heard 
the ‘justice not charity’ message. This 
could simply be put down to the MPH 
communications not being loud enough 
to reach the whole country. But this is an 
unlikely explanation, as whatever MPH 
could be said to have lacked, it was not 
communications air time or PR support. 
Indeed, Nick Sireau argues that MPH was 
“mainly a communications exercise” (ibid:5). 
Somewhere along the way, ‘justice not 
charity’ got lost or drowned out, and MPH 
never achieved the transformational change 
it promised. The research evidence points 
to a number of possible explanations:
•	Dominant	frames	overwhelmed	 
‘justice not charity’
The campaign was constructed around 
complex themes: debt, trade, and aid. 
The research evidence outlined above 
(in 1.1) has shown how difficult it is for 
even engaged members of the public to 
sustain a discussion on these topics. Yet 
the PPP research shows that this material 
complexity was only the tip of the problem. 
More fundamentally, the public couldn’t 
accept the ‘justice not charity’ frame. 
In Wave 2 of the qualitative research 
in 2005, the MPH-involved and ‘very 
concerned’ respondents who were 
interviewed commented that they were 
sure MPH must have been raising money 
somehow, through selling white bands 
or by taking some revenue from the text 
messages people were sending (PPP 
2005, in Darnton 2007). In Wave 3 in 
2006, respondents who had been involved 
in MPH were mystified as to why the 
campaign had not sought to raise money. 
One reason given by a respondent to 
explain the general sense of ineffectiveness 
of the campaign was “...because Live 8 
didn’t raise as much money as Live Aid...” 
(PPP 2006:17). 
In reflecting on these findings from a 
frames perspective, we could say that 
the transaction frame for tackling poverty 
(in which giving money to charities is 
understood to be the only way to engage 
with global poverty) proved too strong for 
the ‘justice not charity’ frame to depose  
it. It can be suggested that more effort 
could have been focused on exposing  
the prevailing (transaction) frame, in order 
to break it and allow the public to  
engage differently.
Interestingly, Graham Harrison identifies 
a different framing problem. His analysis 
suggests that as Africa came to dominate 
the imagery around MPH, it became 
more difficult to activate the ‘justice not 
charity’ message (Harrison 2010). Harrison 
suggests that Africa is so bound up with 
charity in the public’s mind that African 
imagery was antagonistic to MPH’s 
economic justice frame. This resonates  
with research on the Live Aid Legacy,  
and suggests that more effort could have 
been expended on the exposing and 
breaking of the existing ‘aid frame’ within 
the campaign.
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•	The	‘justice	not	charity’	message	 
was delivered by... charities 
It is a central premise of frames theory 
that frames are embedded in everyday 
institutions and practices, as well as in 
communications. The apparent disjuncture 
between the medium and the message 
may well have left those in the coalition 
confused. If this occurred, then there is 
little surprise that the message was not 
understood by the public. 
For the ‘justice not charity’ frame to be 
successfully propounded it was essential 
that it came from a unified coalition that 
was seen as something different from the 
usual development charities. When some 
coalition members started to use their 
brands within the campaign (eg putting 
their logos on the MPH white bands), this 
lessened the chance of the mass public 
seeing beyond ‘charity’.
•	Lack	of	control	and	cohesion	in	 
a complex coalition 
Societal values and meanings are 
collectively constructed. This means that 
the collective effort of a lot of partners 
and voices is needed to connect with or 
reinforce those values and meanings. As 
with the example of branding above, a 
good deal of strong leadership and co-
ordination is required for the frame to hold 
firm. This is especially true when it comes 
to messaging, but messaging was one 
of the areas of MPH activity that coalition 
members were least able to agree upon (for 
revealing details, see Sireau 2009). 
Another constraint was the limited time 
available for MPH to make its mark. It 
can take considerable time to reframe a 
whole area of public activity and achieve 
values change. With a complex coalition 
of organisations involved and a limited 
window of mass public engagement, 
MPH was unable to maintain the level of 
cohesion and control needed to sustain 
its initial impact over the longer term. The 
independent evaluation of MPH by Firetail 
describes “the absence of a strong centre” 
(Martin et al 2006:70), and explains the lack 
of continued activity in 2005 after the G8 
Summit by saying that MPH “simply…did 
not have adequate plans in place” (ibid:69).
•	Tension	between	achieving	big	
numbers and moving the public on
MPH was designed to engage the mass 
public. Mass support was sought both 
to achieve a political impact and to try 
to transform how the public engaged 
with poverty. This made for a challenging 
campaign: there is some doubt as to 
whether any campaign can secure political 
change and transformational change at the 
same time. In the case of MPH, it was the 
former that became the dominant theme. 
MPH was unable 
to maintain the 
level of cohesion 
and control needed 
to sustain its initial 
impact over the 
longer term.
35
Finding Frames
All the stops were pulled out to ensure a 
really big political campaign, with blanket 
coverage in the media. White bands were 
used to make public support visible. 
Celebrities featured heavily in public 
communications to make it clear that 
poverty and MPH were big news, although 
most did little or nothing to get the intended 
‘justice not charity’ message across. 
The ultimate device to ensure the campaign 
was both newsworthy and popular was 
the series of Live8 events. These concerts 
had a highly contested genesis, with 
Bob Geldof (their figurehead) ending up 
nearly splitting the coalition (see Sireau 
2009). Whatever its original purpose, Live8 
became the focal point of 2005 activity 
for the mass public. ‘Justice not charity’ 
was squeezed out. By February 2006 PPP 
researchers were finding that Make Poverty 
History was itself history, subordinated to 
Live8 in the public’s mind. As one MPH-
involved respondent commented (PPP 
2006:12):
“Live8 was the event, and Make Poverty 
History was its slogan.”
Conclusions
In summary, this analysis of the evidence 
around MPH concludes that the 
campaign nearly managed to reframe 
global poverty, but not quite. In not quite 
achieving this objective, the events of 
2005 inadvertently reinforced the Live Aid 
Legacy. In his analysis Graham Harrison 
cites one NGO campaigns director who 
commented in the wake of MPH that 
the campaign proposition had become 
“Buy Charity, Get Justice Free” (Harrison 
2010:405). This view was echoed in 
research with the general public. In May 
2007 one respondent involved in the PPP 
research showed how MPH had become 
synonymous with Live8, by recalling the 
campaign as follows (PPP 2007:26):
“It was a big concert in a few places around 
the world with all the big names in music. 
Bob Geldof. They did one 20 or 25 years 
ago. They tried to make a load of money to 
cancel world debt.”
After all the hope of transforming public 
engagement, MPH appears simply to 
have returned the public to the place they 
were in when they were children. To make 
matters worse, the experience of some of 
the public who took part in MPH in some 
way was that a sense of false promise 
turned into disillusionment. In the 2007 
wave of PPP research the researchers 
reported that “A general sense of 
disempowerment feels more pervasive than 
ever” (ibid:23). Underlying all the confusion 
around what MPH was – or might have 
been – was the inescapable realisation that 
“Poverty isn’t history” (ibid:23).
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2.The role of 
values in public 
engagement
37
Finding Frames
This section...
• Briefly continues the Make Poverty 
History case study, arguing that the 
consumerist values inherent in the 
campaign strategy worked against the 
‘justice not charity’ frame.
• Introduces the psychological basis 
of values theory, following the work 
of Shalom Schwartz and his values 
circumplex. Schwartz’s thesis that 
values are inter-related is described, 
demonstrating how one value can 
diminish the power of its antagonistic 
partner. Tim Kasser and colleagues’ 
subsequent work on motivational goals 
is also presented.
• Seeks to identify which values and 
goals are most active in driving public 
engagement with global development. 
There is little directly relevant research 
on this question. There are enough 
clues, however, to isolate a cluster of 
values around Universalism – and goals 
relating to Community Feeling – as key 
to driving engagement with ‘bigger than 
self’ problems, including development 
issues. 
• Introduces a few refinements to 
the proposed positive values for 
development. These are based on 
possible objections stemming from 
both the practice of development as 
it is undertaken in the global South 
(grounded in self-interest), and the 
practical task of engaging publics in 
the North (where values of Benevolence 
are often invoked as part of a strategy 
based on ‘starting where people are at’).
2.1 The values of MPH lite
The section above has described MPH 
as representing a shift in approach for 
public engagement, with the ‘justice not 
charity’ proposition at its centre. This core 
ethos, as well as the coalition structure, 
demanded a radical departure from 
established fundraising-driven approaches 
and ‘transactional’ engagement activity. As 
has been explained above, however, the 
MPH campaign struggled to get out of the 
charity frame.
Part of the problem was the deliberate 
mass mobilisation approach. Strong voices 
at the time, both within and outside the 
coalition, criticised MPH for being too 
populist. Anecdotally, their complaints were 
also expressed as calls for the ‘justice’ 
message not to get lost in the campaign. 
Meanwhile other voices, also strong in the 
coalition, were clear that the campaign 
would need to be ‘mass’ to succeed. The 
primary goal was to build a campaign 
that would go from zero to total public 
awareness in seven months. This was 
at the heart of the brief given to MPH’s 
advertising agency Abbot Mead Vickers 
(see Sireau 2009:16). 
Although these contrasting views caused 
tensions at the time, it is clear with the 
benefit of hindsight that MPH contributed 
to giving issues of global poverty a much 
higher public profile, and opened up a 
new space for debate (a space into which 
papers like this one can be launched).
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‘MPH Lite’ and other actions
The communications campaign was built 
around various calls to action, pointing 
supporters to a wide range of things 
they could do to achieve the political and 
economic objectives of the campaign. 
Not all of these actions would rightly be 
described as ‘mass mobilisations’ however 
– certainly not in the sense of direct action. 
The PPP research asked about ten different 
actions that people involved in MPH could 
have taken. These included ‘registering on 
the MPH website’, ‘sending an email to 
a politician’, ‘sending a text message to 
Make Poverty History’, ‘attending a Live8 
concert’ and ‘joining the Make Poverty 
History rally in Edinburgh’ (reported in eg 
Darnton 2007). 
While some of these actions suggest 
significant commitment on the part of 
supporters, others are purposefully easy  
to undertake. The epitome of the easy 
actions was ‘wearing a white band’ 
(undertaken by 61% of the MPH involved, 
according to the PPP research – see ibid). 
The white bands became so popular 
that they were described by some 
commentators as meaningless fashion 
items – which they apparently were for 
large numbers of young people who wore 
them as one of many wristbands up their 
forearms in the summer of 2005. 
Writing about what the public had  
(or hadn’t) learned from MPH, the PPP 
researchers described a whole raft of  
the MPH actions as ‘MPH lite’ (Darnton 
2006). Notably these were the actions 
undertaken in the biggest numbers  
(see eg Darnton 2007). 
‘MPH lite’ seems a fair description of 
much of the public engagement activity. 
There were actions that offered little or no 
message or other content related to debt, 
trade and aid. And the actions themselves 
could be deemed ‘superficial’, in terms of 
the level at which people had to engage to 
undertake them. 
The low costs of participation recall the 
critique of ‘cheap participation’ levelled by 
Jordan and Maloney (see 1.2 above). For 
instance, the emphasis on online activism, 
while innovative to the extent that it allowed 
the campaign to communicate with a vast 
supporter base, could easily fall prey to 
criticisms of ‘clicktivism’ (a phenomenon 
described in 1.2). 
Database deletion
In one case study of Make Poverty History, 
written as part of an analysis of the history 
and current practice of campaigning 
for social change, Paul Hilder describes 
MPH as an example of “an effective 
media campaign, coupled with celebrity 
endorsement” (Hilder et al 2007:50). This 
praise is tempered with criticism, however, 
of the deliberate deletion by the coalition of 
its supporter mailing list (containing roughly 
450,000 email addresses). 
‘MPH lite’ seems a fair 
description of much of the 
public engagement activity.
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The decision to delete supporter data 
exemplifies the lack of legacy planning 
by the member NGOs, whose explicit 
precondition on entering the coalition was 
to disband after the year was out. Paul 
Hilder sees the destroying of the mailing  
list as a serious error in the campaign 
strategy. Overall, however, he concludes 
that: “The campaign achieved spectacular 
reach with its one-to-many media strategy 
and consumerism, reinforced by the use 
of viral symbols of solidarity like the white 
bands” (ibid:47). 
It is hard to argue with this conclusion but 
it is striking that consumerism was such 
a key ingredient of the recipe for success. 
Recalling Nick Sireau’s description of the 
campaign not as a mass movement but 
as “a communications exercise” (Sireau 
2009:5), we might note that in place 
of the values of economic injustice on 
which the campaign strategy was plotted, 
the consumerist values embodied in 
advertising, celebrities and fashion took 
centre stage. These elements not only 
obscured the ‘justice not charity’ frame  
but brought along their own values, to 
the point where a critical friend might 
reasonably ask ‘where did the justice go?’ 
Summing up our analysis, we could say 
that MPH was built around a positive, 
and potentially transformative, master 
frame. But the campaign’s surface framing 
reinforced among the public those negative 
values that the deeper strategy was trying 
to move away from. 
Quantity versus quality: the tensions  
in mass engagement
There is a tension apparent in MPH 
between delivering mass engagement 
and delivering depth of engagement – 
essentially quantity versus quantity. It is 
illuminating to set this tension alongside 
other elements of the problem of public 
engagement we have identified in this 
paper. Part of the answer to breaking the 
lock-in of public engagement must surely lie 
in endeavouring to develop new models for 
mass campaigning – models that over time 
can deliver both breadth and depth. 
These models will need to be built for the 
longer term, on positive values. They will 
also need to express positive values in 
everything they do that involves the public. 
It may well be necessary to engage the 
public on their own values, starting from 
where they are at, but a strategy must then 
be rolled out to take them to a place in 
which positive values for development are 
activated and strengthened.
In seeking to re-engage the public in global 
poverty once again, we should now ask 
what those positive values might be.
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2.2 Activating positive values
“Every time a non-governmental 
organisation attempts to motivate change 
by appealing to individuals’ self-interested 
concerns for money and status, to 
businesses’ desire to maximise profit, or 
to governments’ felt mandate to increase 
economic growth, it has subtly privileged 
and encouraged the portion of people’s 
value systems that stands in opposition to 
positive social (and ecological) attitudes 
and behaviours” (Kasser 2009:8) 
Tim Kasser, a US psychologist, wrote 
this warning as part of his recent work 
advising Oxfam on how to construct 
its campaigns around positive values. 
Kasser’s statement neatly sums up the 
point that values operate not in isolation 
but relative to one another. In some cases 
the balance operates like a see-saw: if we 
activate one set of values, we diminish the 
opposing set. In as much as consumerist 
values are opposed to what we might call 
humanitarian values, strengthening the 
former weakens the latter. 
Kasser warns that practitioners cannot 
have it both ways. They must decide  
which it is to be: which set of values they 
will focus upon. In so doing they will end  
up deciding whether certain short-term 
gains are worth the risk of longer-term 
losses. Understanding the psychological 
theory around values can help make sense 
of our MPH narrative above, deconstructing 
why the campaign did not lead to a  
lasting shift in the breadth and depth of 
public engagement.
Values and human motivations
Values are of primary importance in 
psychology, which as a discipline is 
concerned with understanding the origins 
of human behaviour. Values are seen to be 
at the root of our motivational system: they 
are the guiding principles by which we act, 
and by which we evaluate both our own 
actions and those of others. 
A useful definition is offered by Norman 
Feather, who fuses his own descriptions of 
values with those of Shalom Schwartz and 
Milton Rokeach – probably the two most 
influential psychologists working on values. 
Feather describes values as (among other 
things) “general beliefs about desirable 
ways of behaving, or desirable goals” 
(Feather and McKee 2008:81). 
To the extent that this describes human 
motivations it is a workable definition, 
although it is also helpful to make a 
distinction between values and attitudes. 
Schwartz writes that values “transcend 
specific situations” and “...differ from 
attitudes primarily in their generality 
or abstractness” (Schwartz 1992:3). 
In psychological theory, attitudes are 
understood as beliefs and orientations 
relevant to a specific object or behaviour, 
whereas values are more foundational. 
Thus a specific attitude is a stronger 
predictor of its related behaviour than 
a value would be, but values are more 
broad-spectrum, having a general influence 
across a wide range of attitudes  
and behaviours.
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Values in dynamic systems
A substantial body of literature has grown 
up around values. This includes robust 
methods of measuring values that have 
been applied in studies with large samples, 
undertaken in many countries. Notably 
psychologists have found – perhaps 
surprisingly – that there are relatively few 
values in human motivational systems, and 
that these are found consistently across 
different cultures worldwide. 
Schwartz’s values system, perhaps 
the best known and certainly the most 
widely applied and validated of the values 
frameworks, comprises 56 principal value 
‘labels’ that can be boiled down into just 
ten value types (Schwartz and Boehnke 
2004). Schwartz’s main contribution is 
not so much in defining the contents of 
the values, but in identifying the dynamic 
structure in which they are positioned and 
interrelate. First he maintains that individual 
values are not distinct from one another 
but represent identifiable points positioned 
on “a continuum of related motivations” 
(Schwartz 1992:45). Next he observes that 
the relationships between individual values 
can best be understood in terms of the 
degree to which they are compatible or in 
conflict with one another. 
Survey tools such as Schwartz’s Values 
Survey reveal that people find it difficult to 
hold certain combinations of values at the 
same time, whereas other combinations 
are relatively easy to hold simultaneously. 
The degree of ease or difficulty with which 
people hold two particular values, or follow 
particular courses of action consistent 
with those values, reflects the level of 
compatibility or conflict between those 
values. For example, people who rate 
wealth and status as important tend not to 
rate social justice and living in a world at 
peace as equally important. 
It has been pointed out that all people  
hold all the values on Schwartz’s continuum 
all the time to some extent, but the balance 
between these values varies from individual 
to individual (see eg Kasser 2009). It 
follows from this that when we talk about 
‘changing values’ we do not mean creating 
new values and introducing them into the 
system in place of old values. What we  
do mean is changing the level of 
importance accorded to a particular  
value relative to others. 
Schwartz’s values circumplex
Our values are often regarded as being 
innate. The relative priorities between them 
(our default settings, so to speak) appear to 
be strongly determined by what happens 
in our early life, by our families and by our 
education. But this prioritisation can also 
be changed through later influences in 
response to our lived experience. How our 
interactions in social life are framed thus 
has particular influence on the balance of 
values that we hold – hence the potential 
for frames to contribute to changing values 
(as discussed in Section 3 below).
42
Finding Frames
Due to the dynamic interrelations between 
values, what results when the scores from 
values surveys are plotted diagrammatically 
is not a linear version of a continuum,  
but a circular model or circumplex. In this 
model compatible values appear adjacent 
to one another, and conflicting values 
appear as opposites. Where values do  
not correlate with one another, they  
appear ‘orthogonally’ to one another –  
at right angles. 
Schwartz’s values circumplex is reproduced 
above (Figure 5). It is not a conceptual 
model but an empirical one: the result 
of what happens when the survey data 
are plotted out (using ‘circular stochastic 
modelling’). Furthermore, the model has 
been validated through use of the Schwartz 
Values Survey with 200 samples in over 70 
countries worldwide (see Maio et al 2009).
Once this values structure is set out, it 
becomes easier to see the ‘problem’ with 
consumerist values, from the perspective 
of increasing public engagement with 
development issues. The positive values 
that will deepen and sustain support for 
development are found in the north-east 
segments, described under the ‘higher 
order’ type of Self-Transcendence values. 
These are the value types Universalism  
and Benevolence. 
Figure 5: Theoretical model of relations among 10 motivational 
types of values (after Schwartz & Boehnke 2004)
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These positive values are in conflict with 
the Self-Enhancement value types - 
Power, Achievement and Hedonism – in 
the south-west segments. Given the 
antagonistic relationship between opposing 
values on the circumplex, the positive 
prosocial values can be described as non-
individualistic and anti-consumerist (see eg 
Grouzet et al 2005). These Universalism 
and Benevolence values can in turn be 
seen to motivate action to tackle a wide 
range of ‘bigger than self’ problems, within 
which we can include global poverty (see 
Crompton 2010).
Blurred boundaries between values
Schwartz says that because the circumplex 
expresses a continuum of motivations, 
the boundary markers on the model 
are somewhat arbitrary (“conceptually 
convenient” – Schwartz 1992:45). It follows 
that the values items and types can be 
clustered in different ways, and relations 
between the values plotted in different 
combinations. This technique is often  
used when designing research hypotheses 
and survey tools. 
The primary examples of oppositional 
pairings are Self-Enhancement versus 
Self Transcendence, and Conservation (ie 
conservatism) versus Openness to Change. 
A further pairing suggested by Schwartz is 
Uncertainty Control (based on the ‘power’ 
and ‘security’ types) versus Intellectual 
Openness (based on the universalism and 
self-direction types). Schwartz argues 
that this pairing is likely to predict political 
affiliation: those with dominant Uncertainty 
Control values tend to be conservative, 
while those with stronger Intellectual 
Openness values tend to be liberal 
(Schwartz and Boehnke 2004:252). 
This example of how different elements  
of the values structure can be emphasised 
underlines the foundational nature of values 
in determining worldviews. There is also 
resonance between the political analysis 
here and the thinking on cognitive frames 
that we will go on to explore in Section  
3 below.
Goals and psychological needs 
Similar evidence on the structure of human 
motivations has recently been developed 
in relation to goals, instead of values; Tim 
Kasser is at the forefront of this work (see 
eg Grouzet et al 2005). For Kasser and 
colleagues, goals are subsidiary to values in 
the motivational system, values being “the 
higher order conceptions of the ideal that 
typically organise people’s goals” (ibid:801). 
Goals reflect humans’ inherent need states: 
a combination of their psychological needs 
(for affiliation and self-acceptance on the 
one hand, and status and pleasure on the 
other); their physical needs (eg for food and 
shelter); and their spiritual needs. 
Kasser’s approach is derived from 11 
goal types that can be plotted against 
two bipolar scales, with one axis showing 
physical versus spiritual goals, the other 
extrinsic versus intrinsic. Kasser has 
also developed a survey tool called the 
Aspiration Index (Kasser and Ryan 1996). 
When plotted, the results from large  
sample surveys conducted internationally 
produce a circumplex model that is similar 
to Schwartz’s. 
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Kasser’s goal structure is interesting to us 
particularly for its minor differences in terms 
of the contents of the motivational items 
– the goals. Some of these fill gaps in the 
coverage of Schwartz’s values. Another 
interesting element is the differences in 
structure behind the Schwartz and Kasser 
values systems (see Figure 6).
In terms of identifying positive goals 
for increasing public engagement with 
development issues, our attention 
is focused on the Intrinsic goals of 
Community Feeling and Affiliation, which 
appear on the right hand side of the model. 
These are shown to be in conflict with 
the opposing Extrinsic goals: Conformity, 
Popularity, Image and Financial Success. 
The pairing of Community Feeling and 
Financial Success is taken to be the 
quintessential example of conflicting 
motivations. These goals appear exactly 
192 degrees apart from each other, almost 
diametrically in opposition. The Grouzet, 
Kasser and colleagues’ goal circumplex 
thus provides us with an even more clear-
cut case that prosocial and consumerist 
behaviours spring from conflicting 
motivations, and that pursuing the two 
sets of goals at once is likely to prove very 
difficult for a given individual. 
Figure 6: Circular representation of the goals, based on a study 
of 1,800 students from 15 nations (Grouzet et al 2005)
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The primacy of intrinsic needs
At the same time, the ‘higher order’ 
dimensions of the goal circumplex identify 
the opposition of intrinsic and extrinsic 
needs, which is perhaps more applicable 
than the self-enhancement versus self-
transcendent dimensions of the Schwartz 
values circumplex. Rather than seeing 
prosocial behaviour as in part driven by 
spiritual dimensions, the Grouzet model 
puts the emphasis on self-determination: 
the individual’s sense of agency to  
make change for the better in society 
(spirituality is unpacked into the other 
spiritual/physical dimension). 
The highlighting of the intrinsic/extrinsic 
axis in the Grouzet model allows us to 
focus more on the oppositional nature 
of the two sets of goals. Intrinsic goals 
are defined as those that are “inherently 
satisfying to pursue in and of themselves”. 
They arise from the psychological needs for 
relatedness, autonomy and competence 
(ibid:801). Extrinsic goals are seen as 
“primarily concerned with gaining some 
external reward or praise” (eg status or 
financial success) and are “less likely to be 
inherently satisfying”. 
In this way extrinsic needs are understood 
as a sort of compensation for a deficiency 
in a person’s capacity to achieve intrinsic 
goals. It is argued that extrinsic needs 
arise from insecurity that has its roots in 
an inability to satisfy innate psychological 
needs (Kasser 2004). This element of 
displacement shines further light on the 
motivations for consumerist and socially 
dominant behaviour, and suggests that 
self-direction in the pursuit of common 
goals (ie pro-social behaviour) is the more 
natural state of things (see also work cited 
in Section 3 below on mirror neurons). 
Grouzet and colleagues note that people 
with strong extrinsic goals have more 
difficulty fulfilling their intrinsic needs – for 
acceptance, affiliation and so forth. In turn 
these findings tie into Kasser’s earlier work 
on well-being (see eg ibid), which notes 
that achieving consumerist goals doesn’t 
even make people happy.
The same conflicts between self-serving 
and ‘bigger than self’ motivations are thus 
apparent in both sets of empirical work on 
values and goals. If anything, the sense 
of irreconcilable conflict between the two 
agendas is sharper in the work on goals, 
given that they relate to the purposes of 
human strivings. 
It is worth recalling at this point Tim 
Kasser’s warning to NGOs quoted at the 
start of this section: that any form of public 
engagement that appeals to people’s 
sense of self-interest will diminish their 
sense of common good. A number of 
examples of such tactics, and the collateral 
damage they are likely to inflict, appear 
in the literature. Most are taken from the 
environmental sphere. 
In presenting a set of experiments based 
on Schwartz’s values circumplex, Greg 
Maio warns about the negative impacts 
of promoting energy efficiency measures 
as money-saving steps, even though the 
pro-environmental and financial benefits 
could make those measures appear a 
win-win for the householder (Maio et al 
2009). Likewise, in his work on values and 
frames, Tom Crompton cautions against 
selling photo-voltaic cells or hybrid cars on 
the basis that they will enhance the buyer’s 
social status (Crompton 2010). 
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Values, causes and correlations
Values matter not only in themselves – 
because they reflect sharp and sometimes 
conflicting differences in motivations – but 
also because the motivations they embody 
in turn influence other attitudes and 
behaviours. Again the literature on values 
and goals is well evolved, and empirical 
work has shown both correlations and 
causal associations with other perceptions 
and actions. 
Thus Kasser reports findings that show that 
a strong orientation towards money and 
possessions (hence placing importance 
on financial success and image goals) 
correlates with attitudinal orientations that 
include lower empathy, more manipulative 
tendencies, higher Social Dominance 
Orientiation (ie a preference for hierarchy 
and social inequality) and greater prejudice 
towards out-groups (Kasser 2009). 
The last of these attributes, the tendency 
towards discrimination, is also found 
in many studies using Schwartz’s 
values system, which tend to correlate 
universalism values with positive attitudes 
to racial difference (see eg Feather 1970, 
and Rokeach 1973 in eg Sawyerr et 
al 2005) and with readiness to contact 
members of an out-group (eg Sagiv and 
Schwartz’s 1995 study of Israeli Jewish 
teachers, in eg Feather and McKee 2008). 
Some other values types have been found 
to correlate with the ‘Big Five’ personality 
traits that are often used to mark out 
different types of people in contemporary 
psychology (see eg Roccas 2002). 
Correlations are also widely observed 
between motivations and behaviours. 
Kasser reports, for example, that people 
with strong Materialistic Values Orientations 
(MVOs) are less likely to report undertaking 
pro-social behaviour, and more likely to 
commit antisocial acts such as stealing 
and cheating (Kasser 2004).
Acting on values
Experiments have also been undertaken 
to demonstrate the causal influence of 
values on behaviour. These experiments 
tend to involve ‘priming’, in which certain 
values are activated within the participant in 
order to test how they influence behaviour. 
One widely reported class of experiments 
involved priming people with the term 
‘money’, and then finding that they were 
less willing either to help the researcher 
with some subsequent task or to donate 
part of their research fee to charity (eg Vohs 
et al 2006). In this way what Maio calls the 
“systemic implications of values change” 
are demonstrated, whereby activating 
one value diminishes its antagonistic 
counterpart (Maio et al 2009:701). 
Maio’s own experiments go further, in 
showing that activating one value can 
also activate an adjacent value, as well as 
diminishing an antagonistic partner. Maio’s 
results echo earlier data showing that just 
priming people with ‘achievement’ values 
can lead them to regard a task in a different 
light – the research task itself (eg a word 
puzzle) becomes an opportunity for  
proving self-worth. 
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These results impinge on work on 
framing, which is discussed in the section 
below. But Maio also proves through his 
experiments that “priming a set of values 
increases behaviour that affirms those 
values and decreases behaviour affirming 
opposing values” (ibid:712). He concludes 
that “changes in either set of values have 
reciprocal effects on the opposing values” 
(ibid:713).
It is notable that none of this evidence 
on the association between values and 
behaviours relates to behaviours concerned 
with tackling poverty. Indeed the laboratory 
experiments tend to relate to trivial ‘helping’ 
behaviours such as picking up dropped 
pencils. Despite this, the bigger correlations 
in this kind of research can demonstrate 
associations with more meaningful pro-  
and anti-social behaviours in the real world. 
Universalist values, fairtrade and  
human rights
From this point of view there are a couple 
of highly relevant pieces of evidence for 
practitioners in development NGOs. The 
first is that those who express stronger 
universalism values also express more 
supportive attitudes about human rights 
(Cohrs et al 2007). In turn, those expressing 
stronger attitudes about human rights are 
more likely to undertake supportive actions, 
including donating to human rights NGOs. 
The second piece of evidence comes from 
a study of US buyers of fairtrade products 
(Doran 2009). All the respondents filled 
out the Schwartz Values Survey, and it 
was found that the most loyal fairtrade 
purchasers ranked the Universalism 
values as the most important. The loyal 
purchasers also scored highly on Self-
direction values, indicating that they were 
willing to make minority choices and hunt 
out fairtrade products in specialist shops. 
It is important to note that these loyal 
purchasers ranked the Benevolence items 
in the survey as less important than did 
‘intermittent’ fairtrade shoppers, for whom 
these values were the most important.  
As well as underlining the general 
correlation between self-transcendence 
values and action to tackle poverty (here, 
buying fairtrade) the findings underline the 
need to distinguish between Universalism 
and Benevolence value types. The former 
relate to showing care for all people, 
and the latter to showing care for those 
like oneself (in one’s in-group). These 
differences will be teased out below, as we 
consider precisely which values should be 
activated in order to engage the public in 
development issues. 
“priming a set of 
values increases 
behaviour that 
affirms those values 
and decreases 
behaviour affirming 
opposing values”
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2.3 Identifying positive values  
for development
We have noted that the values literature 
includes only limited references to the 
influence of values and goals on support 
for tackling global poverty. Reciprocally, 
looking at the development literature, there 
is little work on the values that underlie 
support for concern about global poverty. 
In this section, however, we explore these 
value links for ourselves. We explore what 
happens if we take the values theory 
approach, as laid out above, and apply 
it to driving public engagement with 
development. What are the positive  
values that result?
Despite the lack of literature about the 
values that drive public engagement, 
development academics David Hudson 
and Jennifer van Heerde have undertaken 
some exploratory work. They did this by 
using DFID data to explore the motivations 
of concern and support for tackling global 
poverty (Van Heerde and Hudson 2010). 
Hudson and van Heerde began their 
analysis with a literature review that 
identified two root causes of political action. 
May and Olson provide a two-part typology 
for activism, one type based on ‘the logic 
of expected consequences’ and the other 
on ‘the logic of appropriateness’ (May 
and Olson 1996 in ibid). Essentially, those 
influenced by ‘expected consequences’  
are motivated by rational self-interest, while 
the ‘appropriateness’ type is based on 
moral beliefs. 
Back to basics: self-interest  
and morality
Synthesising these findings with the rest of 
the literature, Van Heerde and Hudson boil 
the causes of concern for poverty down 
to self-interest and morality. Interestingly, 
they then move on to an analysis of media 
coverage of the developing world in 2005. 
This indicates that these two prevailing 
models – or ‘frames’ as the authors call 
them – dictated the narrative in all the 
development stories in the newspapers  
that year. 
Van Heerde and Hudson apply the 
dichotomy between self-interested and 
moral motivations to recent data from the 
DFID Survey of Public Attitudes (as best 
they can, given the problems with the 
available measures). They find that morality 
(as measured by the statement ‘poverty 
in developing countries is a moral issue’) 
is positively correlated with concern about 
levels of poverty in poor countries. But, 
self-interest (measured with an index based 
on a basket of questions about economic, 
security, political and personal impacts) is 
shown to have a negative correlation with 
concern for poverty. 
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This finding is consistent with the values 
evidence laid out above. It is at odds, 
however, with hypotheses derived from the 
development literature, which suggest that 
both morality and self-interest could drive 
concern for development. Van Heerde and 
Hudson unpick this apparent contradiction 
by disaggregating the self-interest index 
into its constituent measures, finding that 
while attitudes relating to the national 
interest correlate negatively with concern, 
items focusing on self-interest (eg poverty 
having consequences that ‘affect me 
personally’) correlate positively. 
In a parallel paper van Heerde and Hudson 
conclude that “It is entirely plausible 
and logical that people are able to hold, 
simultaneously, both an instrumental 
and normative view for supporting 
development assistance” (Hudson & van 
Heerde 2010:15). While this conclusion 
might seem logical, and is in line with 
thinking in development studies, it goes 
against the well evidenced work on values 
and goals in the psychological literature. 
Indeed it is reminiscent of the cases that 
environmentally minded psychologists 
write about, such as the energy efficiency 
schemes that look like a win-win but are 
more likely to involve trade-offs between 
shorter- and longer-term forms of 
engagement (see eg Maio et al 2009). 
Preference accommodation and 
preference shaping
In trying to make sense of this, van 
Heerde and Hudson highlight the work 
of Hay (2007), who saw a clear choice 
that needed to be made between two 
alternative strategies for engaging the 
public (Hay 2007). Hay’s two routes to 
public engagement are summarised as 
‘preference accommodation’ or ‘preference 
shaping’ – put simply, meeting the public 
where it is at, or aiming for values change. 
Hay argues strongly for the latter. 
Preference accommodation, Hay says, 
appeals to self-interest and is ultimately 
a self-fulfilling prophecy: if you argue that 
support is rational, people will calculate 
the costs and benefits and conclude that 
engagement isn’t worth it. Engagement in 
elections offers an obvious example, where 
the concept of ‘pivotality’ suggests that the 
chances of your vote being the one that 
makes the difference to the overall outcome 
are so slim that it would be illogical to 
vote at all. Hay argues that if you play to 
people’s self-interest, they will become 
more self-interested and disengage from 
political activism. 
Ultimately van Heerde and Hudson’s 
analysis reaches a conclusion that is 
in line with the values literature. There 
are apparent tensions here between 
development studies and values theory, 
and these will be teased out in the following 
section of this paper. For the moment, 
however, the task of mapping drivers of 
engagement with global poverty points 
back to the intrinsic values and goals 
identified through the work in psychology.
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Self-interest and the aid budget
An interesting study from the development 
sector, concerning the work of AusAid, 
throws up parallel findings (Instinct and 
Reason 2009 – discussed in detail in 
Darnton 2009). Seeking to increase  
support for spending on development 
aid among the Australian public, AusAid 
commissioned a choice modelling 
exercise that involved testing a range of 
scenarios with the public. The optimal 
solution identified – the one that produced 
the largest public endorsement for an 
increase in aid spending to 0.5% of GNI 
– emphasised self-interest motivations 
(spending 75% of aid on neighbours in 
the region, for example, and prioritising 
education of the kind that reduces  
women’s propensity to breed). 
Meanwhile, in AusAid’s segmentation 
model, the two segments that reported 
the highest support for development aid 
did not show strong concern for global 
poverty. Instead they supported foreign 
aid on the premise that it would bring 
domestic benefits. While these findings 
show that self-interest can drive support 
for development spending in the short 
term, the evidence from the psychological 
literature and from development academics 
suggests that such strategies are likely to 
decrease public engagement in the longer 
term. This study provides a classic example 
of the choices and trade-offs that confront 
us if a values lens is applied to the evidence 
on building public support for development.
While this development sector research 
provides indicative findings about 
motivations, it doesn’t go so far as to 
analyse support for tackling global poverty 
in terms of existing values and goals scales. 
On the basis of this review, there is certainly 
a need to pursue such an opportunity. 
As will be discussed below, some work 
has been done in the development sector 
around values. This includes Oxfam’s 
examination of core motivations for 
campaigning and the Mindsets research 
in 2008 that informed the development 
of Oxfam’s new customer segmentation 
(Oxfam 2008). 
Schwartz’s values types
However, such work does not explicitly 
tie into the psychological work on values. 
Because of this it misses out on drawing 
upon a substantial body of potentially 
illuminating empirical evidence. To identify 
the specific motivations that are supportive 
of public engagement with development 
issues, we believe it is worthwhile to 
examine the values and goals literature 
closely, and make some inferences. In 
order to perform this task, it is necessary to 
look at Schwartz’s full table of the ten value 
types and their associated items.
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Value Type Definition  Value Labels 
Power  Social Status and prestige, control or - Social power  
 dominance over people and resources  - Authority
  - Wealth
  - Preserving my public image
  - Social recognition
Achievement  Personal success through - Successful  
 demonstrating competence according - Capable  
 to social standards  - Ambitious
  - Influential
  - Intelligent
Hedonism  Pleasure and sensuous gratification - Pleasure  
 for oneself  - Enjoying life
  - Self-indulgent 
Stimulation  Excitement, novelty and challenge in life  - Daring
  - A varied life
  - An exciting life 
Self-direction  Independent thought and - Curious  
 action – choosing, creating, exploring - Creativity
  - Freedom
  - Choosing own goals
  - Independent
  - Self-respect
Universalism  Understanding, appreciation, tolerance - Protecting the environment  
 and protection for the welfare of all - Unity with nature  
 people and for nature - A world of beauty  
  - Broadminded
  - Social justice
  - Wisdom
  - Equality
  - A world at peace
  - Inner harmony
Figure 7: Schwartz’s ten value types and their 
principal value labels (Schwartz 1992)
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Value Type Definition  Value Labels 
Benevolence  Preservation and enhancement of the - Helpful  
 welfare of people with whom one is in - Honest  
 frequent personal contact - Forgiving  
  - Loyal
  - Responsible 
  - A spiritual life
  - True friendship
  - Mature love
  - Meaning in life
Tradition Respect, commitment and acceptance - Accepting my portion in life  
 of the customs and ideas that traditional  - Devout 
 culture or religion provide the self - Humble
  - Respect for tradition
  - Moderate
  - Detachment
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations and - Obedient  
 impulses likely to upset or harm others - Honouring of parents and elders  
 and violate social expectations or norms - Politeness 
  - Self-discipline
  
Security Safety, harmony, and stability of  - Clean 
 society, of relationships, and of self - National security
  - Reciprocation of favours 
  - Social order
  - Family security
  - Sense of belonging
  - Healthy
Figure 7: Continued...
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Psychological experiments and survey 
data have shown that universalism 
values are linked to pro-social attitudes 
and behaviours, and also to specific 
development-related attitudes and 
behaviours. These are accepting different 
others and rejecting discrimination; 
supporting human rights and donating to 
human rights organisations; and buying 
fairtrade products (see Section 2.2 
above). In presenting his values system, 
Schwartz himself is clear that support for 
development issues is a core component of 
Universalism values, rooted both in human 
responses to resource disputes and in the 
realisation of living within finite limits: 
“The motivational goal of universalism is 
understanding, appreciation, tolerance, 
and protection for the welfare of all people 
and for nature …The motivational goal 
of universalism values can be derived 
from those survival needs of groups and 
individuals that become apparent when 
people come into contact with those 
outside the extended primary group and 
become aware of the scarcity of natural 
resources. People may then realise that 
failure to accept others who are different 
and treat them justly will lead to life-
threatening strife, and failure to protect 
the natural environment will lead to the 
destruction of the resources on which life 
depends” (Schwartz 1992:12).
Defining positive values for development
If we pursue this psychological way of 
thinking about values, with its circumplex 
structures and its evidence that certain 
pairs of values work antagonistically 
against one another, then we can identify 
a set of positive values for driving public 
engagement with development as follows:
• ‘Universalism’ values should be activated, 
including Equality; A World at Peace;  
Social Justice.
• In addition, given what Greg Maio 
calls the “systematic effects of values 
change”, and Tim Kasser’s warning that 
endorsing negative values is reinforcing 
them, activating positive values should also 
involve avoiding ‘Power’ values. These 
include Social Power; Wealth; Authority; 
and Preserving My Public Image.
• Given that supportive values for 
development and the environment are 
strongly compatible within the Universalism 
type (as articulated by Schwartz above), 
there may also be benefits in activating 
the neighbouring ‘Universalism’ values, 
including A World of Beauty; Unity with 
Nature; and Protecting the Environment.
• The final three Universalism values 
(Broadmindedness; Wisdom; Inner 
Harmony) may similarly have a positive 
effect on public engagement with global 
poverty, even if only because they activate 
their neighbouring Universalism values. 
Greg Maio’s experiments have shown 
that ‘target values’ activate ‘unmentioned 
values’ (Maio et al 2009:701).
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• It can also be argued that Benevolence 
values (such as Helpful, Responsible,  
True Friendship and Meaning in Life) should 
be included in a set of positive values 
(although they fall outside the Universalism 
type). This is because they are part of 
the Self-Transcendence higher-order 
values type, and as such can be seen as 
supportive or reinforcing of the adjacent 
Universalism values. But the psychological 
evidence shows that the Benevolence 
values appear to correlate with engagement 
with development issues more weakly than 
do Universalism values. We can recall the 
survey data discussed above, which found 
that intermittent fairtrade purchasers were 
the most strongly Benevolence-orientated 
(Doran 2009). 
According to Schwartz’s definition, 
Benevolence values motivate support 
for in-groups: “close others” not “all 
people” (Schwartz 1992:11-12). On the 
one hand these values are adjacent to 
the Universalism values on Schwartz’s 
circumplex, which means that through 
association they may activate self-
transcendent motivations such as 
Universalism. Benevolence values are 
defined, however, as driving support for  
the in-group, which means that the kind of 
pro-social actions they motivate might be 
to the benefit of the individual’s in-group 
over and above the benefit of others. 
To take an example from the environmental 
sphere, it is possible that Benevolence 
values could drive NIMBY (‘Not in My 
Back Yard’) responses to renewable 
energy developments, or the stockpiling 
of fuel and other finite resources. In a 
development context it could be argued 
that Benevolence values are likely to 
have at best a neutral effect on support 
for tackling global poverty. However, this 
theoretical assertion can be challenged 
from a practical viewpoint (see the section 
on ‘Refining positive values’ immediately 
below). These ambiguities are explored 
in Section 2.4, but they would clearly 
benefit from more primary research on the 
relationship between specific values and 
behaviours supportive of tackling poverty.
Key goals for public engagement
Returning to the goal system developed 
by Grouzet, Kasser and colleagues, we 
can recall that the Intrinsic motivations are 
Community Feeling, Affiliation and Self-
Acceptance (Grouzet et al 2005). These 
are in conflict with the Extrinsic goals of 
Conformity, Image, Popularity and Financial 
Success. To identify which items we should 
be promoting in order to increase public 
engagement with development, we need 
to look more closely at the dimensions of 
each of these goals. We can do this by 
examining the survey statements used to 
measure the importance of each of the 
goals in Kasser and Ryan’s Aspiration  
Index (Kasser & Ryan 2006). In the interests 
of brevity, the following table shows only 
the statements for each of the Intrinsic  
and Extrinsic goals we are focusing on 
[Figure 8].
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Figure 8: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals in Grouzet et al’s 
goal circumplex, with corresponding items from Kasser & 
Ryan’s Aspiration Index (reproduced from Crompton 2010)
Life-goal of  Corresponding Opposing Corresponding 
particular  indicator goals life-goal(s) indicator goals 
importance for presented to   presented to 
motivation to subjects in  subjects in  
engage in surveys   surveys 
‘bigger-than-self’  
problems
   
Affiliation. To  People will show Conformity. I will be polite   
have satisfying affection to me,  To fit in with and obedient.
relationships with and I will to them. other people.
family and friends   I will live up to the
 I will feel that there Image. To look expectations of my society.
 are people who attractive in
 really love me. terms of body My desires and tastes
  and clothing. will be similar to 
 Someone in my life   those of other people.
 will accept me as Popularity. To  
 I am, no matter what. be famous,  I will "fit in" with others.
  well-known 
 I will express my love and admired. My image will be one
 for special people.  others find appealing. 
   
 I will have a  I will achieve the
 committed, intimate  "look" I've been after.
 relationship.  
   People will often comment
   about how attractive I look.
   I will successfully hide   
   the signs of aging.
   I will keep up with fashions  
   in clothing and hair. 
   I will be admired by  
   many people.
   My name will be known   
   by many different people.
   Most everyone who    
   knows me will like me
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Figure 8: Continued...
Life-goal of  Corresponding Opposing Corresponding 
particular  indicator goals life-goal(s) indicator goals 
importance for presented to   presented to 
motivation to subjects in  subjects in  
engage in surveys   surveys 
‘bigger-than-self’  
problems
Self-acceptance.  I will be efficient. As above As above 
To feel competent 
and autonomous. I will choose what
 I do, instead of
 being pushed 
 along by life. 
 I will feel free. 
 
 I will deal effectively
 with problems 
  in my life.
 
 I will feel good
  about my abilities.
 I will overcome the 
 challenges that life 
 presents me.
 I will have insight 
 into why I do the 
 things I do.
Life-goal of  Corresponding Opposing Corresponding 
Community I will assist people Financial  I will have many
feeling. who need it, asking success. expensive
To improve the nothing in return. To be wealthy possessions.
world through  and materially
activism or The things I do will successful. I will be financially
generativity make other people's   successful.
 lives better.
Related to this   I will have enough
intrinsic goal is I will help the world   money to buy
the importance become a better   everything I want.
of a sense of place.
agency in working   I will have a job
to create change.   that pays well.
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Of the three Intrinsic goals, Community 
Feeling appears to offer the most obvious 
fit with support for tackling global poverty. 
It is explicitly about taking action in the 
world, and building a sense of agency in 
the individual, such that he or she can take 
action and have that action achieve the 
desired effect. As discussed in the section 
above, these self-determination dimensions 
of the goal system are missing (or are less 
explicit) in Schwartz’s values circumplex. 
In support of Community Feeling,  
Self-Acceptance goals seem important 
because they can activate adjacent goals. 
But they are also important in themselves 
because they can help to increase feelings 
of agency. 
We might reasonably assume that Affiliation 
is less important in driving support for 
development, as on the strength of the 
survey items it appears to relate to support 
for in-groups and to strengthening self-
identity. We could make a comparison here 
with Benevolence in the values circumplex.
Addressing antagonistic goals
In terms of diminishing antagonistic goals, 
it can be concluded that Financial Success 
should certainly be avoided; this goal 
is diametrically opposed to Community 
Feeling. Similarly Popularity, Image and 
Conformity (in so far as it is central to 
consumer culture) should also be avoided.
Having made these inferences, based on 
what we know about the well evidenced 
relationships between Intrinsic goals and 
propensity to engage in ‘bigger than 
self’ problems, it is again important to 
stress that the relationships between the 
specific values and goals advocated here 
and measures of public engagement in 
development issues should be established 
through primary research at the first 
opportunity. Indeed we are already planning 
to pursue such a programme of research 
by means of a quantitative panel survey 
(see Section 6 below).
Community Feeling 
appears to offer  
the most obvious  
fit with support  
for tackling  
global poverty.
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The Oxfam blob diagram
However, there is further evidence that 
the values and goals picked out here are 
consistent with those that development 
NGOs have already identified as 
representing the ideal foundation on which 
to campaign with the public. In 2006 Adrian 
Lovett led a research study that resulted in 
the recommendation of a set of motivations 
around which Oxfam should build its 
campaigns. This outcome was represented 
in what has become known internally as the 
‘blob diagram’ [Figure 9].
We can quickly see that the values and 
goals advocated in this paper fit well 
with the Oxfam prescription in the blob 
diagram, even though it is written around 
attitudes. For instance, the Universalism 
values of Equality and Justice are explicitly 
mentioned on the Oxfam model. A World  
at Peace value item directly relates to 
Oxfam’s Freedom from Fear and Want. 
Meanwhile the goal of Community Feeling 
can be seen to cohere with Belief in Human 
Agency (supported by the goal of Self-
Acceptance), Solidarity for the Human 
Family, and Care for Others. The close 
mapping between Oxfam’s attitudinal 
blobs and intrinsic goals and values is also 
apparent to Tim Kasser, who has remarked 
on how well embedded the positive goals 
and values are in Oxfam’s ‘Be humankind’ 
brand campaign (Kasser 2009). 
Figure 9: ‘The Attitudes we want to activate and strengthen…’ 
(Adrian Lovett for Oxfam, 2006)
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Having said this, there are two of the 
‘blobs’ in the Oxfam motivations set that 
do not appear to map neatly onto values 
and goals in the psychological literature. 
‘Happiness not driven by material wealth/
consumption’ and ‘Development as  
care (for distant others)’ cannot be 
considered values or goals in themselves, 
but rather seem to require the reframing 
of familiar concepts around particular 
(Universalism) values. 
This reading of the Oxfam motivations 
set suggests that the missing strand in 
their campaign strategy may be the use 
of a frames approach. Such an approach, 
which can activate particular values and 
worldviews through the use of particular 
words and concepts, expressed in every 
aspect of how practitioners engage the 
public, is introduced in Section 4 below.
2.4 Refining positive values  
for development
The section above began by laying out a 
perceived opposition in the literature on the 
drivers of public engagement with global 
poverty: morality on the one hand versus 
self-interest on the other. But we have also 
encountered David Hudson’s argument that 
there is no logical reason why support for 
development should not be motivated by 
both sets of values at once (Hudson and 
Van Heerde 2010). 
Values theorists would argue that it is 
difficult to span both sides of the values 
circumplex simultaneously, and yet for 
Hudson it seems “entirely plausible” that 
people manage it (ibid). For instance, when 
a member of the public buys something 
from an Oxfam shop, or purchases a 
fairtrade product, they are likely to be 
exercising dual motivations with no sense 
of dissonance whatever.
Similarly there could be an objection 
from development practitioners that a 
psychological approach based purely 
on values theory does not recognise the 
practicalities of development work on the 
ground. It could be argued that the ends of 
development are more important than the 
means: if self-interest drives public or state-
level support, then surely that is preferable 
to no support at all. However there are 
clearly myriad ways to achieve those ends, 
and values theory can help us to see the 
trade-offs inherent in different approaches.
A conflicted space for NGOs
There is evidence that NGOs increasingly 
find themselves in this conflicted space 
when undertaking development work. 
Development academic Matt Smith writes 
of the “blurred boundaries” between NGOs, 
states and markets (Baillie Smith 2008:11). 
Such blurring does not easily fit with a 
dichotomous view of development work, 
such as one based purely on values theory. 
These slippery exchanges between practice 
and principle are one reason why Matt 
Smith advocates an approach to public 
engagement grounded in development 
education, based on enabling the public to 
participate in discussion and deliberation 
about the purposes and practices of 
development work. Such an approach 
has the added value of building up the 
legitimacy of NGOs to do that work, in  
the eyes of the public. 
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Moreover, it appears that the way 
development is actually being delivered  
in the global South at present is more 
driven by self-interest on the part of 
developing nations than by altruism on 
the part of Northern donors. The South is 
advancing its own development agenda, 
and South-South partnerships are the 
dominant model. 
Development academic Emma Mawdsley 
is exploring models of South-South 
development, and in a recent paper 
she cites Brazil and India talking about 
global development as ‘horizontal co-
operation’ and ‘development co-operation’ 
respectively (Mawdsley 2010:11). China is 
the biggest force in this emerging model 
of development, pursuing its agenda 
not through donations but through 
partnerships. Mawdsley tellingly quotes  
the Chinese ambassador announcing  
his government’s intention to build a 
$1bn hydro-electric dam in Guinea with 
the words: “The dam is not a gift; it is an 
investment... That is what win-win  
means” (ibid: 18). 
The overlap between North and South
Whether or not the contractual 
arrangement proposed by the ambassador 
really constituted a ‘win-win’ is an open 
question. Many development practitioners 
(and other commentators) express 
reservations about China’s way of working, 
in Africa in particular. To an extent, such 
development realities are a distraction 
from the main thrust of this paper, which 
focuses on engaging the UK public in 
development. Yet the two arenas of activity 
– public engagement in the global North 
and development practice in the South – 
do overlap. For example, it is notable that 
a number of NGOs (including Oxfam and 
WWF) are working with the governments of 
developing countries (including China) to try 
to manage the potential negative impacts 
of partnership arrangements, grounded in 
self-interest, on the world’s poorest people. 
One of the implications drawn out at the 
end of this paper is that NGOs will need to 
find a new way to present themselves and 
their work to the UK public. If and when 
they do so, we would suggest that the 
model they should present is one that takes 
account both of how development is being 
practised in the South, and how their own 
role in that development is shaping up.
Mauss’s gift theory
Beyond these real-world tensions based 
on development in action, there are also 
theoretical concerns about a development 
model based solely on self-transcendence. 
These concerns arise not from psychology 
but from development studies grounded 
in other disciplines such as geography, 
anthropology and sociology. 
Marcel Mauss’s gift theory has become 
a staple of sociological thought, and an 
influential text in development studies 
(Emma Mawdsley uses gift theory to 
structure her recent paper). Mauss focuses 
his attention not on the gift itself but on 
the act of giving, which is a social act 
that creates a bond of solidarity between 
the giver and the receiver (Mauss 1954). 
For the bond to be fully established, the 
recipient is expected to reciprocate with a 
gift of their own at some point in the future. 
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When a gift is given without the expectation 
of reciprocation, the result is what Marshall 
Sahlins calls ‘negative giving’ (1972 – in 
Mawdsley 2010). As Mauss explains: “The 
unreciprocated gift makes the person who 
has accepted it inferior, particularly when 
it has been accepted with no thought 
of returning it” (Mauss 1954:65). The 
implications of this kind of negative giving 
in an international development context are 
stark. A charity-based development model 
entrenches uneven power structures and 
results in aid dependency – a phenomenon 
observed by a number of recent authors on 
development aid, including Sachs, Easterly 
and Moyo (Mawdsley 2010). 
Two-way exchange and reciprocation
This reading of charity as gift is not 
necessarily entirely incompatible with 
an approach to development grounded 
in intrinsic values, but values theory 
suggests that gifts freely given through 
Universalism must also allow for an element 
of reciprocation, or exchange. Rather 
as instant online activism with no further 
engagement can be regarded as mere 
clicktivism, so mechanisms for gathering 
donations that involve no subsequent 
interaction or other meaningful two-way 
exchange can be seen as simply reinforcing 
the prevailing, unequal, status quo.
Away from this fundamental critique 
of development as charity, there are 
potential problems with the specific values 
that are identified as driving support for 
development, when we look at them 
pragmatically. First, there is the danger 
that Universalism can appear high-
minded. Rather than building empathy, 
an insistence on support grounded in, 
say, the value of equality could be read as 
having the reverse effect. If the subjects 
of the support – states in the developing 
South – are motivated by self-interest, then 
an insistence on intrinsic motivations in 
the supporting North could enhance the 
‘othering’ effect apparent in the current 
model of development as charity. 
Negotiating disciplinary divides
We are grappling here with something 
of a clash of disciplines and a collision 
of different specialised vocabularies. 
Universalism describes a specific set of 
values items as defined in a particular 
school of social psychology. ‘Universal 
values’, on the other hand, have wider 
resonance in a number of disciplines 
that inform development studies. In each 
of these disciplines, universal values (or 
principles) tend to be problematised. 
For instance, the philosopher Nigel Dower 
writes critically about the universal ethics 
informing global citizenship, as embodied 
in international agreements such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) and the Earth Charter (2000):  
“No ethic is universally accepted, or is  
ever likely to be...” (Dower 2005). Similarly, 
Matt Smith has remarked “universal  
values are clearly not from nowhere,  
and definitely from somewhere”  
(personal communication). 
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‘Universal values’ as they appear in 
the development literature are clearly 
distinct from the Universalism values of 
social psychology. Because of this, it is 
important when advocating the adoption of 
Universalism in the context of development 
that we are aware both of the problematic 
resonances of the term ‘universal’ and of 
the potential for mistakenly defining a rigid 
set of values and assuming them to be 
universally good. Practical examples from 
development as it is happening on the 
ground (as discussed above) suggest that 
other ways of doing development exist, and 
some of these may be delivering at least as 
much ‘good’.
Benevolence in action: Citizens UK
If universal values (and also Universalism) 
could be seen to be high-minded, then 
Benevolence can appear to have greater 
instinctive appeal when seeking to engage 
the UK public in global poverty. There is a 
risk, as discussed in the previous section 
of this paper, that too much Benevolence 
could lead people to entrench themselves 
further in their in-groups. This could mean 
that they do not reach out to others who 
are distant from them. Yet Benevolence 
is widely recognised by development 
practitioners as an effective way in to 
working with the public. Being all about 
care for one’s in-group, Benevolence values 
are seen to be more in line with people’s 
daily concerns than are Universalism 
values. It is for this reason that values 
campaigning and community organising 
principles traditionally ‘start from where 
people are at’. 
The most successful current exponent of 
community organising in this country is 
Citizens UK. Its success can be measured 
not least by its influence on contemporary 
politics. It hosted the unofficial fourth 
leaders’ debate before the 2010 General 
Election, and has since been adopted by 
the government as an exemplar for the Big 
Society concept. 
Citizens UK’s method is to work with 
existing groups, such as community groups 
and faith groups, giving everyone a chance 
to speak and then reflecting people’s 
concerns back to them. This is followed 
by a process of bringing groups together 
around a common agenda, built up from 
the initial concerns that people voiced. The 
local groups become members of Citizens 
UK, then the executive takes their common 
agenda forward and lobbies for political 
change at a high level ( in Westminster, for 
example, or by targeting London’s Mayor 
as in a recent campaign on the living wage). 
This method of organising has apparently 
been very effective both in engaging and 
empowering local groups, and in making 
the space for political change. From a 
values perspective, it is Benevolence in 
action. The danger, however, is that it 
activates and reinforces Benevolence 
values, to the point where participants 
never get beyond caring for their in-group. 
For some campaigning agendas (such 
as the living wage, or rights issues) that 
may be sufficient. But for ‘bigger than self’ 
problems such as climate change – or 
global poverty – such an approach may  
be insufficient. 
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Instead of taking action on the global 
environment, for example, local groups 
engaged through a Citizens UK-style 
approach may just work on local 
environmental issues such as dog fouling 
and litter. This potential shortcoming 
was confirmed by Neil Jamieson, chief 
executive of Citizens UK, when he spoke 
recently to a meeting of senior leaders 
of UK NGOs: “The agenda comes from 
our members. It usually starts with my 
children, my home, my street. But never 
international development” (personal 
communication). Underlining the differences 
between community organising (grounded 
in Benevolence) and development 
(understood as grounded in Universalism), 
Jamieson continued: “Our people don’t 
go to those meetings [ie those convened 
by development NGOs] – they’re too 
self-serving, too sacrificial. Our people are 
convened around family.”
Ways forward for Benevolence
While observing the potential limitations 
of the Citizens UK approach, as NGOs 
we must acknowledge the apparent 
advantages of engaging the public through 
the Benevolence values which they more 
strongly hold, rather than the Universalism 
values which will be needed in order to 
deepen their engagement with global 
poverty. In any case, Benevolence is next 
to Universalism on the values circumplex, 
and we know from experimental work 
that activating Benevolence values will 
strengthen the adjacent Universalism values 
(see eg Maio et al 2009). 
Yet values theory also highlights tensions 
in campaigning approaches, and reveals 
the potential effects of applying different 
engagement techniques. We cannot afford 
to rule out the chance of people becoming 
empowered campaigners if that means 
engaging them first on the things they 
care about the most (or most often). But if 
their immediate concerns do not coincide 
with those of development NGOs, then 
practitioners will need to have strategies 
in place to strengthen positive values, and 
within this to bring Universalism values to 
the fore. Clearly there is a debate to be had 
over what constitutes positive values for 
development, and this paper is designed to 
inform that debate (and others besides). “The agenda comes from 
our members. It usually 
starts with my children, my 
home, my street. But never 
international development”
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Ways forward for Universalism
As with Benevolence, this section has 
discussed challenges to an approach to 
public engagement grounded wholly in 
Universalism. Many of these challenges 
come from observing how development 
work is done on the ground, driven forward 
by mutual self-interest. Notwithstanding 
these observations, the real-world evidence 
from psychology is clear that the use of 
negative, extrinsic values reinforces those 
values and diminishes people’s intrinsic 
motivations and their pro-social actions. 
If, for short-term reasons, NGOs choose 
to trade on extrinsic motivations, to earn 
revenue or engage new supporters,  
then they must do so, but all the time  
being mindful of the collateral damage 
these tactics will cause to the supporter 
base in the longer term. Such tactics 
should only be employed as part of 
a considered, longer-term strategy 
for building public engagement with 
development – a strategy founded on the 
positive values outlined above. As with 
the example of online organising cited in 
Section 1, the key to achieving deeper 
public engagement is getting supporters 
onto a journey of engagement: from local to 
global, from online to offline. Not for nothing 
is the pre-eminent US online organiser  
called MoveOn.org.
Other ways through the evident tensions 
between the practices and principles of 
development NGOs, and the core business 
of engaging the UK public, will be apparent 
to other readers of this paper. Many of the 
tensions and contradictions in development 
work are likely to remain insoluble – hence 
the need for debate and deliberation to 
work through these tensions as far as 
possible, as development educators  
have advocated. 
There are likely to be no easy answers 
to many of the ethical and values-based 
questions we are posing. Working with 
values can seem formidably abstract – 
values are abstract by their very definition 
(Schwartz 1992). In using frames, however, 
we can find a way to activate values and 
make them usable in public engagement 
activities by development NGOs, as we  
will endeavour to demonstrate in the  
next section.
 
If, for short-term reasons, 
NGOs choose to trade 
on extrinsic motivations, 
to earn revenue or 
engage new supporters,  
then they must do so, 
but all the time being 
mindful of the collateral 
damage these tactics will 
cause to the supporter 
base in the longer term
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3.A frames approach  
to public engagement
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This section...
• Introduces frames, and seeks to 
explain the concept via a brief overview 
of its rich heritage across a number of 
academic disciplines. The relevance 
of frames to development NGO 
practitioners is established, based 
primarily on frames’ ability to tap into, 
and activate, particular associated 
values.
• Focuses in on the idea of cognitive 
frames, as they appear in cognitive 
linguistics. In particular we look 
at frames as practical tools for 
campaigning, in the ‘cognitive policy’ 
work of George Lakoff.
• Sets out Lakoff’s practical distinction 
between ‘deep frames’ (a specific sort of 
conceptual frame that presents a moral 
worldview) and ‘surface frames’ (which 
identify the context of a discourse and 
provide an angle of viewing).
• Explores the practical applications of 
these two interrelated concepts.
3.1 An introduction to frames
We have argued above that it is time 
to reframe international development 
and how the task of tackling poverty is 
constructed and approached. In particular, 
our analysis of the current state of public 
engagement suggests that the public 
is stuck in a transaction frame, with the 
Live Aid Legacy as the dominant model 
of how tackling poverty is understood. 
Breaking out of this transaction frame, and 
the associated aid frame, involves every 
facet of our public engagement work and 
how we communicate it. This includes the 
fundamentals of how we campaign and 
how we fundraise.
In the development sector we are happy 
enough to talk about reframing in this way; 
we all know essentially what it means. But 
what exactly are ‘frames’ and how do they 
work? How might frames lead us to the 
values that we have identified as driving 
public engagement with global poverty over 
the long term?
Frames can be defined as cognitive 
devices that we use to understand words 
and things, and by which we structure 
our thoughts. When we hear a word, it 
automatically evokes in us a set of ideas, 
values and feelings. This set of evocations 
can be described as the ‘conceptual frame’ 
for that word. When we encounter new 
words, we understand them by reference 
to existing frames, and as we acquire 
new frames so our understanding moves 
along. What occurs with words also occurs 
with sensations and experiences: we 
understand the world by reference to our 
existing frames.
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Frames in the mind, in language  
and the world
George Lakoff, a US academic working in 
cognitive linguistics, defines frames in this 
way (2006:25):
“Frames are the mental structures that 
allow human beings to understand reality – 
and sometimes to create what we take to 
be reality …They structure our ideas and 
concepts, they shape how we reason, and 
they even impact how we perceive and 
how we act. For the most part, our use of 
frames is unconscious and automatic – we 
use them without realising it.”
Most obviously, frames are found in 
language. Linguistic ‘discourse analysis’ 
can examine large bodies of text to pick  
out commonly used words and the other 
words they are used in connection with 
(their ‘colocations’). In this way, frames 
can be identified. As we have mentioned, 
frames can also be discerned in the 
everyday world, particularly in spaces 
that have been deliberately constructed 
(including buildings, settlements, institutions 
and policies). 
As well as existing out there in the world, 
and in language, frames inhabit each one 
of us. They are, after all, mental structures. 
Cognitive linguists such as Lakoff argue 
that conceptual frames open up their 
own neural pathways; as the frames 
are repeated (or we encounter them 
repeatedly), so the pathways are reinforced. 
We keep frames in our long-term memory. 
In this way it can be literally said that 
frames structure how we think. They 
essentially become the defaults with which 
we understand the world. This means 
that they are deeply ingrained, but they 
can also be revised over time. Through 
repeated exposure to what we hear, read 
and experience, new frames can become 
dominant in our minds.
3.2 Different concepts of frames 
Lakoff offers a view of frames that we 
wish particularly to highlight in this paper 
because of its potential value to public 
engagement strategies. In recent years 
Lakoff has focused considerable attention 
on how to operationalise frames analysis as 
a practical, campaigning tool. 
Before examining the detail of Lakoff’s 
work, however, we should go back to 
the roots of frames analysis. The frames 
concept has an impressive and diverse 
heritage in academic thought in the late 
20th century, and it is worth setting out a 
few other readings of ‘frames’ in order to 
gain a fuller understanding of the concept. 
This will enable us to understand Lakoff’s 
approach to framing in its wider context.
Frames are the mental 
structures that allow 
human beings to 
understand reality – and 
sometimes to create 
what we take to be reality
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The origins of the frames concept: 
Minsky, Goffman and Fillmore 
The concept of frames seems to have 
burst into a number of different academic 
literatures around 1974. It all began with a 
number of US authors writing from different 
disciplines, some of them connected to 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), exploring frames in relation to their 
different fields. They included Marvin 
Minsky, a pioneer of Artificial Intelligence 
and computer programming; Erving 
Goffman, a sociologist; and Charles 
Fillmore, a linguistics and semantics expert. 
Minsky is generally credited with being the 
first to use the term. He seized upon the 
idea of ‘frames’ as a theoretical means 
of explaining the apparent power and 
speed of human thought processes – 
which Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems 
would need to emulate. Minsky referred to 
‘chunks’ of knowledge – human or artificial 
– as frames. But he did not claim any great 
originality in developing the concept. He 
acknowledged his debt to the psychologist 
Frederic Bartlett, who wrote about similarly 
chunked ‘schema’ in his seminal book 
Remembering (1932). 
In Minsky’s 1974 paper, the frames concept 
is introduced as follows (1974:1):
“Here is the essence of the theory: When 
one encounters a new situation (or makes 
a substantial change in one's view of 
the present problem) one selects from 
memory a structure called a frame. This is a 
remembered framework to be adapted to fit 
reality by changing details as necessary. A 
frame is a data-structure for representing a 
stereotyped situation, like being in a certain 
kind of living room, or going to a child's 
birthday party. Attached to each frame are 
several kinds of information...”
The information that is contained within 
the frame structure is both factual and 
procedural in that it encapsulates both 
what to do and how to do it. The fact 
that these different kinds of knowledge 
are stored together in a chunk is key to 
providing our thoughts with speed and 
ease. The frame structure is described 
by Minsky as “a network of nodes and 
relations” – a structure that can apply to 
brains just as well as to computers. 
The top level of each frame is fixed, as 
there are certain elements of a frame that 
must always be in place for that frame 
to apply. A living room, for example. 
must have walls and a door and some 
comfortable furniture. The lower levels of 
the frame consist of ‘slots’ or ‘terminals’  
in which specific pieces of information can 
be held. These effectively fill in the detail of 
a specific occurrence of a frame –  
eg particular furnishings and decor. 
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Using frames to understand the world
In Minsky’s explanation, we understand 
a scene or discourse by picking a pre-
existing ‘stereotype’ frame. As we fill in 
the detail, in the lower ‘slots’, we continue 
to adapt the pre-existing frame. In some 
cases there may come a point where the 
specific data no longer fit the top-level 
conditions for a particular frame, at which 
point a new frame is substituted in (and the 
observed facts effectively break out of the 
first frame).
Minsky’s idea of frames made up of 
terminals, some of which are pre-set 
and some of which are empty, is central 
to Artificial Intelligence. It was further 
developed by other early thinkers in AI, 
including Roger Schank and Robert 
Abelson, a pair of cognitive psychologists 
at MIT who wrote about the closely related 
concept of ‘scripts’ (1977). Schank and 
Abelson’s thesis follows Minsky’s, except 
that the slots in the frame are patterned into 
a narrative or scenario which is also a part 
of the stereotypical situation, or ‘script’ as 
they call the frame structure. 
In the ‘restaurant script’, for example, 
the slots include ‘chef’, ‘waiter’, ‘diner’, 
‘menu’, ‘main course’ and ‘bill’, and these 
are formed into scenarios that arrange 
them into a narrative (eg we expect the bill 
to arrive towards the end of the script). All 
these elements and arrangements are co-
located in the unconscious brain. They are 
activated when we encounter a restaurant, 
or a discourse about restaurants. The script 
or frame brings with it not just the dictionary 
definition, but all we know factually and 
procedurally about the word or situation. 
This may include how we feel about it, and 
in this way frames can activate values.
Writing around the same time as Minsky 
but from a sociological perspective, 
Erving Goffman uses ‘frames’ primarily to 
explain everyday practices and institutions. 
Goffman talks about frames as “frames 
of reference” and “basic frameworks of 
understanding available in our society for 
making sense out of events” (1974:10). 
Explicitly drawing on Gregory Bateson’s 
use of the term some 20 years previously, 
Goffman defines frames as “Definitions of 
a situation, built up in accordance with the 
principles of organisation which govern 
events – at least social ones - and our 
subjective involvement in them” (ibid:11). 
The definition nicely shows the circular 
quality of frames: we perceive them in 
daily life, or discourse, and we use them to 
structure our process of perceiving.
Charles Fillmore, the semantic linguist, puts 
forward a definition of frames that is similar 
to Goffman’s but applies to the context of 
language. “The frame idea is this. There 
are certain schemata or frameworks of 
concepts or terms which link together 
as a system, which impose structure or 
coherence on some element of human 
experience...” (Fillmore 1975:123). 
Fillmore describes how he first hit upon 
the idea of a frame in thinking about 
sentences. The sentence, which he calls 
the ‘syntagmatic structure’, is the frame 
within which sit ‘paradigmatic items’ – or 
words. These words can be substituted for 
one another within the frame. 
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When worked up, this linguistic approach 
results in Fillmore’s definition of a semantic 
frame as “any system of linguistic choices – 
the easiest case being collections of words 
– that can get associated with prototypical 
instances of scenes” (ibid:124). At the 
end of his first paper on frames, Fillmore 
contrasts his definition of frames with those 
used by Goffman and Minsky. Despite 
differences of detail and application, 
Fillmore concludes that “the sense of 
organisational coherence is present in all  
its uses” (ibid:130). 
In summary it is possible to think about 
frames as ‘structuring structures’ (to 
borrow a phrase from the sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu, writing about ‘habitus’ - 1977).
3.3 Lakoff’s cognitive frames
George Lakoff was an undergraduate 
at MIT under Noam Chomsky, and was 
already well established as a linguist by the 
mid-1970s. His work is cited in Fillmore’s 
paper. Lakoff summarises Fillmore’s main 
thesis thus: “The meanings of all words 
are characterised in terms of frames: a 
hypothesis that has held up for over 30 
years” (Lakoff 2008:251). 
In 1975 Lakoff was one of a handful of 
pioneering academics establishing the 
foundations of cognitive linguistics, a 
discipline that brought an understanding of 
the brain to bear on theories of language 
and meaning. In cognitive linguistics, the 
meaning of a word is not just a simple 
dictionary definition but a cognitive frame 
associated with a particular word in a 
particular language community. Other 
mechanisms, such as metaphor and 
prototyping, can also be involved. 
Cognitive frames, words and the 
association between them are stored in 
our long-term memories – “instantiated in 
the synapses of our brains”, as Lakoff puts 
it (2004:17) – then activated by the use 
of particular words. That activation does 
not just involve some abstract meaning of 
the word. It also involves the experiential 
context (the ‘scene’ as Fillmore or Goffman 
might put it), together with its physical and 
emotional components and any positive or 
negative valuations. 
So meanings of words are not just abstract 
definitions in dictionaries. Access to the 
meaning of a word is gained through 
activating the whole frame, and the 
association between a word and its frame 
is built into the brain through a process of 
neural binding. 
“Neurons that fire together wire together”, 
it has been observed (see eg Lakoff 
2008:83). And the more they fire, the 
stronger the connection – and the more a 
particular frame is potentially referenced 
when activated by a particular word or 
experience. We have to note that different 
individuals and different social groups may 
have different dominant frames – including 
different experiences, values and emotions 
– linked to the same word. 
71
Finding Frames
The unconscious function of frames
All the diverse authors writing about frames 
are keen to stress that the ‘actor’ tends not 
to be aware of the frames he is activating 
as he does so. In Fillmore, for instance, 
frames give the reader access to “aspects 
of the scene never made explicit in the text” 
(1975:125). In cognitive linguistics, shaped 
by recent discoveries in the brain sciences, 
frames become a key part of the structure 
of the automatic brain. They are lodged in 
the ‘cognitive unconscious’, which Lakoff 
says is responsible for 98% of the thinking 
the brain does (Lakoff 2008:3). This is 
consistent with Marvin Minsky’s original 
purpose in evolving the frame concept, in 
order to explain “the power and speed of 
mental activities” (Minsky 1974:1).
Lakoff describes his approach to frames 
as taking advantage of the “massive 
new knowledge” about how we think, 
made available through developments 
in neuroscience (ibid:4). Lakoff’s work in 
cognitive frames can be compared to that 
in behavioural economics, which also builds 
on recent progress in brain science. It is 
fitting that Lakoff’s most recent book, The 
Political Mind, was published in the same 
year as Thaler and Sunstein’s influential 
Nudge (2008); both texts build on the 
foundational work in cognition and decision 
making undertaken by Danny Kahneman 
(a psychologist who won the Nobel Prize 
for Economics). Lakoff devotes a whole 
chapter to discussing the behavioural 
economic principles arising from 
Kahneman’s work, and their echoes  
in his own version of frames theory.
Revealing mirror neurons
One of the more recent discoveries in 
neuroscience is that of ‘mirror neurons’. 
Lakoff was involved in this discovery, and 
built it into his thesis on cognitive frames. 
Mirror neurons, situated in the premotor 
cortex of the brain, have been found to 
fire both when we act and when we see 
someone else acting (2004:54). They also 
form pathways to other neuron circuits, 
which are associated with emotions. 
It is concluded from this that when we see 
someone else acting, we can physically 
feel how they are feeling. This is relatively 
new science: the discovery of mirror 
neurons did not come until the late 1990s, 
led by neuroscientist Marco Iacoboni and 
colleagues at the University of Parma (see 
Iacoboni 2008). There is still much detail to 
be sketched out (for instance, the related 
structures of ‘super mirror neurons’ are 
“just beginning to be studied” – Lakoff 
2008:118). Already, however, the scientists’ 
findings confirm Lakoff’s contention (and 
Fillmore’s hypothesis) that words activate 
whole chunks of knowledge as frames. 
Taking up the concept of mirror neurons, 
Lakoff and his colleague Vittorio Gallese 
neurologically explored the activity of 
‘grasping’. They found that the information 
for understanding the activity was co-
located in the brain with the neurons that 
control the act of grasping, as well as those 
that recognise grasping when they see it 
performed (2008:252). 
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As well as strengthening the cognitive 
frame hypothesis, the discovery of mirror 
neurons allows Lakoff to claim that 
humans are cognitively wired for empathy. 
The worldview that he promotes in his 
recent writing (that of the ‘morality is care’ 
model) is the one that is truest to our 
brain anatomy: we are not naturally utility 
maximising machines in the traditional 
economic mould. Thinking back to Section 
2 on Values above, we can see that a good 
fit is suggested between a frames approach 
to campaigning, and the values that we 
have picked out as supportive of strong 
engagement with global poverty.
Our cooperative instincts
Further overlaps can be found between 
cognitive science and linguistics in 
the work of Michael Tomasello, of the 
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary 
Anthropology in Leipzig. Tomasello is a 
cognitive and developmental psychologist 
who also works with cognitive linguists. 
In many detailed experimental studies, he 
has shown that children have a natural 
tendency towards helping their peers and 
their elders. On the basis of empirical 
investigation he argues that this is a 
specifically human behaviour, not found in 
our primate cousins. 
Moreover, it appears that helping and 
cooperative behaviours are not, as 
some may suspect, a product of cultural 
conditioning and parental training 
(2009:3-5). Tomasello suggests the reverse: 
that young human children are instinctively 
helpful and cooperative, and only later do 
they learn to limit this tendency through 
socialisation into their group norms. 
A complementary approach is taken by the 
primatologist Frans de Waal in his book 
The Age of Empathy. He argues that apes 
do have empathy and a helping instinct, 
and that his must be continuous with the 
human make-up (de Waal 2009). Whether 
we agree with Tomasello that humans are 
special in this respect or with de Waal’s 
assertion that we are like our chimpanzee 
cousins, these biological and psychological 
data support the idea that humans have 
natural empathetic and co-operative 
dispositions. The nature and culture of 
humans are far more complex than those 
of chimps, and this is why we need to pay 
close attention to the cognitive frames that 
humans depend on and deploy.
Such analysis is supportive of the case  
put forward by psychologists such as  
Tim Kasser. Kasser describes extrinsic 
goals as an expression of deficiency in  
the ability to find intrinsic fulfilment. 
Evidence that shows that humans are 
predisposed to be empathetic and to  
act co-operatively is therefore highly 
relevant for how we manage cognitive 
frames. Some cognitive frames (the  
‘deep frames’ we discuss below) will play  
in favour of these predispositions. Others 
will work against them.
Biological and 
psychological data 
support the idea 
that humans have 
natural empathetic 
and co-operative 
dispositions.
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3.4 Lakoff’s cognitive policy
Lakoff’s recent work makes extensive use 
of developments in the brain sciences,  
and thus develops the principles of 
cognitive linguistics. In his more recent 
work we see a shift in focus: from an 
analytical interest in cognitive linguistics 
as the study of language and thought, 
to a practical pursuit of ‘cognitive policy’ 
(the setting of that theory in the context of 
running political campaigns). 
Lakoff’s work since 2000 has been credited 
with helping the Democratic party win back 
public support in the United States (see, 
for instance, Don’t Think of An Elephant!, 
2004). He has used frames analysis to 
reveal the process by which ‘conservatives’ 
in the US have taken control of the 
discourse around key areas of public policy. 
They have done this by using frames to 
embed “their deepest values into the  
brains of tens of millions of Americans” 
(Lakoff 2008:3). 
Framing political discourse
One of Lakoff’s favourite examples is the 
tax relief frame – the consistent use of the 
phrase ‘tax relief’ by those on the American 
right. Lakoff uses ‘tax relief’ both to explain 
the concept of a frame, and to show its 
political application:
“We think, mostly unconsciously, in terms 
of systems of structures called ‘frames’. 
We use our systems of frame-circuitry to 
understand everything, and we reason 
using frame-internal logics. Words activate 
that circuitry, and the more we hear the 
words, the stronger their frame circuits 
get. Take the frame evoked by the phrase 
‘tax relief’ as an example. The word ‘relief’ 
evokes a conceptual frame of some 
affliction, and a reliever who performs the 
action of relieving. So taxes are an affliction, 
a reliever is a hero, and anyone who wants 
to stop him from the relief is a villain. You 
have just two words, yet all of that is 
embedded. If you oppose reducing taxes 
and you use the phrase ‘tax relief’, you’ve 
already lost.” (Lakoff 2010a:12)
Lakoff defines cognitive policy as “the 
practice of getting an idea into normal 
public discourse”, an aim that can be 
achieved by the sustained use of particular 
frames (2008:169). As well as being an 
explanatory device, frames become a 
political tool in the work of Lakoff. This 
turns Lakoff from a cognitive linguist into 
a self-avowed ‘cognitive activist’ (“I think 
the label fits me well” – 2004:74). Lakoff 
has thus put distance between himself and 
other academics, and lays himself open to 
charges from linguists that his approach 
is “an extension of what is supported by 
cognitive science” (in Brulle 2010:87). 
Frames analysis is always a subjective 
endeavour. Goffman frets throughout his 
book over how he should write about 
the structuring frameworks he observes 
in social life, as he can only write about 
frames using the frames he has to discern 
them. However, in the writing of Lakoff the 
cognitive activist, frames analysis becomes 
an explicitly political endeavour. Lakoff 
admits: “As a professor I do analyses of 
linguistic and conceptual issues in politics, 
and I do them as accurately as I can. But 
that analytic act is a political act” (2004:74).
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In the process of operationalising cognitive 
frames for policy purposes, Lakoff and his 
colleagues are drawing on a body of widely 
accepted scientific theory and evidence. 
In developing the application of this 
scientific base, they have provided useful 
clarifications and definitions for the practical 
analysis of political discourse. 
While most cognitive linguists, cognitive 
scientists and cognitive psychologists 
remain in the study or the laboratory, 
Lakoff and his associates have developed 
an approach that has practical value for 
campaigners and other change agents. 
Lakoff is not alone in applying cognitive 
science and linguistics to the analysis of 
practical and political discourse (see Chilton 
1996, for example). What is distinctive and 
important about his approach, however, is 
that he has identified some highly resonant 
frames that have proved to be powerful 
tools for changing how people campaign, 
act and think. It is for this reason that we 
have used Lakoff’s classification of frames 
in our approach.
3.5 Deep frames, surface frames and 
conceptual models
For the purposes of this emerging 
programme of work, we have chosen to 
base our approach to frames on the work 
of George Lakoff and his colleague Joe 
Brewer. Brewer is a frames analyst who 
has applied Lakoff’s thinking to change 
issues. The scientific basis for using the 
idea of cognitive frames is well founded. 
The existence of frames in human cognition 
and communication is widely accepted by 
cognitive scientists, cognitive psychologists 
and cognitive linguists. Frames are an 
integral part of the way our brains work, 
even though they cannot be seen by 
looking at neurons themselves.
It is important to note that, being cognitive 
structures composed of and carrying 
meanings, frames tend to be culturally 
specific. Terms such as ‘house’ or ‘land’ 
activate different frames in different 
cultures. In a development context the term 
‘charity’ does this too.
As we have seen with values, different 
individuals and subgroups use different 
frames as their defaults. This means that 
there are question marks over whether 
some of the most widely applied of 
Lakoff’s frames carry across to the UK 
context. Despite this there are frames 
from Lakoff’s work that resonate with 
the public engagement questions we are 
examining. Moreover, Lakoff has provided 
some terminology to differentiate between 
different kinds of frames. His work in this 
area helps to make the concept of frames 
into practical tools.
Distinguishing between deep frames 
and surface frames
Lakoff and Brewer make the distinction 
between ‘deep frames’ and ‘surface 
frames’, which Lakoff describes as follows:
“Surface frames are associated with 
phrases like ‘war on terror’ that both 
activate and depend critically on deep 
frames. These are the most basic frames 
that constitute a moral worldview or a 
political philosophy. Deep frames define 
one's overall ‘common sense’. Without 
deep frames there is nothing for surface 
frames to hang onto. Slogans do not make 
sense without the appropriate deep frames 
in place” (Lakoff, 2006:29).
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As Joe Brewer would explain it, a surface 
frame sets the context for what a situation 
or discourse is about – effectively it names 
the subject matter, and at the same time 
provides an angle for viewing it. ‘Tax relief’ 
and ‘war on terror’ are examples of surface 
frames, already mentioned, as are ‘house’, 
‘land’ and ‘charity’. These surface frames 
can activate deep frames that are the 
evaluative context for the discourse. 
The link between deep frames  
and values
Deep frames set the subject in a moral 
context, or ground it within a worldview. 
Surface frames can be neutral (they are 
not necessarily charged with positive or 
negative associations) but deep frames are 
always loaded. Deep frames are seldom 
made explicit, but are usually taken for 
granted within the discourse or experience; 
it requires analysis to identify them. 
Deep frames are important as they can 
activate, and reinforce, particular values. 
They function at the level of values;  
for Lakoff, they are neural circuits  
in themselves.
It has to be emphasised that the concept of 
deep frames has only appeared in Lakoff’s 
work very recently. It seems to have been 
coined as part of the political task of 
operationalising frames theory. The term 
‘deep frames’ is only used once in Lakoff’s 
most recent book, The Political Mind, and 
is introduced not as a concept in itself 
but to explain cognitive policy: “Cognitive 
policy is a framing campaign that precedes 
specific material policies. It introduces the 
deep frames, the moral frames that come 
first” (2008:170). 
Some cognitive linguists might prefer to 
write simply about ‘conceptual frames’  
(as indeed Lakoff did in 2004). Conceptual 
frames are explanatory knowledge 
structures stored in the long-term memory. 
They are activated by specific words or 
scenes, and they incorporate particular 
roles and scenarios (much as in the 
definition of a script, provided above). 
Elements of this conceptual frame are  
likely to overlap with other related frames  
to form ‘frame systems’. A single word  
may activate several frames at once in a 
single system. 
To provide a development-relevant 
example, the ‘charity’ frame may evoke 
the semantic meaning of a particular 
kind of social institution, as well as 
our understandings about it and how 
to engage with it. It may also activate 
related conceptual frames, such as those 
concerned with moral judgements about 
aspects of what charities are and what 
they do – a ‘rational self-interest’ frame, 
for example. It is values-linked conceptual 
frames such as these that Lakoff seems to 
be referencing with the term ‘deep frames’. 
From changing frames to changing 
practices and institutions
One of the benefits of isolating ‘deep 
frames’ from other conceptual frames is 
that it enables Lakoff to provide guidance 
to practitioners on how they should 
be used. According to the methods of 
cognitive policy, activating and changing 
deep frames should be pursued as the first 
priority. The aim should be to popularise 
new deep frames that can support new 
surface frames in the form of new practices 
and institutions, and new communications 
messages (eg Lakoff 2010b). 
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“Surface frames relate to our everyday 
language, practices and the wider 
world….Deep frames work at a more 
foundational level, and are in dialogue 
with our values.”
Without having the supporting deep frames 
in place, communications messages 
that aim to draw on deep frames will be 
effectively unintelligible. This is because 
they will have no framework of meaning to 
support them. Switching his dimensions 
from depth to length, Lakoff states: “The 
effectiveness of short-term frames depends 
on the prior effectiveness of long-term 
frames” (ibid:79).
The distinction between ‘surface’ and 
‘deep’ frames is not generally made in the 
cognitive linguistics literature. The term 
‘surface frame’ is only used infrequently 
by Lakoff, although rather more often by 
Joe Brewer and his consultancy Cognitive 
Policy Works. It is useful, however, in 
analysing actual discourse, to talk about 
‘surface framing’. This can be described 
as the practice of selecting words to evoke 
particular conceptual frames or frame 
systems – what Lakoff has described in 
cognitive policy as “a way of framing reality 
to reveal a deep truth” (2008:171). 
One way surface framing works can 
be seen in an everyday example we 
don’t usually notice: in the ‘Commercial 
Transaction’ frame (a widely-described 
conceptual frame) we have roles including 
‘buyer’, ‘seller’, ‘goods’ and money’. 
Framing a sentence around someone 
buying goods is different from framing it 
around someone selling those goods.  
The sentence ‘’Fred bought the beans  
from Bill” evokes the same scenario as  
“Bill sold the beans to Fred” but the focus  
is different: in one case our interest is 
directed to the buyer as the actor, in the 
other it is directed to the seller. 
Frames as propaganda:  
‘the war on terror’
Another way in which surface framing 
works can be seen in a more dramatic 
example: the phrase ‘war on terror’, which 
is a surface framing in the form of a slogan. 
What it does is select one frame that 
encourages us to think in terms of war and 
military means as opposed to, for example, 
international law and policing. The example 
of ‘tax relief’ comes in the form of an 
everyday term but also selectively activates 
a relief-and-rescue scenario, as Lakoff has 
amply shown.
The practical problem with surface 
framing is that it can often be exploited 
for propaganda purposes, or ‘spinning’. 
Lakoff goes to some lengths to explain why 
framing is not just spinning, however (see 
2004:100). When used honestly, he argues, 
surface framing is not trying to disguise 
what is happening, as spinning does. 
This is another reason why Lakoff suggests 
that surface frames will be meaningless 
slogans if deep frames are not put in place 
first. From the practitioner perspective, 
the distinction between deep and surface 
frames is a useful one, helping to identify 
the level on which strategists are working, 
and to ensure that the elements of a 
strategy, a campaign, and a communication 
are all consistent.
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Charting the relationship between  
deep and surface frames
It is clear from the above that, despite 
differences in terminology, certain deep 
conceptual frames, or conceptual frames 
working together, link into values systems. 
We have developed a chart [Figure 10 
below] to clarify the relationships between 
deep and surface frames, values, attitudes 
and other psychological constructs. 
The lefthand side of the chart arranges 
psychological constructs into a hierarchy 
familiar to psychologists (based on Stern 
et al 2005). There are no lines or arrows 
linking the constructs, as influence can  
flow both ways. 
We have set our reading of Lakoff’s 
and Brewer’s surface and deep frames 
alongside the psychological schema. We 
did this to show how surface frames relate 
to our everyday language, practices and 
the wider world, and how they can reflect 
our attitudes towards certain subjects and 
situations (eg ‘land’ or ‘charity’). Deep 
frames work at a more foundational level, 
and are in dialogue with our values. 
The multiple peaks from each deep frame 
up to the surface frames show how a given 
deep frame can be activated by a wide 
variety of surface frames. Reciprocally, the 
use of one or two surface frames does not 
guarantee that a particular deep frame will 
be activated. Different people are inclined 
to respond using different deep frames that 
they depend upon, and it can take several 
surface frames woven together to ensure 
that a particular deep frame is activated as 
the speaker (or ‘actor’) intends.
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There is one further element of Lakoff and 
Brewer’s classification of frames that may 
be helpful in indicating how frames can be 
operationalised as tools for change. Our 
diagram above shows deep and surface 
frames grouped together as ‘Conceptual 
Models’, which are defined by Joe Brewer 
as mental models that enable people to 
interpret “how something works”. Various 
surface and deep frames cluster together  
in conceptual models, to provide a person’s 
understanding of how a certain situation 
unfolds or sustains itself. Clusters of  
deep and surface frames of this type  
might usefully be labelled ‘explanatory 
conceptual models’. 
This approach is consistent with cognitive 
linguistics, and goes back to Lakoff’s earlier 
work. It antedates the introduction of the 
terminology of deep and surface frames. 
For instance, Lakoff’s Women, Fire and 
Dangerous Things (1987) outlines a more 
restricted notion of ‘idealised cognitive 
model’ – one that is similar in many 
respects to Fillmore’s frames and bundled 
together with like concepts of “frames, 
scripts and schema” (ibid:116). The notion 
of an explanatory conceptual model, 
whose function is to provide a ready-made 
understanding of how some part of the 
world (eg the economy) works, is a useful 
analytical tool for our present purposes.
Figure 10: Vertical slices of frames mapped to psychological factors
After ‘A Schematic Casual Model of Environmental Concern’ (Stern et al 1995)
Plus ‘Vertical slices of deep frames, surface frames, and everyday life’ (Darnton, Crompton, Kirk 2010)
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Explanatory conceptual models are of 
interest to us as practitioners (or ‘actors’) 
because they are a way to bring together 
surface and deep frames, and also a 
way to make sure that the stories we tell 
(verbally, or through our actions) activate 
the values in our audiences that we would 
like to encourage. For instance, when the 
subject of global poverty is introduced, it 
evokes sets of feelings, values and ideas, 
which include mental models of how 
poverty works. Often these can involve 
causal chains of thoughts (eg global 
poverty means poor people, who lack 
money, because they live in third-world 
places, which are undeveloped, and need 
to follow first-world principles to develop). 
Within these conceptual models, deep 
frames are also activated, imbuing the story 
of how things work with a sense of how 
things should work, or what makes them 
work. Through these models, narratives 
that superficially relate to different areas 
of policy and everyday life are brought 
together through their basis in common 
worldviews and values. In this way, frames 
can provide an overarching structure to 
bring together apparently diverse agendas, 
such as development, climate change and 
rights issues (see also Crompton 2010).
 
frames can provide an 
overarching structure to  
bring together apparently 
diverse agendas, such  
as development, climate 
change and rights issues
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4.Towards  
positive frames  
for development
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This section...
•	Explains the exploratory methodology 
we used to identify the frames employed 
in development NGOs’ current 
discourses and practices.
• Goes on to identify some hypothetical 
deep frames that we see shaping NGOs’ 
discourses and practices. From these  
we infer some alternative (positive) 
deep frames that are consistent with 
the positive values for development 
identified earlier in this report.
• Extends the process of identification  
from deep frames to surface frames,  
setting out some current surface frames  
for development that are problematic 
in terms of the deep frames and values 
they activate (and these identifications 
are corroborated by the wider 
development and research literature). 
• Tentatively sets out some alternative 
‘positive’ frames for development, 
but on the proviso that these are 
intended as inputs into a wider process 
of deliberation among sector NGOs 
and wider stakeholders (including the 
public). This deliberation is needed to 
amend and refine these frames, ideally 
before taking them out into research.
We have already used a frames perspective 
to explain some of the problems that 
current practices in development 
engagement may be exacerbating for 
sector NGOs, and DFID. Now we would 
like to explore the potential for using 
frames as a practical tool to reframe those 
practices, and to re-engage the public in 
global development. 
Section 2 above has set out the ‘positive 
values’ suggested in the literature, which 
could reshape our communications and 
other engagement practices. At their 
broadest level these are intrinsic values, 
which can enhance engagement in 
all ‘bigger than self’ problems (see eg 
Crompton 2010). In the language of the 
values circumplex, these are Universal 
values, common to tackling global  
resource problems in both the 
environmental and development  
spheres (see eg Schwartz 1992). 
Define, then design
Specifically these ‘development values’ 
include those that Schwartz identifies 
as ‘equality’, ‘social justice’ and 
‘broadmindedness’. We know what these 
values are; by identifying them in specific 
frames, we should be able to develop tools 
to activate and strengthen them in our 
audiences. This strategy is consistent with 
that advocated by Lakoff for advancing 
Progressive values in Don’t Think of 
An Elephant!: first define the values to 
campaign on, then use frames to activate 
and reinforce those values. 
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Ultimately the ‘cognitive policy’ task for 
Lakoff is about “bringing our country 
together around its finest traditional values” 
(2004:95). By analogy, it follows that we 
should be bringing interested parties 
together around positive development 
values, through the activation and 
strengthening of positive deep frames.
4.1 Towards positive deep frames  
for development
It has been mentioned above that Lakoff 
and Brewer have identified a series of 
deep frames that occur in a wide range 
of discourses and situations, particularly 
relating to public policy and campaigning. 
In order to identify which of these relate 
to the development sector, we staged a 
conversation about common practices 
and working assumptions in the UK 
development sector. We invited senior 
NGO staff to take part, and arranged for 
Joe Brewer to observe this brainstorm from 
his office in the United States. Brewer’s 
role was to perform and write up an 
‘extempore’ discourse analysis. 
In developing his analysis Brewer identified 
a few deep frames that resonated with 
our conversation, plus a larger number of 
surface frames that marked out different 
themes in the conversation. He brought 
these frames together in a number of 
conceptual models. 
It should be emphasised that this was 
an exploratory exercise. The frames 
that Brewer identified are effectively 
hypothetical, in that they have not been 
validated through a formal discourse 
analysis exercise. We hope to go on to 
undertake such a task in due course. 
Nor is it likely that our conversation 
captured all the possible surface frames 
that relate to the development sector, or 
that we necessarily reflected them in the 
most rounded fashion. In short, there is 
more work to do here, but these frames 
constitute a starting point. They provide 
the sense that there is great potential in 
developing frame-based tools for the  
sector more rigorously.
Deep frames for development:  
Brewer’s list
The deep frames that Joe Brewer identified 
are briefly outlined below, presented as 
antagonistic pairs. As with the values 
that they draw on, people only tend to be 
able to work within one half of the pair at 
a time – the mind struggles to take two 
contradictory positions simultaneously. 
In terms of values and attitudes, 
psychologists call this ‘cognitive 
dissonance’. In frames theory Lakoff 
shows how conflicting deep frames 
are “mutually inhibitory”, stating that it 
would be physically impossible for the 
brain’s circuits to map the two conflicting 
worldviews together (eg 2008:88). Thus, 
if you are activating one deep frame, you 
are effectively suppressing its partner. 
Each deep frame works as a cognitive 
structure as much by the absence of its 
inverse frame as by the presence of the 
lead frame. In some cases there is no clear 
inverse possible, but ideas of the opposite 
worldview are inherent in the description  
of the frame. 
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A number of the deep frames that  
George Lakoff has identified in his work 
on frames analysis were apparent in our 
conversation about UK development 
NGOs’ practices. These principal deep 
frames are set out below, based on 
descriptions by Joe Brewer. 
1. Rational Actor v Embodied Mind
At the heart of every major social issue will 
be a theory of human nature that asserts 
what is natural and good for human 
communities. Currently, there are two major 
competing theories of human nature that 
are structured by specific deep frames.
The Rational Actor frame is a representation 
of the human mind that presumes a 
specific rational analysis (eg cost-benefit 
calculations to maximise ‘utility’) as the 
principal model for decision-making. This 
frame asserts a world filled with individuals 
who make self-directed choices. Reasoning 
is treated as an abstract, formal process 
independent from the bodily experience 
and represented by mathematical 
formulations, a decision-making ‘calculus’. 
This is by far the most prevalent 
explanatory conceptual model of humanity 
in the world today. Its core tenets have 
been built into the foundations of many 
major institutions including the World Bank, 
the IMF, the marketing industry, public 
education and publicly traded corporations. 
A new model of human nature is taking 
shape in a variety of research areas through 
the cognitive sciences. The emerging 
coherence of this model is captured 
in the Embodied Mind frame, which 
represents the human mind as an emergent 
phenomenon comprised of vital inputs 
from the brain, body, and physical/social 
environments. This frame asserts a world 
that is filled with complex social organisms 
whose reasoning is profoundly influenced 
by neurological and cultural processes. 
In this worldview reasoning is not purely 
a mechanical process like mathematical 
logic, but comes from human interaction 
with the physical and social environment. 
It is equally important that rationality is not 
separated from other elements of humanity, 
in particular emotions and moral values. 
More specifically it is important that it is 
not separated from two key aspects of the 
mind, namely empathy (Lakoff, cf de Wall) 
and the instinct to cooperate (Tomasello, 
and also de Waal).
2. Free Market v Shared Prosperity
Two contrasting explanatory conceptual 
models predominate when considering 
how markets work, where wealth comes 
from, and what the root causes are for the 
economic conditions of people.
The Free Market frame presumes that the 
world is filled with individuals seeking to 
maximise their self-interest (see also the 
Rational Actor frame). Wealth is created 
through the industrious efforts of these 
individuals, whose personal freedoms 
combine with self-discipline to make 
them more competitive. This presumed 
industriousness makes them deserving  
of the wealth they acquire. 
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Free markets are moral: If everyone 
pursues his own profit, the profit of all 
will be maximised. Markets are endowed 
with a natural capacity to produce optimal 
outcomes, so the best path to poverty 
alleviation is to open trade routes for 
corporations (treated as rational actors)  
to generate wealth and increase  
general prosperity.
The Shared Prosperity frame presumes that 
the world is filled with support systems, 
often referred to generically as ‘the 
commons’. These serve as mechanisms 
for generating wealth. The commons are 
owned by everyone, and are available for 
everyone’s use. They may be natural (as 
with aspects of ecosystems) or manmade. 
Wealth is created through shared 
infrastructure that empowers people 
to cooperate on a societal scale. This 
infrastructure may be schools for educating 
the populace, courts that issue trustworthy 
contracts for business transactions, or 
transportation systems for moving people, 
goods, and services. Markets comprise 
one piece of this shared infrastructure and 
are only as effective at creating widespread 
prosperity as their design features allow.
3. Elite Governance v  
Participatory Democracy
Two contrasting explanatory conceptual 
models arise for explaining how democracy 
works and what the proper role is for 
citizens in the decision-making process.
The Elite Governance frame asserts that 
governance is too complicated for the 
everyday citizen. Experts are needed to 
take care of important decisions on behalf 
of the people. These elites are seen as 
the vanguard for democracy because 
they bring their technical expertise to bear 
on challenging problems and protect the 
governing body from irrational whims of 
‘the mob’. In some instances, this means 
replacing direct representation with 
‘rational’ management procedures such 
as cost-benefit analysis (thus making the 
governing body into a rational actor, as 
described above).
The Participatory Democracy frame is 
grounded in a basic belief that people  
are capable of governing themselves.  
While experts are needed to provide 
essential counsel, it is the people 
themselves who should be empowered  
to set their own trajectory. 
Elected officials are accountable to 
the democratic process through direct 
engagement with key publics. The crowd 
is seen as a source of valuable knowledge 
and insight, sometimes referred to as 
‘wisdom of the crowd’. It is the empowering 
potential of this frame in particular that 
provides its resonance with development 
issues: it calls for recognition of the self-
determination of both Southern peoples 
and Northern consumer-supporters.
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4. The Moral Order frame
The Moral Order frame can be described 
as an ‘ancient frame’ or explanatory 
conceptual model that taps into folk theory 
about how the world works (it clearly 
antedates the ‘rational actor’ frame). The 
logic is this: since we owe everything we 
are – our very existence – to the workings 
of nature, nature is seen as moral. Over 
history, natural hierarchies of power 
emerge. But because they are natural, and 
nature cannot be immoral, these traditional 
hierarchies of power are moral. 
The history of who has been most powerful 
then comes to define a natural moral order: 
God above man, man above nature, adults 
above children, Western culture above 
non-Western culture. The moral order is all 
too often extended to men above women, 
whites above non-whites, Christians above 
non-Christians, straight people above gay 
people. As such it underpins many of our 
narratives around charity and mission, 
indeed this frame informs the foundations 
of the big development NGOs that operate 
around the world today. 
The moral order depends on our 
understanding that relationships are 
expressed vertically, and that being placed 
higher in the hierarchy makes one item or 
person morally superior to those in inferior 
positions. This frame is consistent with an 
authoritarian worldview, and inconsistent 
with more egalitarian principles.
There is no clear antagonistic partner for 
the Moral Order frame, so dominant is it 
in our culture. But, like the Rational Actor 
frame, there are alternative models of order 
that have recently emerged. These include 
those developed through cybernetics and 
computer sciences, which arrange items 
into networks non-hierarchically. 
Non–hierarchical structures
Network theory of this kind is generating 
new models of relationships, models which 
may in time crystallise into an alternative, 
non-hierarchical, ordering frame. At present 
these non-hierarchical ‘open’ structures 
capture the redistributive thrust flowing 
from positive values. However, it may be 
that these open networks prove too values-
neutral, or do not automatically activate 
the values we would wish to advance. 
Ultimately the openness of these networked 
relations should be allied to strong moral 
purpose and an explicit drive for equality if 
this frame is not to slip into moral relativism. 
What is needed is a model of ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ that is not premised on ‘up’ 
and ‘down’ or ‘higher’ and ‘lower’. 
Drawing on existing structures in political 
philosophy, cultural anthropology or 
religious worldviews may help to refine this 
frame into something both charged and 
salient. Importantly we can see these ideas 
resonating with contemporary development 
practice, notably South-South partnerships 
of the kind described in Brazil as ‘horizontal 
development’ (discussed in 2.4 above).
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These may not be all the deep frames that 
most resonate with UK development sector 
practices, but this suite provides a solid 
foundation for initial debate. It also offers a 
good basis for further research. It can be 
observed that these deep frames overlap 
and reinforce one another; more than one 
will often appear together in a particular 
discourse or situation. Some other deep 
frames identified by Lakoff and Brewer 
have been deliberately omitted. This is 
because although they might have a similar 
core (and activate similar values), they 
also support a range of less development-
specific surface frames. 
The Self Interest versus Common Wealth 
deep frames are a good example of such 
an omission, overlapping with the Free 
Market versus Shared Prosperity frames 
that we have included. Lakoff’s Strict Father 
versus Nurturant Parent deep frames have 
also not been included in this analysis. They 
are ubiquitous in Lakoff’s cognitive policy 
work (eg 2004; 2008) but we felt they were 
too US-specific to apply readily to UK 
situations and discourses. We also felt that 
they might clash as much as overlap with 
the Moral Order versus Non-hierarchical 
Networks pairing, especially in the context 
of global development.
These are clearly questions for debate, and 
that debate should be informed by further 
empirical work. Most obviously, research 
should be undertaken to link values to 
frames – to establish precisely which values 
are activated by which frames. Formal 
discourse analysis will also be required 
to verify the salience – and the precise 
definitions – of each of the identified frames 
for particular subgroups of people, and in 
particular contexts. 
Even when a substantial body of evidence 
has been gathered, debate should 
continue. The antagonistic structure 
of Lakoff’s deep frames is one of the 
areas that needs to be considered at 
length. Lakoff’s polarities fit well with the 
primary use for which cognitive policy 
was developed: helping ‘progressive’ 
Democrats in the US to reclaim the political 
agenda from the prevailing Republicans. 
Because of this it seems right for Lakoff  
to be partisan about the use of deep 
frames: in the electoral context (after  
re-counts and legal challenges if necessary) 
there are clear winners and losers. It could 
well be observed that this kind of dynamic 
is not applicable to the pursuit of global 
development, in which development  
for all (or a good quality of life) is the 
ultimate objective.
Refining deep frames
In the context of development we are 
right to be particularly cautious about 
advocating one route and judging it correct 
in opposition to another that is posited 
as wrong. As was observed earlier in 
the section on refining positive values for 
development (2.4 above), development 
work on the ground is looking for ‘win-wins’ 
and cannot afford to eschew any route in 
practice, even if that route is apparently at 
odds with ‘positive’ principles. 
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In the context of campaigning for 
transformational change, Malcolm Gladwell 
highlights the importance of networks 
with strong ties and a strong hierarchical 
structure at their core. He gives the 
example of the US civil rights movement, 
largely co-ordinated through the 
hierarchical structure of black churches: “If 
you’re taking on a powerful and organised 
establishment, you have to be a hierarchy” 
(Gladwell 2010:7). 
Gladwell’s argument runs that one 
reason why online activism can’t deliver 
transformational solutions is that social 
media are good at building networks, 
which are the opposite of hierarchies. 
This view echoes the diagnosis of Lakoff’s 
deep frames, which shows hierarchies 
and networks in opposition to each 
other. The key difference is that Gladwell 
reminds us that different organisational 
structures are good for different purposes. 
Sometimes when we are campaigning, 
we will need to make use of hierarchies as 
well as networks. It could be argued that 
the Make Poverty History coalition might 
have benefited from some hierarchy at the 
centre, giving it more control over strategy 
and messaging.
Development blurring boundaries (again)
This example underlines how frames 
theory could be subject to much the 
same criticism as values theory in 
the development context: advancing 
development is simply not a zero-sum 
game. Yet frames seem better suited to 
resisting such criticism because they are 
more complex structures than are single 
values. Frames are in conversation with the 
world, being both the pre-existing structure 
we use to see the world and the structures 
we develop in the act of seeing the 
world. This is why they can be defined as 
‘structuring structures’ as described above.
For instance, the moral order frame is 
likely not merely to tap into the negative 
values of Power and Achievement, but 
also to have elements of ‘charity’ in it that 
tap into Universalist values (recalling the 
‘othering’ effect of development based 
on supposedly universal values – again at 
2.4 above). Frames’ very complexity, and 
their construction and evolution through 
engagement with the world at large, should 
make them resilient to such criticisms in a 
way that values might not be. 
Deep frames are particularly resilient in  
this respect because of their power to 
activate values that might otherwise remain 
abstract and hard to mobilise. This makes it 
harder to measure frames than to measure 
values, but it also makes it easier to work 
with them.
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Deep frames for debate
Looking back across the deep frames 
that Joe Brewer has identified, we would 
like to suggest that practitioners in the 
development sector engage with and 
deliberate over the following deep  
frames, with a view to adopting them 
in their communications and public 
engagement practices:
The Embodied Mind frame,  
not the Rational Actor frame
The Shared Prosperity frame,  
not the Free Market frame
The Participatory Democracy frame,  
not the Elite Governance frame
Non-hierarchical Networks,  
not the Moral Order frame
The implications of a frames approach 
are opened up in Section 5 below, which 
reflects on how NGOs’ practices might 
change if these suggestions are carried 
forward. As deep frames are usually implicit 
in discourses or practices, operationalising 
these frames will involve some 
interpretation on the part of practitioners. 
This is also where surface frames and 
conceptual models come in. 
It will be up to each practitioner to establish 
how to apply these frames in their practice, 
and to decide how that practice should 
change as a consequence. If a coordinated 
approach can be taken across the sector, 
then there is the potential to make inroads 
into how the public engage with global 
poverty. While this journey of change 
cannot be entirely mapped out from this 
point, the deep frames we have identified 
should provide a sound footing on which 
to begin the process of debate and 
collaboration that will be required.
4.2 Towards positive surface frames  
for development
It is relatively straightforward to prescribe a 
set of positive frames at the level of deep 
frames, given that these are so closely 
linked to values and so morally charged. 
Deciding which surface frames should 
be used to foster positive values is more 
difficult. This is because surface frames 
operate much more as situational markers, 
locating the discourse in a particular 
situation or flagging up the subject to the 
audience. As has been discussed in the 
context of conceptual frames in general, 
some frames are not values-linked at 
all, and using them on their own will not 
activate values-related (‘deep’) frames. 
Further contextual clues, and additional 
surface frames, are often needed to ensure 
that a particular deep frame is activated, as 
part of a system of frames. 
If a coordinated approach can be 
taken across the sector, then there is 
the potential to make inroads into how 
the public engage with global poverty.
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Because of this, we cannot recommend 
that a particular surface frame be used in 
place of another, as a means of reinforcing 
particular positive values. But we can say 
that certain surface frames are likely to 
trigger particular deep frames (alone or in 
combination). We can also say, on the basis 
of the ‘do no harm’ principle, that those 
surface frames that link to negative deep 
frames should be used only where they 
cannot be avoided. 
Avoiding, not denying, negative frames
Lakoff’s work makes clear that challenging 
harmful frames, by tackling them head on 
and attempting to refute them, only serves 
to activate and reinforce the frame. This is 
the point made in the title of Don’t Think of 
An Elephant! – when exhorted not to, the 
images and associations of an elephant 
come straight to mind (Lakoff 2004:3). On a 
more serious level, Lakoff frequently quotes 
the example of then President Nixon saying 
‘I am not a crook!’; the US public heard, 
not for the first time, the frame ‘crook’ and 
Nixon was stuck in it (eg ibid). 
Accordingly frames theory suggests that 
practitioners should avoid using negative 
frames, rather than challenging or repeating 
them. Again, we see that practitioners need 
to be wise to the impacts of the frames 
they are reproducing. There will also be 
times, however, when it is possible (and 
indeed desirable) to open these contested 
concepts up to structured debate. We 
will argue for such an approach at several 
points below.
Some of the surface frames that 
we consider to have more negative 
associations are outlined here; many 
more will be apparent to practitioners as 
they proceed with the task of applying 
the recommended deep frames to 
their communications and engagement 
strategies. We have provided a summary 
table that suggests some alternative ways 
of framing particular topics. 
Work in progress 
We are hesitant about specifying positive 
frames, for two reasons. First, we are 
not best placed to do so: practitioners 
must work out solutions that suit the 
audiences and contexts they are working 
with and align with the positive values and 
deep frames we have identified. Second, 
the development sector must evolve 
its own new frames in partnership, and 
then apply them through collaborative 
working. Changing values and frames is 
an ambitious endeavour and can only be 
achieved collectively. 
At no point should this programme of work 
be top-down. Instead the audiences we 
are trying to reach should be engaged 
in a bottom-up process of strategy 
development using deliberative methods, 
wherever possible. It is important to stress 
that different surface frames will work better 
for different audiences, who will be starting 
with different perceptions and frames of 
their own. 
90
Finding Frames
Despite these caveats, however, we  
offer some alternative frames as a starting 
point for the sector’s work on positive 
frames. Our suggestions are supported  
by arguments based in frames theory, but 
also draw on other disciplines. It is hoped 
that readers may use these arguments  
in debates about adopting a frames-based 
approach to public engagement that  
they will pursue beyond the bounds of  
this paper. 
•	‘Charity’
The surface frame that the word ‘charity’ 
presents is problematic if seen from a 
frames perspective. It may evoke the moral 
order deep frame, with its connotations of 
unequal power relations (powerful giver, 
grateful receiver) – hence MPH’s core call to 
action of ‘justice not charity’. 
‘Charity’ is also problematic as a way to 
describe organisations whose goal is social 
or global justice. It taps into the moral 
context of the moral order frame, and the 
transactional context of the free market 
frame, both of which reinforce  
the extrinsic goals related to Social 
Dominance Orientation. 
As we have seen above, this reading is 
consistent with thinking from development 
studies, most notably that of Marcel Mauss 
(see section 2.4). Mauss argues that the 
unreciprocated or ‘negative’ gift sustains 
unequal power balances and renders 
the recipient inferior. This plays out in the 
development economics literature about  
aid dependency. Mauss sums up the 
impact thus: 
“Charity is still wounding for him who has  
to accept it...” (Mauss 1954:65)
The public’s limited understanding of  
what ‘charities’ do should be taken as  
an opportunity to reframe the work of  
these organisations. Note that other words 
that link together in the frames system 
around ‘charity’ – such as ‘donate’ and 
‘donation’ – are also likely to activate the 
moral order frame.
•	‘Aid’
As the object at the centre of the charitable 
transaction, ‘aid’ is perhaps the most 
problematic surface frame in our analysis. 
As the research data show, the public only 
tend to understand it as ‘emergency aid in 
response to disasters’ (eg Creative 2006; 
McDonnell et al 2003). Because of this, to 
use ‘aid’ more widely threatens to reduce 
the work of the sector simply to providing 
a conduit for aid, with the assumption that 
providing aid is the best (or only) way to 
tackle poverty. 
The aid frame is also likely to activate 
the moral order deep frame, as well as 
presenting a transactional or monetised 
model of engagement, grounded in the free 
market frame. The word ‘aid’ is best used 
solely for describing emergency supplies in 
response to disasters – broadly the work of 
the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) 
and UKAid – leaving NGOs and other civil 
society stakeholders (potentially including 
DFID) to pursue broader objectives.
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•	‘Development’
The concept of development is problematic 
because it could potentially activate the 
moral order frame – especially among those 
audiences who are not development sector 
professionals. Lakoff cites ‘development’ as 
one of the prominent frames that link into 
the moral order deep frame. 
The way this frame works in people’s 
consciousness can be explained via a 
metaphor in which each country is a person 
and industrialisation is understood as 
adulthood. ‘Developing’ or ‘undeveloped’ 
nations are represented as children, and 
are therefore backward. The only way they 
will be able to progress to maturity is by 
learning lessons from those higher up the 
moral order (2004:11). 
As suggested earlier, some academics 
working in development studies are 
troubled by the term. We have already 
discussed the ‘othering’ effect of 
‘development as charity’ (based in universal 
values – see Baillie Smith 2008). In a 
paper on the history of UK development 
NGOs in Africa, Firoze Manji describes 
how ‘development’ was introduced 
as a corrective to discourses around 
‘civilisation’. This was at a time when UK 
NGOs were trying to adapt in order to 
move with the spirit of independence in 
African states. 
The problems with the term are explained  
in the language of frames as follows  
(Manji and O’Coill 2002:574):
“The real problem was that the dominant 
discourse of development was framed 
not in the language of emancipation 
or justice, but with the vocabulary of 
charity, technical expertise, neutrality and 
a deep paternalism…. The discourse 
of development...reproduced the social 
hierarchies that had prevailed between 
both groups under colonialism. On this 
basis, the so-called ‘developing world’ 
and its inhabitants were (and still are) only 
described in terms of what they are not.”
As well as picking out the ‘othering’ effect 
of the development frame, Manji suggests 
some alternative frames, including justice 
and emancipation. ‘Development as 
freedom’ is the conclusion of Amartya 
Sen’s celebrated analysis of development 
issues from an economics perspective (Sen 
1999). ‘Freedom’ as an organising structure 
for development work is consistent with the 
wider literature on development studies; it 
also echoes our thinking on deep frames, 
where ideas of non-hierarchical networks 
offer an alternative to the moral order.
Recent work in development studies 
has gone beyond Sen’s model. AK Giri, 
a professor of development studies in 
India, has written that ‘development 
as responsibility’ should replace 
‘development as freedom’ – “because 
freedom discourse...is still incapable of 
undertaking the suffering that the self 
needs to undertake in order to fulfil its 
responsibility to others” (Giri 2005:342). We 
are reminded of the debate (at 2.4 above) 
on the status of universal values in the 
context of development, where the purity of 
Universalism might only represent a weak 
call to action (or worse, an othering device 
for sustaining inequalities). 
92
Finding Frames
It is worth recalling here that the specific 
‘Responsible’ value item is allocated to 
the Benevolence value type, adjacent to 
Universalism. This could strengthen the 
argument for including Benevolence values 
in engagement strategies – see 2.3 above.
It should be emphasised that Giri (unlike 
Sen) still teaches in India. His framing can 
be understood in the context of ‘horizontal 
development’ models based on South-
South partnerships. Accordingly, Giri 
makes space for values of self-interest, 
on the grounds that care for the self is a 
prerequisite for care for others (Giri and van 
Ufford 2003:254, in Baillie Smith 2008:15):
“There is a need to rethink development 
as an initiative in self-development on the 
part of both the subjects and objects of 
development, and ethics not only as an 
engagement in care of the other but also 
as an engagement in care of the self. 
Such a redefinition and reconstruction of 
both ethics and development is a crucial 
starting point for a new understanding and 
reconstitution of development as a shared 
human responsibility, and as a shared 
human possibility.”
•	‘Corruption’	and	‘aid	effectiveness’
This review has cited recent research  
that shows that corruption is the only 
aspect of global poverty that all segments 
of the public are keen to talk about. This 
means that the resulting conversations 
need to be handled carefully. Work on 
frames strongly suggests that ‘corruption’ 
should not be tackled head on, on the 
‘don’t think of an elephant’ principle. It is a 
word that readily activates both the moral 
order and free market frames, reinforcing 
the insoluble nature of the problem of 
poverty thus defined.
We contend that ‘aid effectiveness’ isn’t 
much better than ‘corruption’ because it 
sits within the aid frame, and links to the 
negative deep frames already identified  
with ‘corruption’. With its talk of 
effectiveness, it also reinforces ‘rational 
actor’ models of policymaking. In fact,  
‘aid effectiveness’ could be deemed a  
good example of the kind of superficial 
‘spinning’ that George Lakoff is keen to 
expose: simply turning a phrase around to 
make it sound positive, without tackling  
the underlying frames it activates. 
There is no doubt that attitudes to 
corruption need to be tackled: it has 
become a universally acknowledged 
impediment to addressing poverty and to 
engaging the public. We would suggest, 
however, that taking practical steps to 
tackle corruption (and financial iniquities of 
all kinds such as profiteering by banks in 
developing countries) is a better course of 
action than just talking to the public about 
tackling corruption. Out of such practical 
activity, and deliberative work with the 
public to develop and communicate it, new 
frames should emerge.
•	‘Communications’
‘Communications’ may not be a phrase 
much used when talking to the public,  
but it could be deemed to be an 
unhelpful frame for internal audiences 
and sector partners. In the right context 
‘communications’ could be positive, if the 
terms were understood to mean ‘dialogue’ 
or ‘two-way communication’. As it is, 
‘communications’ can often be associated 
with a range of tools, most probably used 
for marketing purposes, through which an 
organisation ‘gets its message across’. 
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Phrases such as this are revealing of the 
conceptual model of communication that 
is dominant in our culture and so many of 
our organisations. This model has been 
described in terms of a ‘conduit metaphor’ 
(Reddy 1979); it is an encoding-decoding 
model in which a message is sent from a 
sender to a receiver. The message contains 
a meaning, which the receiver unwraps  
or decodes. 
Part of the conceptual problem here is that 
the folk model of communication assumes 
that words are like vessels that contain 
meaning - they have a fixed 'content'. 
Thanks not least to work in cognitive 
linguistics, we can now see this model 
as inadequate. Communication is a co-
operative process, one that involves not 
explicit coding but a good deal of taken-for-
granted background and active inferencing 
(which may be more or less unconscious). 
Instead of having fixed content, 
the meaning of communications is 
emergent. It takes shape in the course 
of communicating, rather than having 
been pro-formulated. The reason why 
NGO practitioners should worry about 
the inadequate ‘conduit model’ of 
communication is that it is one-sided and 
hierarchical: the sender does the work and 
the recipient is disempowered. This kind 
of one-way model of communication can 
activate the negative deep frames of moral 
order, the free market and the rational actor 
(based on the power of information). If we 
are to talk about ‘communications’ then 
we must be sure that the context needs to 
be carefully managed in order to generate 
genuine dialogue.
•	‘Campaigns’
In the development NGO context, 
‘campaigns’ (like ‘communications’) 
is a frame that we should have certain 
reservations about. The main risk is that 
a ‘campaign’ frame activates a certain 
understanding of NGOs as ‘charities’, 
which brings with it assumptions about the 
role of superior Northern supporters and 
inferior Southern recipients. If campaigns 
have short timescales, and prescribed roles 
for ‘activists’ (also potentially problematic), 
then they are in danger of reinforcing 
negative deep frames. Once again, careful 
management of the term is required.
Having identified some surface frames that 
are potentially problematic, we tentatively 
suggest some alternatives in the summary 
table below. These alternative frames 
should be regarded as range finders, 
suggested to help others find positive ways 
of framing their messages. 
The inadequate ‘conduit model’ 
of communication ... is  
one-sided and hierarchical: the 
sender does the work and the 
recipient is disempowered.
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The exercise of finding positive frames is 
far from simple: each alternative comes 
with its own frame system, and activates 
other frames that may not be as positive. 
Additional research is required to explore 
questions such as ‘Can these new frames 
‘stretch’ across different subgroups?’,  
‘Can they ‘travel’ from their current 
contexts to development applications?’  
and ‘What associated frames do they bring 
with them?’.
Once new frames are arrived at, they 
will need careful testing with different 
audience groups. Such testing is needed 
to establish which deep frames and which 
values are being activated. Terms such as 
‘governance’ and ‘NGO’ are already linked 
to other frame systems and may well bring 
problems of their own.
As well as research with the public, 
discussion and debate will be required. 
If consensus can be reached on some 
of the alternative frames, the process of 
values change will be a smoother one. 
Rather than being viewed as an expert 
task, the process of finding frames should 
be understood as a journey of debate 
and deliberation, involving a range of 
stakeholders and audience groups. 
New frames should emerge from these 
stakeholders talking and thinking together. 
Current (negative) frame Alternative (Positive) Frames?
Charity Justice; Fairness
Charities Movements; NGOs
Aid Mutual support; Partnership
Development Well-being; freedom; Responsibility
Corruption; Aid effectiveness Good/bad governance; Fraud
Communications Conversations 
Campaigns Engagements; Dialogues
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A participative approach
Our proposed methodology for frame 
development is more participative than 
empirical; it bears a closer resemblance 
to development education work than 
to market research. The capacity of 
development education to evolve new 
frames has already been spotted by  
Matt Smith, who recommends that “a more 
reflexive approach is suggested which 
goes beyond the instrumentality of ‘frame 
changing’ and brings constituencies  
into the development process” (Baillie 
Smith 2008:15).
In addition to the negative and alternative 
surface frames suggested above, a full 
list of the 21 surface frames identified in 
our stakeholder conversation is given in 
Annex A, described in Joe Brewer’s words. 
It will be noted that these surface frames 
are not divided into positive and negative; 
in some instances they appear to be 
bivalent, or neutral. This is in keeping with 
the theoretical point that some conceptual 
frames are not values-linked. In practical 
terms it underlines that there is further 
analytical and deliberative work to be 
undertaken by those in the sector before 
a working list of new frames for different 
contexts can be drawn up. 
In effect, the frames we have developed 
so far are hypothetical. Formal discourse 
analysis should now be undertaken using 
source material both from the development 
sector and about development issues. This 
is needed to validate and refine our frames, 
and also to identify any additional surface 
frames not included in our conversation.
The work on frames that we have 
undertaken is only in its preliminary stages, 
so it will be evident that the methodologies 
used for operationalising frames analysis 
as a tool for change are in the early stages 
of development. The next section of this 
report sketches out how sector practices 
might look if redesigned around positive 
values and frames. 
Beyond this paper, we propose taking 
our draft frames out to practitioners in the 
sector, to engage and dispute with them. 
We want to encourage reflection about how 
sector practices might look if reconfigured 
around these frames. That is one element 
of a programme of work that we envisage 
carrying forward in collaboration. Our 
goal is to embed new frames not only in 
development NGOs but also within DFID, 
among stakeholders across the wider NGO 
community, and in society as a whole (see 
Section 6 below for next steps). 
 
Formal discourse analysis should  
now be undertaken using source 
material both from the development 
sector and about development issues.
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5.Implications  
for practice
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This section...
• Applies the thinking in the paper to 
date on positive values and frames, 
setting out some implications for what 
development NGOs’ practices might 
look like if values and frames theory 
were applied across their work. These 
implications are intended as inputs into 
the urgent debate required within and 
beyond the sector; they are intended 
also to demonstrate the transformative 
potential of adopting a values and 
frames approach.
• Sets out implications as they relate 
both to development NGOs internally 
and to their work in collaboration 
with one another and with the wider 
third sector. Specific implications are 
described for development NGOs’ 
campaigns, fundraising and charity shop 
teams. 
• Identifies implications for the UK 
government, including the possibility of 
a wider convening role across the loose 
collaborative and deliberative networks 
that will be required.
So far, this report has identified that the UK 
public’s engagement with global poverty is 
shallow and limited. It has also proposed 
some potential routes to addressing this 
problem, based in values theory and frames 
theory. Now, in this penultimate section, 
we explore the transformative effects such 
theories could have on the practices of 
development sector bodies. 
The implications set out in this section 
represent challenging ideas that could be 
taken up across the sector. In the context 
of this report, they also represent concrete 
illustrations of how frames thinking can 
result in practical changes with the potential 
both to cut across everything NGOs do and 
to ripple outwards to re-engage the public.
Models for behaviour change
Engaging the public in global poverty 
can be seen as a behaviour change task, 
in which the purpose is to encourage 
supportive actions for tackling global 
poverty. Those actions can be developed 
through direct approaches to the public 
(such as communications or fundraising), 
or by providing people with a supporting 
‘infrastructure’ (such as shops, campaigns, 
and opening up fairtrade markets). 
Behaviour change as a practical approach 
starts with an understanding of behaviour 
– or ideally multiple ways of understanding 
behaviour (just as in this paper we have 
used both values and frames theories). 
In recent guidance on behaviour change 
produced for the UK government (drafted 
by one of the co-authors of this paper) it  
is stressed that there is no one winning 
model for delivering behaviour change 
(Darnton 2008). 
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Instead we need to look at myriad models 
and theories that have something to say 
about human behaviour. In so doing, the 
practitioner will ask different questions, 
identify different problems, and suggest 
different interventions. In this kind of 
approach, doing behaviour change is 
about opening up safe spaces for thinking 
about behaviour, deliberating together 
with other stakeholders in the problem, 
and trialling multi-stranded interventions – 
which can then be monitored and refined, 
or abandoned. This approach is not about 
experts in one discipline (even a loosely 
bounded one like behavioural economics) 
having all the answers, and everyone  
else following.
Models from psychology, sociology  
and development studies
Such an approach to behaviour change 
resonates with the themes of this paper, 
and specifically ties in to the multiple 
disciplinary approaches which we have 
adopted here. These include:
 
•	Social	psychological	approaches
In presenting his Theory of Interpersonal 
Behaviour in 1977, US social psychologist 
Harry Triandis wrote about models as 
“concepts that will help people use their 
heads” (Triandis 1977:283).
•	Sociological	approaches
In presenting the new concept of frames in 
the context of Artificial Intelligence, Marvin 
Minsky explains how the slots in a frame 
effectively determine what questions we 
should be asking in a given situation. In 
the children’s birthday party frame, for 
example, the questions might include ‘what 
should I wear?’ and ‘what should I give 
as a present?’ (Minsky 1974). This idea of 
frames as frameworks for understanding 
situations is developed in sociology by 
Erving Goffman (1974).
•	Development	studies	approaches
In calling for more deliberative and 
participative activities to generate new 
notions of development and build the 
legitimacy of NGOs, Matt Smith quotes 
Michael Edwards advocating the setting 
up of “safe spaces for dialogue” as central 
to the strengthening of global civil society 
(Edwards 2000 in Baillie Smith 2008).
Each of these approaches resonates with 
the themes of this paper and provides clues 
about how to get to grips with the different 
theories available and how to navigate 
the tensions between them. If there is no 
one winning model, then as practitioners 
we do not need to choose one theoretical 
approach and rigidly adhere to it. In this 
context, values and frames become 
lenses through which to read problems 
and think through possible solutions. At 
the same time, the act of thinking through 
problems becomes an important act 
of doing; deliberation itself will produce 
transformational change in sector and 
public practices. 
This approach is not about experts 
in one discipline (even a loosely 
bounded one like behavioural 
economics) having all the answers, 
and everyone else following.
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Shifting between different theoretical 
approaches can be difficult. For those 
accustomed to finding the right answers, 
it is likely to be a frustrating process. For 
complex ‘bigger than self’ problems, 
however – including those characterised 
by blurred boundaries, as is the case 
with international development – multiple 
perspectives are likely to yield the most 
fruitful approaches. The capacity to  
shift between perspectives is key to 
developing solutions. 
Marvin Minsky writes about this as one 
of the inherent strengths of frames as 
organising concepts. He argues that ‘view 
changing’ (ie shifting perspectives, or the 
frames through which a situation is viewed) 
“is a problem-solving technique important 
in representing, explaining and predicting” 
(Minsky 1974:26).
No silver bullet
In short, as so many policy papers on 
behaviour change conclude (eg Defra 
2008), there is no ‘silver bullet’ that we 
can turn to here. Yet the two theoretical 
perspectives that we chiefly adopt in this 
paper – values and frames – come up  
with a clear prescription of the objectives 
we should set ourselves in order to extend 
and deepen public engagement in global 
poverty. More research needs to be done 
to refine and validate these assertions. 
But for the moment they provide sufficient 
foundations to enable the primary task  
of deliberating as a sector, and with wider 
audiences and stakeholders, on how  
to reframe development, and re-engage  
the public.
This section opens up the debate by 
drawing out some clear implications for 
the sector about how our practices could 
change if we applied the values and frames 
prescriptions in their purest form. If we 
begin by reiterating the recommendation 
that positive values and frames should drive 
public engagement with global poverty, 
then we can identify a series of practical 
implications. Some cut across the entire 
third sector, while others apply only to 
development NGOs and their structures, 
or to specific public engagement activities. 
Finally, implications for the role of 
government are also spelled out.
5.1 Positive values
This paper has reviewed strong empirical 
evidence on the role of certain values and 
goals in motivating pro-social attitudes 
and behaviours, including actions to 
tackle global poverty. Activating these 
intrinsic goals and universalism values 
should secure public engagement with 
development for the long term. It should 
also help to bring about a shift in societal 
values that should ultimately increase 
the pool of engaged public supporters. 
Importantly, the evidence shows that 
activating conflicting motivations – such 
as values of power and goals of financial 
success and image – will diminish the 
potential for sustained public engagement. 
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The empirical evidence for the causal 
relationship between values and 
behaviours is more developed in relation 
to pro-environmental and other pro-social 
behaviours than to behaviours linked  
with global poverty. But global poverty  
can be seen as one of the ‘bigger than  
self’ problems for which positive values  
can work. Based on such broader 
evidence, as well as evidence relating  
to specific development behaviours 
(eg buying fairtrade), we have identified 
the following values and goals as either 
positively contributing to, or negatively 
detracting from, public engagement with 
global poverty. 
The values and goals we are 
recommending are not uncontested. 
For instance, universalist values are 
seen as problematic by some working in 
development studies (because of their 
‘othering’ effect). Benevolence values are 
held by many practitioners to be important 
ways of engaging the public, although 
they do not naturally appear to motivate 
concern for others from whom that 
public is distant. Self-interest, meanwhile, 
which is associated with ‘negative’ self-
enhancement values, is seen to be a key 
driver of development practice on the 
ground in the global South. 
Positive values to debate
It is vital that debate occurs around these 
issues. Given the problem of static or falling 
levels of public engagement in the UK, this 
report’s recommendations for a move to 
positive values seem timely and necessary. 
But they must work within the practical 
limits and tolerances of the sector.
Our proposed approach is to follow the 
recommendations inherent in values 
theory, encouraging practitioners in the 
sector to engage with those values and 
enter into a collaborative debate. At the 
same time, we will seek to validate the 
relationships between these positive values 
and supportive actions for tackling poverty, 
through further research. 
‘Positive’ values for development,  
to be activated and reinforced: 
the ‘Universalism’ values of Equality;  
World at Peace; Social Justice.
Of secondary importance,  
also to be activated and reinforced:
the ‘Universalism’ values of A World of 
Beauty; Unity with Nature; Protecting the 
Environment; Broadmindedness; Wisdom.
Of potential importance, and only to be 
activated for specific purposes as part of 
a longer-term strategy (especially in order 
to engage the previously unengaged and 
the outright sceptical): the ‘Benevolence’ 
values of Helpful; Responsible; True 
Friendship; and Meaning in Life.
‘Negative’ values for development,  
to be avoided and diminished: 
the ‘Power’ values of Social Power; Wealth; 
Authority; Preserving my Public Image.
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‘Positive’ goals for development,  
to be activated and reinforced: 
the ‘Intrinsic’ goals of Community Feeling; 
Self Acceptance; and, as part of a longer 
strategy, Affiliation.
‘Negative’ goals for development,  
to be avoided and diminished: 
the ‘Extrinsic’ goals of Financial Success; 
Popularity; Image; Conformity.
5.2 Positive deep frames
This paper has described how particular 
deep frames were identified as part of 
the staged conversation we held with key 
NGO staff, which was analysed by Joe 
Brewer. From that set of deep frames, 
we have identified those that we feel will 
most strongly tap into positive values for 
development (see Section 4 above). 
Again, these deep frames are not 
uncontested, and should be opened up 
to debate across the sector. They should 
then be refined in response to that debate. 
It will be interesting, for example, to test 
how well our frames can respond to the 
‘blurred boundaries’ of some development 
activity, and whether their simple polarities 
are sufficient to cope with the complexities 
of development NGO practices. 
Following the process of debate that we are 
advocating, we intend to validate the deep 
frames through formal discourse analysis, 
and also to explore their relationship to 
specific positive values, through primary 
research. For the moment the status 
of these deep frames must be deemed 
hypothetical, and their primary purpose is 
to serve as starting points for debate. The 
deep frames we have suggested can be 
summed up as follows:
The ‘Embodied Mind’ frame  
(not the ‘Rational Actor’ frame)
The ‘Shared Prosperity’ frame  
(not the ‘Free Market’ frame)
The ‘Participatory Democracy’ frame  
(not the ‘Elite Governance’ frame)
‘Non-hierarchical Networks’  
(not the ‘Moral Order’ frame)
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5.3 Positive surface frames
As with the deep frames listed above,  
so this paper has identified some surface 
frames that we feel can be supportive, or 
detrimental, to advancing positive values 
for development. These surface frames 
are set out in Section 4 in full. They are 
necessarily hedged about with considerable 
caveats about the exercise of identifying 
them. These reservations are principally 
methodological: the frames were derived 
from our subjective reading of Joe Brewer’s 
analysis of our staged conversation,  
and will need to be validated and refined 
both through formal discourse analysis  
and through deliberative research with  
the public. 
It is worth recalling, however, that the 
identification of negative frames is 
also supported by points from other 
disciplinary approaches and by primary 
research with the public. Because of 
this we feel confident about identifying 
certain problematic terms with negative 
associations, and we believe it is 
appropriate to regard the deep frames 
we have identified as significant in a 
development context.
Our reservations about specifying the 
positive surface frames are also procedural: 
practitioners themselves will be best 
placed to find the surface framing that 
works for them, and this exercise should 
be undertaken in collaboration between 
diverse practitioners. The sector will need 
to work in concert if a values shift is to be 
brought about. 
Most importantly, these surface frames 
should be viewed as the logical outcomes 
of adopting particular positive deep 
frames. As Lakoff argues, surface frames 
have nothing to hang from if there are no 
deep frames in place; they become mere 
slogans. We recommend that practitioners 
engage with our deep frames, and explore 
how to embed them in their organisations 
and activities. When they have done this, 
it will then be the right time to consider 
how they ‘surface frame’ their messages. 
As they reach this point, our suggestions 
for positive surface frames may represent 
useful range finders for the task. 
Our summary table is provided below, 
with current negative frames set against 
suggestions for alternative positive frames. 
We are more confident about the negative 
frames we have identified than the positive 
ones we have put forward: our positive 
frames are necessarily more speculative 
until practitioners have subjected them 
to a process of vigorous deliberation 
and debate. We also need to subject 
our surface frames to further research, 
particularly observing differences in  
context and across different subgroups  
of the public.
Practitioners themselves 
will be best placed 
to find the surface 
framing that works for 
them, and this exercise 
should be undertaken in 
collaboration between 
diverse practitioners.
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5.4 Implications for development NGOs
If we follow this report’s recommendation to 
use positive values and frames to engage 
the UK public in global poverty, we arrive 
at a set of implications for UK development 
NGOs, and other stakeholders – including 
the UK government.
Rebalance campaigns and  
fundraising approaches
The first, overarching implication is that 
development NGOs should rebalance 
their current focus on campaigns and 
fundraising with a sector-wide set of 
objectives geared to build deep public 
engagement with global poverty over  
time. All the other implications described 
below can be inferred from this one 
overarching goal. 
This implication may prove challenging to 
acknowledge, let alone adhere to. A shift 
away from ‘emergency aid’ fundraising may 
diminish public donations in the short term: 
fundraisers know that showing graphic 
images of suffering works. Moreover, we 
do not know what the impact will be on 
revenue raising if we hold conversations 
with the public grounded in positive values. 
Given the success of the transactional 
model, and the fact that the most effective 
fundraising approaches are known to be 
the most transactional (Sport Relief’s Chris 
Moyles film of a child dying in hospital, for 
example), it is likely that a complete shift 
away from such approaches would result 
in a noticeable drop in income. This means 
that it is unrealistic to suggest such a total 
change of tack by development NGOs. 
Current (negative) frame Alternative (positive) frames?
Charity Justice; Fairness
Charities Movements; NGOs
Aid Mutual support; Partnership
Development Well-being; freedom; Responsibility
Corruption; Aid effectiveness Good/bad governance; Fraud
Communications Conversations 
Campaigns Engagements; Dialogues
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A number of commentators who work 
in and around the sector have argued 
that it is unrealistic to expect NGOs to 
step away from the marketplace and 
overturn their business models (see eg 
Baillie Smith 2008). But at the very least, 
adopting positive values as a critical lens 
or thinking device could enable NGOs to 
judge both the likely collateral damage 
of their strategies and their impact on 
public engagement in the longer term. 
Our analysis of the problem of public 
engagement suggests that without a 
fundamental change of tack, the gradual 
ebbing away of public support for tackling 
poverty will continue. 
 
One way of beginning to move away 
from transactional approaches is to use 
them more sparingly, as part of longer-
term engagement strategies based on 
positive values. Appeals based on financial 
transactions or disempowering images of 
human suffering (both of which tap into 
extrinsic motivations and negative frames) 
may prove impossible to give up in the 
short term. But their negative impacts could 
be somewhat limited if they were used only 
to pull in new supporters – supporters who 
could then be offered only engagement 
activities based on more positive values 
and frames. 
This strategy builds on current good 
practice in Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM), but constructs the 
‘supporter journey’ model around a shift 
in values and frames. The risk here is 
obvious: that the mass-market ‘front–end’ 
of public engagement will remain essentially 
unchanged, with values- and frames-
based activities reserved for more engaged 
subgroups. But ways to move away from 
such transactional activities may also be 
developed over time, if new supporter-
journey models can be found.
The empirical evidence for the potential  
of positive values to drive donations is very 
scarce, but there are clues based on the 
data showing that universalism values are 
good predictors of charitable giving (Cohrs 
et al 2007). If the frames approach does 
prove less effective for fundraising in the 
short term, it should provide deeper and 
wider engagement in the medium term  
and ultimately broaden the potential 
supporter base for all development-sector 
NGOs. The challenge is to work out ways 
to move to a future model of engagement 
– as yet undefined – that activates positive 
values and secures public donations now 
and for the future. It is vital that fundraisers 
contribute to the debate about how to 
operationalise frames theory in  
their organisations.
Go beyond the charity approach
A positive frames approach ultimately 
amounts to a different ‘face’ for UK 
development NGOs. We need to get 
beyond notions of ‘charity’, as these are 
bound up in connotations of mission and 
aid – both of which reinforce negative 
frames of the free market and the moral 
order. What we should be moving towards 
is a ‘third sector’ status: independent 
organisations working in partnership with 
governments North and South (particularly 
civil society in the South), aligned primarily 
by their core values. The goals at stake are 
global development (enhanced well-being) 
and good governance, not disaster relief. 
We need to get beyond 
notions of ‘charity’, as these 
are bound up in connotations 
of mission and aid
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Members of the public who support such 
new-style NGOs are more like change 
agents than activists; their contacts with an 
NGO are transformational experiences, not 
transactions. This implication is in keeping 
with thinking in development education, 
concluding that NGOs should regard their 
range of public engagement activities 
as “an opportunity for dialogue and 
deliberation rather than a one-off purchase” 
(Baillie Smith 2008:14). 
Incorporate all public-facing activities
It follows from this reading of frames 
theory that NGOs should implement this 
approach across all their public-facing 
activities. Frames theory is clear that 
attempting to embed positive frames solely 
through campaigns messaging or brand 
communications is extremely unlikely to 
have an impact on the frames of core 
supporters, let alone the wider public. 
Collaborate across the development 
sector and beyond
NGOs simply do not have the firepower 
within the public sphere to shift frames 
by themselves. Their voices and activities 
are too small amid the din of comment, 
opinion, advertising, and day- to-day 
business raging in national life. 
Even the biggest – like Oxfam, with its  
99% brand recognition and a near 
ubiquitous high street presence – cannot 
hope to affect dominant social frames on 
their own. That said, NGOs are critical 
contributors in frames that dominate issues 
of social justice. Unless they lead the way 
in applying frames theory, it is difficult to 
imagine who might. 
It follows that NGOs should collaborate 
around their shared values base. This 
represents a real challenge to the current 
business model, based on good donor 
stewardship and inter-agency competition 
and differentiation. As MPH showed, 
collaboration is hard to achieve. It may be 
sensible to build a series of open-ended 
and non-binding engagements, following 
the format of thinking spaces. Importantly 
such a collaboration, based on positive 
values and deep frames, would logically 
extend beyond the development sector – 
responding to the calls made for a shared 
values platform across the third sector in 
Common Cause (Crompton 2010).
Stick resolutely to a positive  
values agenda
Despite the open-ended approach 
necessary for creating thinking spaces, 
a thoroughly joined-up strategy and 
programme of work will be needed if we 
are to bring about a frames shift in society. 
Collaborating NGOs will need to hold firm 
to an agreed agenda around positive values 
and frames, and not revert to habitual ways 
of campaigning and fundraising during the 
period of reframing. 
In themselves, sector practices based on 
collaboration rather than competition would 
transform the sector. They would activate 
more positive values, associated with the 
‘shared prosperity’ frame. However, this 
kind of collaboration will require a new level 
of focus. It may become desirable to set up 
a steering group to develop a medium- to 
long-term strategy for partner NGOs that 
are looking to ensure a common approach 
in designing public engagement activities.
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Identify new indicators to  
measure success
With new goals of driving public 
engagement through the instilling and 
reinforcing of positive values, new success 
measures will be required. It is suggested 
that one implication for evaluation methods 
should be the adoption of formal discourse 
analysis, to see the extent to which positive 
frames developed in collaboration by the 
sector have been enacted in different 
communications contexts: in NGO 
materials, in media features and in the 
public’s everyday conversation.
5.5 Implications for development  
NGOs’ campaigns
Enable active participation
If we take the prescription of positive values 
and frames into the arena of campaigns 
by development NGOs, there is a clear 
implication that such campaigns should 
be designed to provide opportunities 
for active participation by supporters – 
including transformational experiences 
wherever possible. This approach activates 
the embodied mind frame, and seeks to 
move the balance away from transactional 
models of engagement. 
Universalism values correlate strongly with 
civic participation. To tap into this people 
should be able to do a variety of things in 
relation to a campaign, including playing 
an active part in developing the campaign 
itself. In this way our model of campaigning 
can be transformed. 
Volunteering is an obvious vehicle for 
such involvement, but many other forms 
of participation that build agency in 
the supporter are available. Some of 
these could arise from the dialogue and 
deliberations that are called for in the multi-
disciplinary approach to change advocated 
in this paper. Such activities give people 
agency, and they also reinforce the qualities 
of self-determination that are part of 
intrinsic motivations.
Facilitate deeper engagement
Campaigns should place a premium on 
depth rather than breadth of engagement. 
Instead of attempting to lower barriers to 
entry and make taking part more quick and 
simple – thereby amassing large numbers 
of shallow actions based on appeals to 
ease and urgency – campaigns should  
be designed to encourage deeper, more 
active participation. 
Frames theory suggests that what we 
should aim for is a networked model of 
engagement. Supporters should be drawn 
together to form empowered networks 
in which they debate and formulate 
plans of action themselves, in contrast 
to current models. The current approach 
is dominated by campaign actions being 
worked up between individual campaigners 
and the NGO, or dictated by the NGO to 
campaigners. There is a need for active 
networks not only across countries in the 
global North but also – critically – between 
North and South.
Campaigns should be designed 
to provide opportunities for 
active participation by supporters
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Avoid short-term, simplistic messages
Campaigns should move away from 
short-termism in messaging, notably 
anything that suggests complete solutions 
in short or imminent timescales (eg Stop 
Climate Chaos, Make Poverty History, End 
World Hunger) or claims of opportunity 
(“last chance to…”; “it’s now or never”). 
Such claims too often inject short-term 
urgency at the expense of longer-term 
engagement. They also invoke a rational 
actor frame through the assumption of a 
linear progression of problem–solution that 
is rarely accurate, and which suppresses 
acceptance of the messy nature of change 
that is inherent within network frames.
There will, of course, be moments when 
tight timescales must be made explicit 
– sometimes there is real urgency or a 
make-or-break moment – but frames 
theory implies that these should be the 
exceptions, not the rule. As with fundraising 
strategies, it is suggested that by moving 
to a longer view of engagement based 
on supporter journeys, tactics that are 
used to achieve short-term goals may be 
outweighed by those designed to deepen 
engagement over the longer term. 
Use celebrities sparingly and judiciously
Following on from the above, the evidence 
from values theory suggests that celebrities 
should be used extremely judiciously. 
This is not just the same old point about 
matching the celebrity to the cause, and 
not overusing well known figures. From 
a values and frames perspective there 
is a fundamental problem in using highly 
individualistic consumer icons as focal 
points for a campaign. 
The association between the dominant 
celebrity culture and consumerist values 
(especially social power and financial 
success) has been demonstrated above, 
in the context of Make Poverty History. 
The involvement of some celebrities is 
likely to forge unwanted connections to the 
negative frame of the free market. Using 
celebrities to generate headlines for a 
campaign can serve to draw its discourse 
up to the surface, making it broad, shallow 
and short, instead of deep, long and 
rewarding. There may be moments when 
brevity and a simple and immediate impact 
are desirable, but again only as part of a 
longer- term strategy based on positive 
values and frames.
There may be exceptional cases to this 
principle. Not all celebrities are the same, 
and some are regarded less as ‘consumer 
icons’ than others. Lenny Henry and David 
Attenborough, for example, can be seen 
as people in the public eye who hold some 
moral authority but are not obviously on the 
‘celebrity circuit’. In his analysis of Make 
Poverty History, Graham Harrison singles 
out Bono and Bob Geldof as two particular 
(and different) cases. They brought their 
own frames to the campaign, with different 
effects (Harrison 2010). 
By moving to a longer view of engagement 
based on supporter journeys, tactics that 
are used to achieve short-term goals may 
be outweighed by those designed to deepen 
engagement over the longer term.
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As well as differentiating carefully between 
celebrities, we have to recognise that 
the impact of deploying a celebrity varies 
according to the context in which he or 
she is used. Campaigns can be highly 
effective when they successfully position 
the celebrity as the public’s ‘friend on the 
ground’, acting as a proxy to the full-body 
experience of witnessing everyday lives in 
poor countries. Examples of such effective 
celebrity-based campaigns were found 
during PPP research into Sport Relief  
films (Darnton 2007). 
Interestingly the successful stories all 
leveraged a sense of ‘common humanity’. 
This encompassed both the Southern 
people featured and the Northern 
celebrities reporting to the television 
audience back home. These celebrities 
were able to take up the role of ‘someone 
like me’ for viewers if the layers of their 
celebrity status were peeled back (for 
instance through a genuine emotional 
bond to the place and people, or a visceral 
response to the suffering). In such cases, 
the potential negative values activated 
through the use of celebrities may be 
offset by the activation of more intrinsic 
motivations, such as affiliation and 
community feeling – although this is a tricky 
balancing act to perform (as values theory, 
and PPP research findings, attest). 
5.6 Implications for development NGOs’ 
fundraising appeals 
Move away from  
transactional approaches
As discussed above, modern NGOs are 
businesses and must operate as much  
in the marketplace and along financial lines 
as any other corporation. But if the lessons 
from values and frames theories are to  
be followed, new models of fundraising  
will need to be evolved to shift the  
balance of engagement away from 
transactional models. 
Using direct appeals as just the opening 
push in a longer-term and more positive 
strategy has already been identified as one 
way to minimise the collateral damage to 
public engagement. Other ways to redraw 
fundraising activities so they do not rely 
so heavily on self-interest/national interest 
arguments should also be explored. We 
need to find ways to avoid the free market 
and moral order frames (eg by avoiding 
the use of disempowering imagery) and 
minimising the use of transactional frames 
such as ‘£5 buys…’ appeals, and child 
sponsorship drives. 
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Donations could be presented as 
supportive of an NGO’s long-term work, 
based on partnership working to help 
recipient countries to develop. This 
kind of approach could incorporate 
positive frames such as education and 
infrastructure projects, and the building of 
better governance and new institutions. 
Conventional ‘emergency’ aid should 
always be positioned as a part of this 
bigger picture. Ultimately the aim is 
enabling development, ideally reframed  
as advancing well-being, pursuing 
freedoms, or building a sense of personal 
and shared responsibility. This case should 
be argued on the grounds of common 
humanity, and with reference to positive 
values wherever possible.
Expand community fundraising
Further fundraising methodologies that 
activate the embodied mind and shared 
prosperity frames should be explored and 
enhanced, as we currently cannot readily 
identify fundraising approaches that evoke 
these deep frames. While it is challenging, 
we do not think that the quest for new 
approaches is unachievable.
New strategies could include more 
community fundraising, where individuals 
take an active part in activities instead of 
relying heavily – as many NGOs do – on 
individual ‘chequebook’ or direct-debit 
giving. These more prevalent forms of 
giving reinforce transactional frames and 
other problematic frames around ‘charity’ 
and ‘aid’. 
5.7 Implications for development  
NGOs’ charity shops 
Return to your roots
If charity shops’ purpose is simply to 
increase revenues for their organisations, 
they will present a problem to NGOs trying 
to break out of the transaction frame. In this 
particular frame supporters are consumers, 
while NGOs are seeking to build demand 
for the products they sell. But supporters 
are also donors: they give both unwanted 
items and their own time as volunteers. 
From a values and frames perspective, 
it follows that charity shops should go 
back to their roots, doing all they can 
to promote the ‘giving’ aspects of the 
shop above the ‘buying’ ones. Closing 
up the loop between the two will also 
provide a strong circular model, one that 
is consistent with Universalism values and 
principles of shared prosperity. Reducing 
the emphasis on the ‘selling’ side is also 
important. Not selling new product (as 
opposed to donated items) is one clear 
way to differentiate charity shops from other 
models. In this way, it is hoped that charity 
shops could become more expressive of 
the positive values of their NGO owners.
Move away from high-street retail norms
As well as exemplifying the values of 
their parent organisations, charity shops 
represent a rich resource for embedding 
positive frames in everyday life. They are 
the frontline of public engagement, right in 
the middle of the high street. Our reading 
of a frames approach suggests that charity 
shops should explore new ways of being 
as unlike the rest of the shops on the high 
street as possible. 
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Different economic models of transaction 
could be trialled, such as not pricing items 
(buyers pay what they think is a fair price in 
the context) and holding items such as toys 
or DVDs in a lending library arrangement 
for a short period, before selling them on. 
Shops could also be used much more 
effectively as windows onto the developing 
world. New ideas such as video links 
could be used to develop transformative 
experiences for the supporter-shopper.
A new wave of community shops?
Recent work with Oxfam on values and 
frames has uncovered evidence to suggest 
that not all shops are as potentially 
harmful to positive values as others. 
Across the Oxfam shops network, it is 
reported that there are certain shops that 
are highly profitable. But this profitability 
is not linked to their having the sharpest 
business practices. It is all about having the 
strongest links into their communities. 
Such shops can be characterised as 
serving a ‘community hub’ function, 
enabling other local networks to flourish. 
They also benefit from the self-direction  
and sense of agency of the volunteers  
who staff and manage them. The notion  
of a ‘community shop’ is in keeping  
with positive goals around community 
feeling and self-acceptance. It may in  
time come to represent a new frame for  
the charity shop.
5.8 Implications for DFID 
Play an active role in the debate
DFID potentially has a key role to play in 
enabling otherwise financially competitive 
NGOs to debate and plan together using 
values and frames perspectives. This 
convenor role would fit well with DFID’s 
position as the body most obviously  
driven by the need to foster public  
support for development. 
As a government department, DFID does 
not have to compete for public donations 
as NGOs do. Because of this it can almost 
be seen to be non-partisan. It is notable 
that some development academics identify 
DFID as having a central role to play in 
promoting development education (eg 
Baillie Smith 2008). 
There is some idealism in these 
suggestions, of course; DFID is a highly 
political entity, and an expression of both 
domestic and international political intent 
on behalf of the government. If in the 
current climate of budgetary restraint DFID 
cannot actively enable a process of cross-
sector collaboration, it may be that other 
neutral cross-sector organisations – most 
obviously BOND, but also the DEA or IBT – 
could facilitate the necessary debate across 
the sector. 
The notion of a ‘community 
shop’ is in keeping with 
positive goals around 
community feeling and 
self-acceptance.
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If DFID is not to lead, however, it should still 
play a central part in the process of society-
wide deliberation that we are advocating. 
By doing so it would recognise the pivotal 
role of government policy in determining 
how the public engage with global poverty. 
Excluding itself from this programme of 
dialogue and collaboration is not an option, 
if there is to be a step change in levels of 
public engagement with global poverty.
Build on the citizen segmentation model
A values-based engagement strategy that 
involves overlapping networks of NGOs 
and stakeholders from wider society will 
represent a challenge to current ways 
of measuring success. As DFID moves 
towards a convenor role, so success could 
be measured in terms of how successful 
DFID has been in bringing in a wide range 
of partners.
The ultimate success of public engagement 
should be measured across the sector 
as a whole, as well as among the public. 
We need to be asking what, if anything, 
is changing in people’s attitudes to global 
poverty and what they are doing about 
it. DFID’s citizen segmentation model, 
based on a basket of measures, should 
offer an excellent tool for advancing 
measurement among different groups 
of the public. In addition, as suggested 
above, methodologies should be agreed for 
tracking the uptake of positive frames in the 
media and other areas of public discourse 
– including people’s everyday talk.
From ‘development’ to ‘well-being’?
The coalition government has recently 
moved away from announcements 
based on financial inputs, placing greater 
emphasis on measurements based on 
impact. This move has some immediately 
positive implications from a frames 
perspective, as it holds the potential to 
remove a negative transaction frame from 
the discussion. However, care must still be 
taken around any remaining language that 
reinforces charity, aid or the moral order.
Ultimately the very name of the department, 
activating the ‘development’ frame, may 
be problematic (in so far as the public is 
aware of what DFID stands for). We would 
tentatively suggest that a Department for 
International Well-being would pursue a 
rather different policy agenda from the 
one that DFID pursues today, while a 
Department for International Freedom 
would probably be unrecognisable. Such 
a suggestion indicates the capacity of 
a values and frames approach to bring 
about transformational change – a scale of 
change that we would argue is needed to 
meet the scale of the global challenges we 
are facing.
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6.Next steps
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The endpoint of this review represents 
a jumping-off point for the next stage in 
what we hope will become a long-running 
programme of work. This report could 
usefully inform and support a process 
of dialogue and deliberation designed to 
change NGO practices, in order ultimately 
to move the UK public on in relation to 
global poverty. 
We have used values and frames as 
thinking devices to help examine the 
problems associated with low public 
engagement with global poverty (as 
exemplified in current NGO practices, and 
in the particular case of Make Poverty 
History). We have also seen that values 
and frames hold the potential to serve 
as useful creative tools for developing 
solutions to these problems. They are not 
perfect tools; there are weaknesses within 
them, and inconsistencies between them. 
Neither appears to hold all the answers. 
Yet together they open up possibilities for 
identifying deep changes in NGO practices 
that could help catalyse transformational 
change in public perceptions.
Importantly, the solutions we are seeking 
are not to be found in their natural state  
in the theories themselves. Instead 
solutions are likely to emerge by drawing  
on values and frames as critical tools in  
an informed debate. 
What we believe is needed is a deliberative 
process involving multiple ‘partners’ in 
and beyond the development sector. 
Such a process should be instrumental in 
itself in bringing about a positive shift in 
sector practices. This way of working is in 
keeping with the interdisciplinary approach 
of policy making for behaviour change. 
It also echoes well-evolved practices in 
development education that are based 
on setting up ‘safe spaces’ in which to 
deliberate and shape possible solutions.
There is inevitably some uncertainty over 
which specific positive values and frames 
to promote in the context of development, 
and we are planning research to refine and 
validate our recommendations. Rather 
than specifying positive values and frames 
ourselves at this stage, we believe that the 
values and frames required should emerge 
from a sector-wide debate. We all need 
to work through the challenges of public 
engagement together, using theoretical 
lenses to view them and suggest solutions. 
However, this does not amount to a vague 
set of recommendations, or the need for a 
talking shop. Rather, we would underline 
that the need for transformative change 
is urgent, and that doing nothing will only 
exacerbate the current static or downward 
trend in terms of public engagement.
If we do not act, then the public will remain 
stuck in the negative mindset bequeathed 
by Live Aid. NGOs will compete for 
supporters ever more aggressively, and 
campaigns and other public engagement 
activities will end up at the bottom of the 
barrel. In this scenario public support and 
donations will also ultimately decline and 
the public mandate for ringfenced aid 
spending could evaporate. If this happens, 
there will be little chance of the public 
moving beyond the aid frame to become 
aware of any other meaningful way of 
engaging in positive change. 
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There is already evidence that the next 
generation of potential supporters (aged 
14 to 20) have inherited a sense of fatalism 
and ‘development fatigue’ from the media 
and from the Live Aid generation (TW 
Research 2010). This shows that the 
negative cycle we are locked into is set to 
continue unless we do something to take 
urgent action. What is needed is systemic 
change – across the sector and up from 
the roots of the sector – to break that cycle. 
Values and frames represent tools with 
which we can work together to deliver  
that change.
In order to move towards change, we can 
identify further substantive steps from here, 
as follows:
i) First, we should set up overlapping 
working groups to debate values and 
frames approaches, define the problems 
of public engagement using those tools, 
and refine a set of positive values and 
deep and surface frames for driving public 
engagement. We suggest an open-ended 
network of overlapping groups, stretching 
out to cover different facets of society: 
NGOs, funding bodies, government, the 
media, academia and so on. Together 
these groups could develop a joint 
agenda for driving public engagement with 
global poverty, using values and frames 
approaches to define the problem and 
identify possible solutions. Within NGOs, 
we particularly look to campaigners, 
fundraisers and CRM managers, and 
communications staff to embrace this 
debate. Fundraisers in particular should 
share their data on recent fundraising 
performance and the costs of recruitment 
and retention; in this way, challenges to the 
current fundraising model can be better 
understood. The relationship between 
fundraising methods and levels of public 
engagement could then be explored more 
deeply. This is just one example of how we 
would like to embed a values and frames 
approach in sector-wide practices. We 
invite any interested readers to contact 
us and enrol their organisations in such a 
programme of work.
If we do not act, then the 
public will remain stuck 
in the negative mindset 
bequeathed by Live Aid.
115
Finding Frames
ii) We urge interested organisations to  
look at their own practices through the 
lenses of values and frames. New ways of 
working need to be evolved and tested, 
and specific organisations may be able to 
do this innovation work alone. For instance, 
Oxfam has begun the task of embedding 
values and frames into its long-term 
strategies, and different teams within the 
organisation are working out what a values 
and frames approach means for them. So 
far the senior management team, the UK 
campaigns team and the Oxfam shops 
team have all applied this thinking to their 
strategy development.
iii) For our part, we plan to engage in a 
programme of dissemination and debate 
around this paper. We will pursue a 
programme of public events, respond to 
invitations to speak wherever possible, 
and find opportunities to open up debate 
to a wider audience. As we do so, we 
shall refine our thinking, and extend 
our networks. We would welcome the 
opportunity to come into individual 
organisations and open up the themes of 
this paper to internal audiences.
iv) Finally, we propose undertaking further 
research, in parallel with a process of 
dialogue and deliberation. There is a 
need for primary research to explore the 
relationships between positive values 
and supportive development actions. 
We also intend to engage the public in 
deliberative research to refine positive 
surface frames, and to differentiate these 
across particular subgroups. In addition we 
wish to undertake formal discourse analysis 
of development-related communications 
materials and media stories, in order to 
track the extent to which positive frames 
are becoming embedded in daily life.
All these proposed actions involve 
collaboration. We will need involvement 
from across the whole sector to carry  
this area of work forward, and engagement 
with the whole of society to embed the 
positive values and frames we wish to 
foster in the next generation. Only through 
collaboration will we finally break out of the 
Live Aid Legacy, and deepen and widen 
the UK public’s engagement with tackling 
global poverty.
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1. Activist frame – A person engaged by 
the NGO is seen as one to be ‘activated’ 
around a particular issue or campaign.
2. Campaign frame – Actions are 
constrained to the roles and relationships  
of a traditional campaign (contrast with 
Social Movement frame below).
3. Change the System frame – Effort is 
directed toward shifting power structures 
and reforming institutions in order to 
alleviate poverty.
4. Charity frame – The NGO is seen as the 
mechanism for privileged people to share 
their wealth with the poor.
5. Common Good frame – The underlying 
value that motivates people to action is a 
sense of caring for others, with the goal of 
increasing collective well-being.
6. Corrupt Government (Africa) frame – 
Aid sent to Africa is like sending buckets 
of cash to corrupt officials, a pointless and 
wasteful action.
7. Empathy frame – Underlying value  
that motivates people to care for the  
poor, based on feelings of commonality  
and compassion.
8. Giving Aid frame – The primary  
activity for reducing poverty is a direct 
monetary transfer from wealthy nations  
to poor nations.
9. Help the Poor frame – A description of 
what NGOs do that emphasises a ‘hand 
outstretched’ to help those in need.
10. Human Kindness frame – A belief 
in the basic goodness of people and 
a strategy for evoking compassionate 
response to drive action.
11. Ignorant Public frame – A belief that 
the reason people don’t do more to help  
is that they are uninformed, which leads  
to a ‘public education’ strategy for 
increasing engagement.
12. Individual Concern frame – Emphasis 
on altering individual decisions through 
appeals to core concerns of individuals.
Annex A: Surface Frames for the UK 
Development sector
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13. International Solidarity frame – 
Sentiment that rich and poor are all part of 
the same community; what affects some  
of us impacts us all.
14. Invest in Entrepreneurs frame – 
Notion that the way to alleviate poverty is to 
treat the world’s poor as entrepreneurs who 
only need to be given loans (eg microcredit) 
so they can start their own businesses.
15. Market-Driven Fundraising frame – 
Treatment of NGO list members as  
potential customers to engage with 
marketing strategies.
16. Poverty frame – Defining the issue of 
concern as poverty, often to the exclusion 
of interrelated issues like trade, corruption, 
environment, governing philosophies, etc.
17. Social Justice frame – Drawing 
attention to race and economic class 
differences, with emphasis on justice  
and human dignity.
18. Social Movement frame – Telling story 
of NGO efforts in context of a movement to 
remove a moral failing or achieve a freedom 
or right for a disenfranchised community 
(contrast with Campaign frame above).
19. Social Responsibility frame – 
Underlying value that calls upon people to 
recognise their role in making society better.
20. Transaction frame – Emphasis placed 
on an exchange of goods or services 
between individuals, commonly in the 
context of an economic exchange.
21. Transformational Experience 
frame – Exposure to an emotionally 
powerful experience that results in deep 
introspection and a persistent change  
of character.
 
Annex A: Surface Frames for the UK 
Development sector
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